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ABSTRACT 
High-profile corporate scandals such as Enron and the recent banking crisis have focused 
attention on the corporate board of directors and the people who make up this focal group 
of corporate control. Legislation, corporate governance policies and best-practice 
frameworks have been introduced, which seek to engender boards that draw on diverse 
skill sets, talents and insights and create a well functioning and gender-balanced team to 
oversee shareholders’ interests and protect the firm as a going concern. Despite high-
profile attention and many initiatives aimed at increasing gender diversity on corporate 
boards, women remain a minority in the vast majority of board rooms across the world. 
The continued absence of women from this nexus of corporate power has as yet not been 
subjected to systematic study. This thesis seeks to address this under-studied area, and 
maps the share of corporate board seats held by women across a wide sample of countries 
and highlights national, industry and firm level variation in the prevalence of women 
corporate board directors. Against this descriptive background, a series of linked studies 
are undertaken that take a nested perspective and consider national, industry and firm level 
institutional influences in explaining the large and persistent variations in female corporate 
board directors. The thesis is informed by institutional theory and develops a conceptual 
framework which is multi-level in character and reflects these different levels of analysis. 
In light of this framework the thesis empirically tests the role played by national, industry 
and firm level factors in accounting for the observed differences in the share of board seats 
held by women. The results of the analysis suggest that institutional context plays an 
important role in shaping the gender-profile of the corporate board of directors. In 
particular, at the national level, countries with more liberal political views, lower cultural 
uncertainty avoidance and a larger share of educated women have more women board 
directors. There are also some indications that in countries where fewer people consider 
themselves religious and where national governance frameworks are better embedded 
boards have more female directors. However, these findings are somewhat sample 
dependent. At the industry level, a larger share of female employees in a given industry is 
associated with a larger share of female board directors. Finally, at the firm level the 
analysis found that where the average age of the boards’ directors was lower, women held 
more board seats. Further investigations at the firm level revealed that where firms 
employed a nomination committee, women held a larger share of the boards’ directorships. 
This effect was further augmented when women served on the nomination committee.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate boards of directors have for decades, if not centuries, been the preserve of men. 
Terms such as ‘old-boys network’, ‘jobs for the boys’ and ‘no place for a woman’ are 
colloquial manifestations of how the corporate board has been seen. Through school-ties, 
alumni networks and golf-course chatter, men have continued to appoint each other to 
board directorships and thus maintained the gender homogenous nature of corporate boards 
that still pervades much of the upper echelons of business to this day (Selby, 2000). Over 
the last two decades however, this has begun to change in some parts of the world. Major 
corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Enron brought into sharp focus the importance 
of board composition and demography. In particular, the obvious absence of women from 
the corporate board was noted, with some suggesting the gender homogenous nature of the 
board was a contributing factor to the boards’ failure in providing oversight (Erhardt et al., 
2003). At the time of Enron’s collapse, women held only 12.4% of board directorships on 
Fortune 500 companies in the US (Catalyst, 2001),  6.4% of board directorships in the UK, 
9.1% in Norway (Grosvold et al. 2007) and 9.8% of the directorships of the Canada Post’s 
top 500 companies (Catalyst, 2001a).  In the wake of these scandals, major corporate 
governance initiatives were instigated to address issues of board independence, 
composition, structure and demography. This included the commissioning of the Higgs 
Report (2003) and the Tyson Report (2003) in the UK; both reports were backed by the 
British government and specifically addressed gender homogeneity of UK corporate 
boards. The introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley act 2002 in the US and Norway’s decision 
to legislate for increased female board participation (Thomson, 2005; Ramirez, 2003; 
Terjesen and Singh, 2008) also came in the wake of corporate scandals. Corporate 
governance reforms particularly highlighted the positive influence women could have on 
board proceedings, bringing much needed talent, experience and perspective (Tyson, 2003; 
Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2001). Politicians and industry federations have also 
increasingly made strides to draw attention to the diversity and talent that firms implicitly 
forego by excluding qualified women from consideration (Kurylko, 2005; Moyer, 1998; 
Terjsen and Singh, 2008; Higgs, 2003). Particular industries such as the automotive 
industry in the US are increasingly emphasising the need for a broader range of skills and 
talent at board level (Kurylko, 2005), and some firms, such as the American cosmetics 
giant Avon Inc., have highlighted their commitment to diversity by systematically 
appointing boards that are far more demographically diverse than the boards associated 
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with Enron and WorldCom. In 2009, Avon has eleven board directors, five are women and 
three are from ethnic minorities.  However, despite increased awareness across countries, 
industries and firms of the importance of gender diverse boards, the share of board 
directorships in the UK, the US and Canada that is held by women has not radically 
changed since 2001.  In 2007 women held 13% of board directorships in Canada (Catalyst, 
2008), 14.8% in the US (Catalyst, 2007) and 11% in the UK (Sealy et al., 2007). Only in 
Norway did the percentage of women board directors rise sharply, in response to the 
affirmative action legislation which required 40% of all directorships to be held by women. 
In other countries the percentage of board of directors who are women is lower still; boards 
in Spain have only 3.2% female board directors (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008), and 
boards in Switzerland have only 0.31% women board directors (Ruigrok et al., 2006). 
 
This enduring variation in the prevalence of women on the corporate boards across 
countries raises a number of important questions: why is there such a large difference 
between the numbers of board seats women occupy in different countries? Is the rate of 
female board participation for a given country uniform within the country? Which 
industries are women attracted to? How does national context influence board 
demography? Does national culture matter? Are women discriminated against? Do women 
want corporate board directorships?  This thesis will attempt to answer some of these 
questions.  
 
The starting premise of this thesis was a desire to better understand the observed cross-
national variation in the share of board seats occupied by women. However, in the course 
of planning and executing the cross-national analysis designed to help explain these 
discrepancies, further layers of analytical complexity became apparent. As I will show, not 
only does the rate of female board participation vary on a country-by-country basis, but 
also across industries within countries. Reported national and industry averages often mask 
substantial within-industry, and within-country variation. From this observation, the 
research evolved to include multiple levels of analysis, taking into account not only 
country context, but also drivers of board diversity at the industry and firm level. The need 
to address country, industry and firm level factors, suggested a nested research approach 
was required, starting with the broadest context at the national level, before evaluating the 
contributions of industry and firm characteristics in accounting for the presence or absence 
of female corporate board directors.   
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Reflecting the research motivation to understand the role of national and industry context 
in explaining the demographic gender characteristics of corporate boards, this thesis is 
informed by institutional theory. Institutional theory builds on a rich disciplinary heritage 
covering sociology, political science and economics, making it particularly suitable to the 
analysis of complex, multi-level, phenomena such as the different rates of female board 
participation.   
 
This chapter has three distinct objectives: firstly, to explain why the prevalence of women 
on the corporate board of directors is an important topic of research with a substantial 
intellectual and practical heritage; secondly, to outline the aims, objectives and structure of 
this thesis; finally, to articulate what research contributions the thesis makes. The next 
section establishes the rationale for the research.  
 
1.1 The importance of women on the board 
The sustained dearth of women on the corporate board of directors has generated 
widespread scholarly interest (Adams and Flynn, 2005; Singh and Vinnicombe 2004, 
Arfken et al., 2004; Sheridan and Milgate, 2003, 2005; Smith et al., 2006; Burke and 
Mattis, 2000; Thomson, 2005; Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2001; Hillman and 
Cannella, 2002, 2007). This growing body of conceptual and empirical work has 
cumulatively articulated a strong case attesting to the importance of female board directors 
and what opportunities firms that fail to consider female board candidates may miss. In 
particular, both a strong normative and a commercial case have been established in favour 
of increasing the role of women on the board. 
 
The business case for increasing the number of female board directors rests on the finding 
that women bring much needed talent and a number of strategic and financial benefits to 
the firms on whose boards they serve. Research shows that women directors make a 
sustained and impactful contribution to corporate strategy. In particular, their contributions 
are noted in revenue generation and marketing, improved financial performance, and talent 
retention and development (Wolfman, 2007; Kanner, 2004; Daily and Dalton, 2003; 
Hillman et al., 1998; Adler, 2001; Catalyst, 2007a; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003). 
For companies producing products for individual consumption, female corporate board 
directors represent a key resource. Research suggests women play a role in over 80% of all 
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consumer purchase decisions made in the US, and are responsible for $3.7 trillion 
expenditure on consumer products and services (Wolfman, 2007; Kanner, 2004). In this 
regard, female corporate board directors are pivotal in ensuring corporate product 
placement and promotion strategies appeal to female consumers. Female corporate board 
directors are not only well qualified to determine how and where products are sold, they 
have also shown an aptitude for spotting profitable product and marketing opportunities 
aimed specifically at the female consumer (Fryxell and Lerner, 1989; Burke and Mattis, 
2000). For example, the sports apparel company Nike made the decision to introduce a 
specific product range aimed at women after a female director suggested this was an 
untapped market (Singh et al., 2001). 
 
A related strategic consideration of why women have a role to play on the corporate board 
relates to talent retention and development. Business relies on the strength of its human 
capital to succeed, and building a strong executive pipeline of qualified women ready to 
take on responsibility at board level is crucial if firms want to continue the trend of positive 
outcomes associated with female board directors. Research shows there to be a direct link 
between the percentage of board seats held by women and the number of women in key 
senior executive positions (Daily and Dalton, 2003). Female board directors have an 
important role to play as a signalling resource to ambitious younger women who see that it 
is possible to reach the upper echelons of business as a woman (Bernardi et al., 2006; 
Thomson, 2005).  Currently serving female board directors can also act as mentors to 
women knocking on the boardroom door and enable the next generation to acquire the 
requisite network of contacts for attaining board directorships. Consequently, the long-term 
future of the next generation of qualified female board directors is closely linked with the 
presence of female board directors today. This gives added impetus for firms to consider 
the current gender composition of their board, as it will affect the future development of 
their strategic competencies.  
 
The evidence suggests women also have a positive influence on firm performance 
(Hillman et al., 1998; Adler, 2001; Catalyst, 2007; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003). 
Hillman et al. (1998) found that shareholders benefited from increased board diversity, 
companies with more women and minorities on their boards showed higher shareholder 
returns than those with fewer. Similarly Adler (2001) identified a strong positive 
correlation between firm profitability and the number of women occupying senior 
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executive positions of Fortune 500 companies. The influential women’s advocacy group 
Catalyst (2007a) revealed the results of their two-year study in 2007 which showed that on 
average, where women held a larger proportion of the available board seats of Fortune 500 
companies, shareholders saw a return on equity 35.1% higher than those with the lowest 
level of female board directors. These findings were consistent with previous research by 
Erhardt et al. (2003) and Carter et al. (2001) which also showed the positive influence 
female board directors had on firm financial performance. 
 
Although scholarly research has developed a robust argument in favour of increased 
gender heterogeneity, the board has been subjected to two dichotomous views at an 
operational level: its perceived enhanced independence on the one hand (van der Walt and 
Ingley, 2003; Selby, 2000; Mattis, 2000), versus increased conflict and delayed decision-
making on the other (Erhardt et al., 2003; Knight et al., 1999; Hambrick et al., 1996). 
Board performance will be affected by the combined intellectual capital available, and the 
experiences, competencies and views of its members (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). The 
broader the talent pool from which board members has been picked, the more capable the 
board should be. The contrasting view is that diversity produces some practical problems 
in terms of board dynamics. With a more diverse range of views and opinions, consensus 
may be harder to achieve, which in turn may delay decision-making and devolve personal 
responsibility (Erhardt et al., 2003; Knight et al., 1999; Hambrick et al., 1996). On balance, 
the argument suggests that that board diversity adds more to a company than it takes away; 
and increases rather than decreases the board’s independence. Selby (2000) makes this 
point when noting that, “directors with diverse skills, experiences and backgrounds are 
more likely to raise questions that add to, rather than simply echo, the voice of 
management” (p 239). 
 
In addition to arguments that emphasise the business case for increased female 
participation at board level, an important strand of the literature makes the normative case 
for greater board diversity, arguing that it is unethical for groups of people to be denied 
access to societal power on the basis of their gender, race, religion or any other individual 
traits unrelated to their ability. The literature argues that society would benefit and 
companies would better reflect their customers and stakeholders by increasing the gender 
diversity on their boards, stating that business should view diversity as a positive attribute 
in its own right rather than a matter of compliance and political correctness (Carver, 2002; 
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Garratt, 1997; Keasey et al., 1997). In particular, the stakeholder argument has generated 
an important strand of literature attesting to the importance of women corporate board 
directors. Research has found that women corporate board directors are attuned to the role 
of the board as stakeholders and their board participation has been found to increase 
corporate philanthropy in the form of charitable giving (Wang and Coffey, 1992; Williams 
2003). A further line of argument suggests that boards should make diversity a central 
issue on the board’s agenda, and explicitly recognise the normative implications of having 
excessively homogenous boards (Mattis, 2000). 
  
Despite the well documented benefits associated with an increase in the proportion of 
board seats held by women and the emphasis placed on board independence and diversity 
in national corporate governance codes and legislative frameworks, the world’s board 
room remains largely male. As chapter 5 will show, when considering the proportion of 
women board directors at the aggregate national level, no country in the world today has 
gender parity or a female majority in their corporate board ranks. 
 
To better understand why countries, industries and firms show such large variation in the 
proportion of board seats held by women and to highlight levers that business and 
governments can pull to improve the board’s gender heterogeneity, this thesis will 
investigate the role played by national, industry and firm level institutional determinants in 
helping or hindering women’s chances of acquiring corporate board seats.  
 
1.2 Research rationale 
Research to date has largely omitted considering the board’s wider institutional context, be 
that at the national, industry or firm level, as an influence on board composition. National 
institutions such as a country’s regulatory environment, the influence of national culture 
and the role played by such factors as religion and education systems have not been 
extensively scrutinised in the literature on female corporate board participation, despite 
widespread recognition in the broader managerial and corporate governance literature that 
institutional context is important for a range of business outcomes (Parboteeah et al., 2008, 
2003, Cullen et al., 2004; Spencer and Gomez, 2004; Munir 2002). 
 
At the industry level, scholars have successfully established that industry does play a role 
in determining the pattern of female board participation (Elgart, 1983; Hillman et al., 2007; 
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Brammer et al., 2007). However, little is known about which particular industry drivers 
affect the gender demography of corporate boards. 
 
Regarding firm level influences on women corporate board directors, studies rooted in 
social psychology have illuminated important patterns of inter-personal board dynamics 
(Westphal 1999; Westphal et al., 2001; Westphal and Stern, 2007) and how these influence 
board composition. However, no study has investigated the impact of the nomination 
committee on redressing the gender balance in the board room. Nomination committees 
represent a corporate governance intervention specifically designed to make the process of 
board appointments more transparent and meritocratic by intervening in the personal 
relationships that have helped shape the gendered face of boards to date, but little is 
understood about the role of the nomination committee in increasing the share of board 
directorships held by women.  
 
By placing the board and the character of the board’s gender composition in the context of 
its broader institutional environment, this research seeks to establish which country, 
industry and firm level institutions enable and prevent women from attaining corporate 
board directorships.  
 
Having outlined the research rationale for the thesis, the next section will address the 
second objective, and outline the aims, objectives and structure of this thesis. 
 
1.3 Aims, objectives and structure of thesis 
The thesis has five objectives: 
 
I. To review comprehensively extant conceptual and empirical literature on the 
prevalence of women on the board, to identify emerging themes and gaps in the knowledge 
regarding female board participation, and to place this literature within the broader context 
of research on boards of directors. 
 
II.  To develop a conceptual framework, which is informed by theoretical gaps and 
emerging themes in the literature, that addresses institutional influences on women’s 
prevalence on corporate boards, and which encompass influences at the macro (country), 
meso (industry) and micro (firm) levels. 
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III. To provide a clear and comprehensive insight into the international variation in the 
prevalence of women on corporate boards across countries and industries. 
 
IV. To evaluate empirically the relevance of national, industry and firm level 
institutional factors in accounting for the prevalence of women on corporate boards. 
 
V. To assess implications of empirical findings for theory and managerial practice. 
 
Structurally, this thesis is divided into nine chapters, which largely follow the order of the 
objectives outlined above. This chapter has provided a flavour of the content and structure 
of the thesis, and is followed by a literature review articulated in chapter 2. This literature 
review comprehensively assesses extant scholarly research on women on the corporate 
board, and places this research in the wider context of research on boards of directors. 
 
Chapter 3 develops the core theoretical contribution of the thesis and articulates a multi-
level framework informed by institutional theory which accounts for national, industry and 
firm level influences on the prevalence of women on the board.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology and research strategy adopted for this PhD. The 
chapter discusses the nature of comparative and multi-level research, but does not detail 
the particular statistical methods employed in the empirical chapters. Following Bowen 
(2000), methodological detail of this kind will appear alongside each individual study.  
 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the proportion of board seats occupied by women 
across countries and industries. The chapter establishes differences between, but also 
within countries, and drills down to firm-level variation in board gender homogeneity. This 
chapter forms the backdrop to the following three empirical chapters. 
 
Chapter 6 is an empirical chapter which evaluates the importance of national institutional 
context in accounting for the prevalence of women on the board in a multi-national 
context. In particular, the chapter focuses on the regulative, normative and cultural 
elements of the broader national environment.  
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Chapter 7 is an empirical multi-level analysis that extends the empirical research from 
chapter 6 to encompass the relative role played by national, industry and firm level 
institutional characteristics in accounting for the prevalence of women on the board.  
 
Chapter 8 completes the nested research perspective and provides a contrasting view to 
chapter 7 by analysing whether nomination committees increase the share of female board 
directors, and whether the particular gender composition of the nomination committee 
itself influence subsequent appointments of women board directors. The study adopts a 
matched-pairs analysis to determine if the nomination committee is a useful intervention 
for increasing the share of corporate board directorships held by women.  
 
Chapter 9 takes a broad view of the findings from chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, drawing together 
the results and insights from these distinct examinations and discusses the findings, and 
suggests implications for theory and management practice. The chapter also evaluates 
limitations of the research, suggests future lines of enquiry and concludes the thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1 Nested structure of the thesis 
 
 
1.4 Research contributions 
This thesis makes four particular contributions. Firstly, as far as it has been possible to 
ascertain, this is the first large-scale systematic cross-national and cross-industry study of 
the prevalence of women board directors.  Secondly, this thesis will analyse the proportion 
of board seats held by women in a nested perspective. Whereas previous research has 
considered either higher level influences such as national or industry characteristics as 
explanatory variables for women’s presence or absence on the board, this research will 
adopt a nested approach as reflected in figure 1.1 and, through a series of related studies, 
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evaluate the role played by national, industry and firm level institutional characteristics in 
influencing boards’ gender demography and in doing so shed light on several research 
questions that have so far not been explored. Thirdly, institutional theory informs the 
analysis in this thesis. Previous research on female corporate board directors has largely 
been conceptualised in terms of board level theories. By widening the theoretical lens and 
applying institutional theory, this thesis outlines the wider context within which women 
acquire board seats, specifically considering the role of regulative, normative and cultural 
factors. Finally, at the firm level this thesis investigates the role played by the nomination 
committee in furthering women’s attempts to enter the board room. No other study has so 
far looked specifically at the role played by the use and composition of the nomination 
committee for increasing the share of board positions held by women, despite its explicit 
intention to make the board recruitment process less opaque.    
  
1.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has articulated the case for why the prevalence of women on the corporate 
board of directors is an important topic of research, outlined the aims, objectives and 
structure of this thesis, and stated the research contributions this thesis seeks to make. The 
next chapter provides a comprehensive literature review of extant scholarly research into 
women corporate board directors. This review places this particular body of research in the 
context of board literature more broadly, and from this develops an agenda for future 
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2.  Literature Review 
This chapter sets out a detailed analysis of the extant academic literature on women 
corporate board directors and highlights prominent conceptual and empirical themes within 
this body of research. In addition to a review of research into women on the corporate 
board of directors, the chapter will place this particular segment of board research in the 
wider context of empirical and conceptual research concerned with the role, structure, 
process and composition of corporate boards, and the different forms of governance 
systems that boards operate in. This chapter will review current research frontiers in gender 
diversity on the board and from this articulate a research agenda which would extend these 
frontiers in productive directions.  
 
This chapter has three objectives: firstly to assess dominant themes in empirical and 
conceptual research concerned with boards of directors; secondly to critically review the 
literature on women on the board; thirdly, to highlight research opportunities yet to be 
explored within this body of research.  
 
2.1 Research concerning boards of directors 
The literature concerned with women on corporate boards sits within a wider body of 
research that addresses a broad range of aspects relating to the corporate board of directors. 
In particular, it owes much to the conceptual discussions of the role and purposes of boards 
of directors and is informed by several significant themes that emerge from the empirical 
literature on corporate boards. This section reviews the conceptual and empirical literature 
on boards of directors in order to provide a broad context for the subsequent discussion of 
the literature on female board directors.  
 
2.1.1 Conceptual perspectives on boards of directors 
The dominant perspective on the role and importance of corporate boards of directors 
stems from the principal-agent paradigm of financial economics (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Lynall et al., 2003, Daily et al., 2003). The principal-agent model, or agency theory, 
owes much to Berle and Means’s (1932) seminal work which highlighted the division 
between firm ownership and operational control that had arisen in the modern corporate 
form, and which brought benefits through the employment of specialised management with 
relevant knowledge and skills (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, Berle and Means also 
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noted the potential for conflicts of interest that arose out of dispersed share ownership and 
the growth of specialised professional management. Formally, the principal-agent model 
notes that the owners of companies, the shareholders or ‘principals’, are often separate 
from the managers of the company, the ‘agents’, and that because of this separation the 
agents often have an informational advantage over principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Under agency theory, managers are assumed to act in their own interests and these interests 
do not necessarily accord with those of the principals. Self-serving managers are expected 
to maximise their personal utility before that of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and, in that sense, the ‘model of man’ embodied in the principal-agent model sees 
management acting as “some form of homo-economicus…individualistic, opportunistic 
and self-serving” (Davis et al., 1997, p 20). The fact that in this particular perspective 
management’s utility primarily derives from pecuniary and status-related rewards rather 
than an intrinsic satisfaction related to the successful performance of the company can lead 
to managerial decisions that are sub-optimal from the perspective of principals. 
Management may engage in acquisitive ‘empire-building’ activities, risk-reducing 
corporate diversification, and prestige-generating corporate philanthropy (Ong and Lee, 
2001; Denis and McConnell, 2003), which may, or may not, result in better shareholder 
value.  
 
From an agency theory stance the board of directors is designed to perform a variety of 
functions that are intended to minimise the costs associated with the separation of 
ownership and control (Daily et al., 2003; Denis and McConnell, 2003). In particular, the 
principal-agent model implies that boards of directors should play a central role in 
reducing the degree of informational asymmetry between principals and agents by carrying 
out an effective monitoring and reporting role. This recognition suggests that it is 
important that the board of directors is, at least to some degree, independent of operational 
management in order for this monitoring function to be appropriately carried out (Davis et 
al., 1997). This view has stimulated significant discussion of the importance of the 
presence of outside or non-executive directors and the separation of the board 
chairperson’s role from operational matters in creating a board that is sufficiently 
independent to effectively fulfil its monitoring responsibilities (Davis et al., 1997; Boyd, 
1995; Green, 2004).  Outside board directors are seen to provide a voice in the board room 
that is independent of executive management. Outside directors are expected to take a 
reasoned view of executive management’s proposals, and at all times assess the firm’s 
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strategy in light of what will bring the most benefits to the shareholders. In so doing 
outside directors exert pressure on executive management not to act out of personal utility-
maximising motives. Outside board directors are believed to help neutralise the agency 
problem, and bring alignment between the management and the shareholders’ interests, 
and consequently improve financial performance (Daily et al., 2003; Peng, 2004). 
Similarly, the separation of the role of the CEO and the Chairman of the Board has been 
held to enhance board independence. Separating the role of the CEO and the Chairman 
diminishes the CEO’s power base and puts in place a more independent scrutiny of 
executive management’s suggestions, which from an agency perspective would suggest 
stronger, more robust decision-making at board level and enhanced financial performance 
(Boyd, 1995; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).  
 
A second important role of boards of directors relates to aligning the incentives of the 
agents with those of the principals such that the former are inclined to act in the interests of 
the latter.  Central to creating this alignment of incentives between managers and owners is 
the design and implementation of appropriate remuneration packages (Daily et al., 2003; 
Conyon, 2006). In particular, systems designed to align the interests of principal and agent 
typically include schemes whereby senior managers are awarded shares, or options to buy 
shares, at reduced rates (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or contractual links between the level 
of executive compensation and bonuses to the levels of returns made to shareholders (Buck 
et al., 2003). An alternative view of CEO remuneration is reflected in Bebchuk et al. 
(2002). Here, the authors propose that rather than viewing a pay structure that is linked to 
performance as a way to combat agency problems, such a pay structure is in fact part of the 
principal-agent problem. Agents are able to influence the board and the process which 
determines their compensation, and in doing so are able to extract financial rewards that 
are not necessarily in the interest of the shareholders, but rather “might lead to the use of 
inefficient pay structures and produce suboptimal incentives” (Bebchuk, et al., 2002, p 
846) 
 
Critiques of the principal-agent model and of interpretations of the board as a vehicle to 
minimise agency costs argue that agency theory is too simplistic (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Donaldson, 1990; Rousseau, 1998; Lubatkin et al., 2005). For example, agency 
theory assumes all owners share the common objective of maximising shareholder returns 
whether they are family members, hedge funds or pension funds. Such a reductionist 
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perspective underplays the motives of other stakeholders such as employees (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). Donaldson (1990) criticised agency as insufficiently nuanced, a view 
echoed by Lubatkin et al. (2005), who proposed that the agency model of man might be 
relevant in the US and reflect managerial behaviour in this particular national institutional 
context. Other countries however, might emphasise other values, which conflict with the 
utility-maximising, self-serving manager inherent in the traditional agency model.  
 
In response to these critiques of the principal-agent paradigm, a variety of alternative 
conceptual perspectives on corporate boards has emerged. In particular, stewardship theory 
is often juxtaposed and contrasted with agency theory (Ong and Lee, 2001; Roberts et al., 
2005). The key distinction between the agency and stewardship perspectives centres on the 
“model of man” embodied in their behavioural assumptions (Davis et al., 1997; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Whereas agency theory 
assumes that managers are self-serving, utility-maximising and opportunistic 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), the stewardship “model of man” is one who is 
collectivist, cooperative and maximises utility by meeting the organisation’s and 
shareholders’ objectives (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997). Within 
stewardship theory pecuniary incentives are less important, whilst intrinsic satisfaction is 
more so (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Since managers want to perform well in running the 
organisation, the interests of managers and owners are inherently less divergent (Bruce et 
al., 2005). Furthermore, because of the absence of divergent objectives, there is no need to 
separate the role of the chief executive from that of the chairman of the board (Ong and 
Lee, 2001). As Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue, “stewardship theory focuses not on 
motivation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), but rather facilitative, empowering 
structures, and holds that fusion of the incumbency of the roles of chair and CEO will 
enhance effectiveness and produce, as a result, superior returns to shareholders than 
separation of the roles of chair and CEO” (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p 52). Under 
stewardship theory, the board’s role is one of empowering and collaborating with 
management (Ong and Lee, 2001; Roberts et al., 2005). The board is seen as being 
fundamentally facilitative and exists to collaborate with operational managers in taking 
actions that are in the best interest of the company (Huse, 2005a). In particular, boards are 
concerned with “whether or not the organisational structure helps the executive to 
formulate and implement plans for high corporate performance. Structures will be 
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facilitative of this goal to the extent that they provide clear, consistent role expectations 
and authorise and empower senior management” (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p 51-2).  
 
A third significant theory of the role of boards of directors, resource dependence theory, 
asserts that firms try to exert control over their external environment, and sees the 
corporate board as an important lever is doing so (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). The idea 
that a firm and its environment, or context, are interdependent was established by Selznick 
(1949) but came to the fore in the 1960s (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Buckley, 1967; Thompson, 
1967). Pfeffer (1972) considered the role and structure of the board and concluded that 
“board size and composition are not random or independent factors, but are, rather, rational 
organizational responses to the conditions of the external environment” (Pfeffer, 1972, p 
226).   In other words, resource dependence theory focuses on how board directors can 
build bridges with the firm’s external environment. It views the board as “an important 
boundary spanner that makes timely information available to executives” (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989, p 297). The resource dependent view of the firm’s board argues that the 
intrinsic value of the board lies in its ability to connect the firm with external resources 
(Daily et al. 2003; Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
By utilising their network of business contacts, the board reduces strategic, competitive 
and environmental uncertainty and manages extrinsic dependencies (Huse, 2005a). “The 
primary role of boards…is to serve as resource providers” (Lynall et al., 2003, p 418). As 
the unit of analysis under the resource based theory has moved from the board to the 
company as a whole, where the board is but one tool at the firm’s disposal, there is no 
explicit ‘model of man’ associated with the resource dependent theory. The directors’ link 
with external resources should provide firms with a better functioning organisation, 
improved performance and odds of survival (Daily et al., 2003). The degree to which 
directors’ resources are essential to the firm’s performance may depend on exogenous 
circumstances such as where the firm is in the corporate life cycle and how well it is 
performing financially (Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer, 1972).  
 
The fourth theory to be applied to corporate boards is institutional theory. Institutional 
theory is a multifaceted conceptualisation, encompassing influences from economics, 
political science and sociology, which will be more fully explored in the next chapter. In 
this chapter, institutional theory will only be considered as far as it is reflected in research 
on corporate boards of directors. The strand of institutional theory most often reflected in 
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research on corporate boards is the notion of legitimacy and isomorphism (Parker et al., 
2007; Peng, 2004; Li and Harrison, 2008; Young et al., 2000; Myllys, 1999; Chizema, 
2008). These elements of institutional theory were first fully articulated by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983). Isomorphism refers to the process by which firms adapt to their wider 
institutional context by adopting embedded practices and in doing so gain legitimacy and 
enhance their prospects of survival. Kondra and Hinings (1998) discussed executive 
turnover in the context of low firm performance. They posited that isomorphic industry 
pressures played a decisive role in executive job security. If individual firm performance 
was consonant with industry average, boards were inclined to keep the sitting CEO. 
However if firm performance fell compared with industry performance, the board would 
likely call for a change in management, even if performance was above the market 
average. This, they argued suggested boards felt isomorphic pressures to conform to 
industry standards for successful survival and growth. Considering firms’ likelihood of 
surviving the process of going public, Certo (2003) suggested that the board’s perceived 
cumulative prestige in terms of human and social capital was likely to impact on investor 
interest and enthusiasm for investing. In particular Certo suggested that “board prestige 
enhances organizational legitimacy” (p 435). Following a similar logic, Lynall et al. (2003) 
considered the role and composition of the corporate board for firms at the early stage in 
the firm’s life cycle and suggested that once firms were large enough to consider an initial 
public offering (IPO), the cumulative prestige of the board, as reflected in profile, network 
and background of its board directors, acted as a signal of legitimacy to the market, 
attracting a higher initial offer price.  
 
At first glance, resource dependence theory and institutional theory may appear similar. 
Both theories stress the wider context within which firms operate and how boards, and by 
extension firms, respond to their environment. Oliver (1997) in her comparative analysis of 
the two theories draws particular attention to two distinct areas where resource dependence 
and institutional theory differ: different sources of external power and different processes 
linking the firm with its environment. From a resource dependence perspective, Oliver 
argues the emphasis is on control of resources, which results in active exchange and 
interaction with the wider firm environment to reduce uncertainty. Institutional theory on 
the other hand suggests power is in the hands of those who influence the norms, values and 
beliefs which firms adapt through the process of isomorphism to acquire legitimacy. Her 
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second observation is that rather than emphasising uncertainty reduction, institutional 
theory is concerned with organizational persistence.  
 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, 1969) have been widely credited with conceptualising the last 
major theory applied to board research that will be considered here; contingency theory. 
Contingency theory is based on the logic of instrumental utility (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Donaldson, 2000; Hambrick and Cannella, 2004), and is predominantly a theory of 
organisational structure, rather than an explicit board level theory. However, scholars have 
applied contingency theory to the corporate board of directors and corporate governance 
structures more widely (Aguilera et al., 2008; Huse, 2005a; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). 
The central tenet of contingency theory rests on the premise that managers can observe and 
anticipate changes in the structural environment within which the firm operates and adjust 
its internal structures and strategies so as better to match the prevailing environmental 
conditions. Firms adapt according to their own particular circumstances (Singh et al., 1986; 
Fligstein and Feeland, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008, Gupta et al., 1994). Thus, 
“organizational structures have to be matched to the contextual demands of size, 
environment and technology” (Patti, 2004, p 139). The contingency view of the board 
refers to its composition in terms of the characteristics and competencies inherent in the 
group of directors: “the balancing of perspectives from various actors may define board 
role expectations and thus also board composition” (Huse, 2005a, p 68). The context 
within which the firm operates and the actors involved, such as managers, board, 
shareholders and employees, will influence what constitutes the most appropriate board 
structure and composition at any one time.  The contingencies faced by the firm will to an 
extent also dictate what the board’s role is (Heracleous, 2001).  
 
Contingency theory differs from institutional theory and the resource dependence theory. 
Institutional theory as applied to management and control mechanisms has been considered 
in terms of isomorphism, which involves adopting prevailing practices to gain legitimacy, 
not necessarily adopting the optimal organisational model as is the case in contingency 
theory. Similarly, in a resource dependence perspective, the board’s role is one of 
boundary-spanning, to minimise risk and uncertainty. As contingency theory is concerned 
with matching the firm’s operational structures to its environment to enhance its longevity, 
an element of risk reduction is implied; however, whereas resource dependence theory is 
predominantly focused on risk and uncertainty reduction, contingency theory goes further 
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and takes account of structural variations in the firm’s environment, in particular firm and 
market size, technology and environmental demands. In that sense, the contingency 
perspective suggests that while there is no one optimal board design, not all designs are 
equally suited to a particular context, but rather the board’s composition will reflect the 
board’s, and by extension the firm’s, corporate governance needs (Corbetta and Salvato, 
2004).  
 
In light of the multiplicity of board theories that exists, there is an argument for adopting a 
multi-theoretical approach to board management (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Consistent with 
this, Daily et al. (2003) argue that “a multi-theoretical approach to corporate governance is 
essential for recognizing the many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably 
enhance organizational functioning” (Daily et al., 2003, p 372) and Huse (2005a) 
concludes that “…board roles and structures must be tailored to balance the contingencies 
facing each corporation. There is not one best way in corporate governance” (Huse, 2005a, 
p 75). 
 
Conceptual board literature to date has produced a nuanced, multifaceted view of the role 
and function of the corporate board of directors. Dominant board theories have offered 
differing justifications for the board’s role and for CEO behaviour. What is evident from 
this body of literature is that conceptual board theory has largely developed along the 
agency, stewardship and resource dependence perspective, with some focusing on board 
theories that have so far taken a more auxiliary role in board literature: contingency theory 
and institutional theory. However, institutional theory in particular seems to offer an 
attractive alternative lens through which boards can usefully be viewed. Institutional theory 
is a rich and accommodating theory, extending far beyond DiMaggio and Powell (1983)’s 
theory of isomorphism (Scott, 1995). In particular, institutional theory, as drawn from 
political science and economics, emphasises enduring national structures (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), that shape the firm’s environment, which the firm, and by extension, the 
board, responds to. Institutional theory, therefore, offers a broad theoretical lens that can 
help understand how board composition is shaped by institutional context. Institutional 
theory will be comprehensively reviewed in chapter 3, as it forms the basis for the 
proposed conceptual framework for the study of the prevalence of women on the board.  
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This section has reviewed the dominant themes in the conceptual theory of women on the 
board; the next section looks at the empirical literature that tested some of the implications 
of these frameworks.    
 
2.1.2 Empirical research on boards 
In this section, empirical literature concerning boards of directors is evaluated. This is a 
large and varied literature encompassing contributions from a wide range of disciplinary 
backgrounds. Some scholars have focused on exploring links between various facets of 
board demography and structure and firm financial performance (Baysinger et al., 1991; 
Dalton et al., 1999; Rhoades et al., 2001). Other researchers have sought to identify 
relationships between board characteristics and executive remuneration (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2006; Mangel and Singh, 1993), and others again the link between board attributes 
and firm level outcomes such as corporate failure and ‘scapegoating’ (Boeker, 1992) and 
the use of poison pills (Davis, 1991). Notwithstanding this variety in research pursuits, 
empirical research on corporate boards is dominated by two major strands of research. The 
first considers the link between aspects of board design, composition, structure and process 
and firm financial performance and strategic implications, whilst the second focuses on 
describing and explaining the prevalence of aspects of board design and structure with an 
emphasis on variation in these across countries (Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 1996; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Ong and Lee, 2001; Denis and McConnell, 2003). Each of these 
literatures will be discussed in turn.  
 
Boards and financial performance 
The literature on the relationship between corporate boards and the financial performance 
of firms has produced largely inconclusive results with no strong evidence of statistically 
or economically significant relationships between board design, structure, demography, 
process and financial performance (Dalton et al., 1998). Informed by the principal-agent 
paradigm, the most prevalent empirical work considers the links between board 
composition, defined as the proportion of outside or independent directors, and whether the 
chairman of the board of directors is also the chief executive, and firm financial 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998). Johnson et al. (1996) highlight the distinction that 
prevails in much academic literature between inside and outside directors. Inside directors 
are officers of the firm, employed by the firm, who work for the firm on a day-to-day basis. 
Outside directors do not work for the firm, are not employed by the firm on a day-to-day 
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basis and are hired to contribute their expertise at board level. Because of this, and the fact 
that board decisions often involve a majority vote, a greater proportion of outside directors 
is expected to bring more objectivity and a dispassionate view of the decisions before them 
(Johnson et al., 1996). Similarly, Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that outside directors must 
constitute a sufficient critical mass so as to be able to challenge the CEO effectively.  
 
The results of empirical studies into a link between director independence and firm 
financial performance have been mixed. Vance (1964), Cochrane et al. (1985) and Kesner 
(1987) found a positive relationship between firm performance indicators and the 
proportion of inside directors. Contrastingly, Moiz (1988) and Mallett and Fowler (1992) 
and Hermalin and Weisbach, (1991) did not discover any such significant relationship. Hill 
and Snell (1988), Schellenger et al. (1989) and Pearce and Zahra (1992) found a positive 
relationship between performance and the number of outside directors, whilst Combs et al. 
(2007) concluded performance was dependent on the relative power of the CEO and the 
board. Perhaps the most robust results available to date are found in Dalton et al.’s (1998) 
meta-analysis of the relationship between financial performance and board composition. 
They analysed the results of 54 previous studies of the relationship cumulatively involving 
159 samples and over 40,000 observations and concluded that there is “no evidence of a 
substantive relationship” (Dalton et al., 1998, p 282). 
 
In a similar vein, research has focused on the relative merits of a separation of the CEO 
from the role as chairman of the board with similarly mixed results (Zahra and Pearce 
1989; Dalton et al., 1998). Again, following from the principal-agent view, the separation 
of the roles of chief executive from board chairman is expected to have a positive influence 
on board performance as it disaggregates the power of the CEO from that of the Chairman 
of the Board (ibid.). Berg and Smith (1978) investigated duality of board leadership with 
four performance measures and found that combining the role of CEO and Chairman only 
lead to negative performance on one of the four measures, total return to investors. Boyd 
(1995) found that duality of leadership produced beneficial results in some cases and not in 
others. He asserted that his findings did not support the corporate governance trend of 
splitting the CEO and chairman of the board role. Changanti et al. (1985) established that 
combining the role of board chairman and CEO was not associated with firm bankruptcy, 
whilst Rechner and Dalton (1989) found that splitting of the role was not linked to 
improved financial performance. In a subsequent study Rechner and Dalton (1991) did find 
  29 
evidence that firms with independent boards outperformed those where the CEO also held 
the role of Chairman of the Board. However, Dalton et al. (1998) established in their meta-
analysis that there was no relationship between board leadership and financial 
performance.  
 
Beyond these major bodies of research, smaller groups of studies have sought to examine 
whether a number of other attributes of boards influence firm financial performance. Most 
notably, research has focused on the possible importance of board size, a board’s 
committee structures, and board processes, with similarly mixed results. Concerning the 
relationship between board size and financial performance, the emphasis of the literature is 
on positive or inconclusive (Certo et al., 2006). Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) found 
larger boards were better able to process information and consequently were better able to 
apply corrective judgement when discovering omissions or errors. Coles et al. (2008) show 
that more complex firms, such as highly diversified firms could benefit from bigger 
boards. Similarly, Carpenter et al. (2001) found a positive relationship between top team 
size and accounting and market returns, whilst Simons et al. (1999) established a positive 
relationship between size and changes in profitability. Other studies, however, found no 
relationship between board size and firm performance (Iaquinto and Fredrickson, 1997; 
Hambrick et al., 1996).  
 
The growing literature that focuses on the impact of various aspects of heterogeneity (in 
terms of age, professional and educational background, gender and ethnicity) in corporate 
boards on financial performance is also characterised by diverse results but with an 
emphasis on positive relationships. Arguably, heterogeneous boards offer pluralities of 
views, access to a wider range of external resources, and are less likely to engage in 
groupthink than more homogeneous boards and, in consequence, are likely to make better 
decisions (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Williams and O’Reilly, 
1993; Pelled et al., 1999). Regarding empirical evidence, Barsade et al. (2000) reported a 
positive relationship between functional heterogeneity and equity market returns, whilst 
Hambrick et al. (1996) found a positive relationship between educational and tenure 
heterogeneity and market share and profit growth. Smith et al. (1994) further showed that 
educational diversity positively impacted on return on investments and sales growth. In a 
meta-analysis scrutinising the link between top management team heterogeneity and firm 
performance Certo et al. (2006) showed that background and experience heterogeneity was 
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associated with the ability to consider a broader spectrum of alternatives when making 
strategic decisions.    
 
Related strands of research attempt to look beyond the composition of the board in order to 
explore the importance of board structure and process for financial performance. Board 
structure is the board’s “internal organization as judged by the divisions of activities 
among committees, the flow of information among directors and the type of board 
leadership” (Zahra and Pearce, 1989, p 320) and is significant because it influences the 
way in which the board interacts with the CEO, the collective approach taken to decision-
making and strategy definition. Board process, in contrast, focuses on the behaviour and 
interaction between directors and the ways in which boards operate (Pettigrew, 1992). 
Until recently, empirical research in this area has been limited, in part reflecting the serious 
methodological difficulties encountered in carrying out such research (Pettigrew, 1992; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
 
Early researchers of board process had some success of gaining access, if not to the board 
room, to the corporate board directors through in-depth interviews (Mace 1971; Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989). Continuing to address the corporate board in a similar manner, Demb and 
Neubauer (1992) interviewed 71 board directors from 11 multinational corporations head-
quartered in different countries. Demb and Neubauer sought to understand whether 
corporate boards operating in different national institutional settings faced the same, or 
different, balancing acts in terms of independence versus familiarity with the business, and 
how boards balanced the need for a close-knit working group without engaging in 
groupthink. The authors concluded that boards faced similar challenges across countries 
and that their priorities were largely consonant irrespective of national institutional context. 
Boards saw strategic direction, succession planning and budget allocation as their top three 
priorities (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). Similarly McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) 
interviewed 108 board directors to understand the role of part-time board members. They 
found evidence that ran contrary to earlier findings suggesting part-time board members 
were ineffective; instead McNulty and Pettigrew found that part-time directors played an 
important role in strategic matters and that they were effective in exercising control over 
executive management, consonant with an agency view of the firm. Other studies that have 
successfully accessed corporate boards and addressed the impact and role of board process 
on performance include Pye (2000) and Roberts et al. (2005).  Cumulatively, these studies 
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started to lift the lid on corporate boards, which had been, and still remain largely “closed 
groups, bound by confidentiality, privilege and custom, with significant access difficulties” 
(Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007, p 845). Despite these challenges, a small cluster of 
researchers has gained access to corporate board rooms and conducted ‘complete member 
researcher participant observer studies’ (Parker, 2007; 2008; Huse and Zattoni, 2008), 
which have unveiled insights into different directors use of contact networks (Parker, 2007, 
2008) and director prestige (Huse and Zattoni, 2008). Huse and Zattoni (2008) showed that 
board prestige was important for firms that did not have a strong market reputation and that 
board process varied depending on the type and situation of the firm concerned. Huse and 
Zattoni’s (2008) findings on board prestige suggest consonance with Certo’s (2003) and 
Lynall et al.’s (2003) view of isomorphic pressures at board level to signal kudos to 
pertinent stakeholders in the market.  
 
Studies on board structure and firm performance have focused on the board’s committee 
structures and how it relates to performance. Dalton et al. (1998) found no relationship 
between firm size, board structure and firm financial performance; however, Yermack 
(1996) found that smaller boards were facilitative of better communication, improved 
decision-making and firm value. Rose (2007) investigated the semi-two-tiered structure of 
Danish boards and he suggested that board structure only mattered in situations where the 
firm was in financial distress.   
 
Typologies of governance systems and comparative research on boards 
A related and important body of empirical board research seeks to develop an appreciation 
and characterisation of various forms of board practices and structures in the context of 
specific groups of countries (O’Sullivan, 2003; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Pedersen and 
Thomsen, 1997). Jacoby (2005) outlines the governance debate in terms of two distinct 
approaches; a “shareholder approach” (Jacoby, 2005, p 6), also called the Anglo-American 
approach for its prevalence in these countries, and a “stakeholder approach” (Jacoby, 2005, 
p 6) practised in countries such as Germany, France and Japan. The shareholder approach 
is characterised by an active equity market, which also serves as a source of corporate 
credit, legal protection for minority shareholders and a dynamic market for corporate 
control (Jacoby, 2005; O’Sullivan, 2003; Aguilera, 2005). In contrast, countries inclined to 
follow the stakeholder approach typically have large blocks of shares held by credit 
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institutions or families, historic ties with employee organisations who are given a voice on 
the board and a less active market for corporate control (Jacoby, 2005; O’Sullivan, 2003). 
 
Traditionally, country-specific governance practices are closely tied up with historical, 
financial and industrial developments (O’Sullivan, 2003). However, recently countries 
have begun to adopt alternative governance practices. This has precipitated an academic 
debate as to whether increased globalisation and international trade will result in 
converging or diverging standards of corporate governance practices (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003; Aguilera, 2005; O’Sullivan, 2003; Fligstein and Freeland, 1995; Jacoby, 
2005; Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997; Otten et al., 2006). Countries traditionally associated 
with stakeholder governance practices have adopted aspects of the Anglo-American model, 
and, vice-versa for example a single tier board structure is increasingly adopted in Japan 
and Germany whilst block holdings have increased in the US (Jacoby, 2005; O’Sullivan, 
2003). There are however also contrary indicators, showing that countries are entrenched 
in their governance practices and are reluctant to change, as evidenced by Bianchi & 
Enriques (1999), who reported failed attempts by the Italian government to introduce 
legislation favouring minority shareholders, in a bid to offer investor protection more akin 
to that found in the UK. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) explored the different observed patterns 
of corporate governance across developed economies and concluded that path dependence 
in part explained why corporate governance continues to vary on a country-by-country 
basis. They concluded that two types of path dependence caused continued cross-national 
variation in corporate governance: structural path dependence and rules-driven path 
dependence. Structural path dependence resulted from sunk costs and rent-seeking 
behaviour, changing corporate governance patterns would be costly when sunk structural 
costs were considered, and those parties that partake in corporate control might be 
personally worse off under a new governance regime, even if that regime proved more 
effective overall. Rules-based path dependence suggested that traditional patterns of 
ownership influence which regulations and rules are subsequently adopted. Powerful share 
owners would seek to maintain their control and status and use their influence to ensure 
any new rules and regulations governing share ownership reflected their interests. The 
authors concluded that path dependence “can explain why, not withstanding the powerful 
forces of globalization and efficiency, some key differences have thus far persisted” 
(Bebchuk and Roe, 1999, p 170).  The literature thus indicates that a single global 
corporate governance standard may still be some way off. The table below summarises the 
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major elements of the shareholder and the stakeholder models of Corporate Governance. 
For a systematic taxonomy of corporate governance systems, see Weimar and Pape (1999).  
 
Figure 2.1 Characteristics of the stakeholder and shareholder approach 
 
 Stakeholder 
approach 
Shareholder 
approach 
Share ownership Concentrated Dispersed 
Particular minority holding protection focus No Yes 
Financial instrument prevalence Debt Equity 
Extensive active market for corporate control No Yes 
Employee board representation Practiced Not practiced 
 
Otten et al. (2006) suggest an alternative way to the convergence/divergence debate. 
Rather than seeing the discussion strictly in terms of whether a country will follow the 
Anglo-American governance approach or rigidly stick to their own national system, Otten 
et al. propose that each country will apply “local-repairs” (Otten et al., 2006, p 30) to their 
own systems of corporate governance “in the light of global ideals” (ibid.). They propose 
that a country will make adaptive changes to its governance practices depending on what 
the country’s current dominant ownership structure is. For example, in countries where 
firms were managed on the Anglo-American model, companies were more likely to see a 
need for improved internal governance in light of managerial scandals at companies such 
as WorldCom, Enron and Arthur Andersen. On the other hand, countries where large 
family holdings were the norm might be more likely to adapt changes to their governance 
practices that allowed for more transparency and media scrutiny than had traditionally been 
available.  
 
Fligstein and Freeland (1995) similarly suggest there is insufficient evidence to show that 
the world is converging on a single best practice corporate governance model, nor that a 
global market for corporate control is emerging. They argue that individual countries’ 
governance practices remain national, as they are rooted in the countries’ industrial 
development history and associated corporate development. This includes the degree of 
state intervention and influence over the private sector and what they call the “…social 
organization of elites” (Fligstein and Freeland, 1995, p 33) which refers to whether 
families, the state or managers exert control over the organisation. “National economies 
have distinct institutional arrangements that outline the relation between investment, 
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ownership, control and economic growth. While they are interested in world trade, they are 
set up to preserve their national system of property rights and governance structures” 
(Fligstein and Freeland, 1995, p 33). Otten et al. (2006) argue that the scholarly field of 
comparative governance is faced with the need to ask different questions, and instead 
“reconceptualize corporate governance reforms in a way that does justice to the 
equifinality of all the major systems of corporate governance” (Otten et al., 2006, p 31). 
 
The corporate board has been under extensive academic scrutiny which has resulted in a 
multiplicity of theoretical views of board theories, reflected in conceptions such as agency, 
stewardship, resource dependence, institutional and contingency theory. These theories 
have informed a large body of empirical research, which has explored a range of board 
attributes and their impact on firm level outcomes and precipitated a debate on the nature 
of different corporate governance systems. However, Finegold et al. (2007) note in their 
meta-analysis of board research, that despite substantial theoretical and empirical progress, 
a number of research questions remain unanswered, in particular related to board 
composition and diversity. The next section reviews the academic literature on women 
corporate board directors.  
 
2.2  Research concerning women on the board 
Having identified and discussed the major themes in the broader literature concerning 
boards of directors, next the literature specifically concerned with the participation of 
women on corporate boards is reviewed. Much of this body of research is empirical and 
many of its contributions resonate strongly with the wider literatures concerning boards of 
directors. Reflecting the structure adopted above, the conceptual literature is explored first 
and then the empirical literature. 
 
2.2.1 Conceptual themes 
Much of the conceptual literature on female board participation builds upon the wider body 
of literature pertaining to corporate boards of directors discussed earlier, but the literature 
on women corporate board directors additionally draws on other theoretical perspectives 
such as ethical, economic and social-psychological theories. The theoretical literature is 
concerned with the characteristics, influences and personality traits women bring to the 
board, and what impact this has on board dynamics, corporate performance and board 
management. The conceptual theory on female board participation resonates with the 
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central propositions advanced in the earlier section on board management theory. Each of 
the major board management theories will be addressed in turn in light of the theoretical 
enquiry on women on the board.  
 
Reflecting a central debate in the principal-agent paradigm, proponents of increasing the 
numbers of women in board positions argue that diversity may have a positive impact on 
the board’s monitoring and control function (Fondas, 2000; Erhardt et al., 2003; Francoeur 
et al., 2007; Valenti, 2008; Brammer et al., 2009). Fondas (2000) cites evidence that 
women are less likely to endorse CEO suggestions without substantial debate and that they 
exert more influence over managerial decision-making, and as women are frequently non-
executive directors they add further objectivity to the board. Similarly, Valenti (2008) 
suggests that female board directors will place further checks on CEO power. Erhardt et al. 
(2003) hypothesise that had embattled energy company Enron had a more diverse board, it 
may not have “…failed in its oversight function…Enron’s board may typify some of the 
problems associated with a lack of diversity; namely, lack of conflict and lack of breadth of 
perspectives” (Erhardt et al., 2003, p 108). The literature indicates that women may have 
an ethical influence in board proceedings and decision-making, requiring more robust 
discussions and thorough analysis before agreeing to corporate proposals (Singh and 
Vinnicombe, 2004; Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Thomson et al. (2005) argue that 
women tend to be socially more responsible, have a better sense of what is fair and right 
and be less inclined to rubber stamp the CEO’s decisions, and that the presence of women 
“…limit the power of male ‘groupthink’ to nod through ostensibly value-creating 
proposals or policies that are ethically questionable” (Thomsen et al., 2005, p 18). 
 
Other researchers have suggested that female board directors might be better corporate 
stewards because of their capacities in empowerment and collaboration. These two 
managerial traits are especially prevalent in women managers (Eagly and Carli, 2003; 
Singh et al., 2001). Women directors have also been found to be more intrinsically 
motivated than men (Thomsen et al., 2005). Corporate scandals of late may be changing 
perceptions of the adequacy of female leaders. “Appointments of women signal an 
organization’s departure from past practices and help it capture the symbols of innovation 
and progress…the selection of women can increase organizations’ chances of obtaining 
leaders who are especially effective under modern conditions” (Eagly and Carli, 2003, p 
827-828). 
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Resource dependence theory looks at women’s ability to link the firm to its broader 
environment. Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) point out that as women are less likely to be 
CEOs, a position generally associated with an extensive network of contacts, they are 
likely to have a smaller network, making them less interesting to board nomination 
committees. Board interlocks are another resource for the board to draw on, where board 
directors know one another and other board directors through directorships at mutual 
organisations (Westphal and Milton, 2000). As women have fewer board directorships, 
they tend to also have fewer interlocks. Adams and Flynn (2005) point out that women’s 
contact networks tend to be different from men’s, and perhaps are more likely to consist of 
people from outside the corporate sector. Hyland and Marcellino, (2002) suggest that such 
a difference in network contacts can work in favour of the company, extending the reach 
and type of resources available to the firm. In the context of resource based theory of the 
firm, Fondas (2000) suggests companies that appoint female directors are able to convey a 
sense of legitimacy to their shareholders, thus women become a corporate ‘signalling 
resource’. Hillman et al. (2007) propose three distinct categories within which women can 
add value to the board in a resource dependence perspective. Women can add overall 
improvements in advice-giving and counsel, though the authors also recognise that 
increased diversity can be associated with more conflict. In line with Fondas (2000), 
Hillman et al. (2007) also acknowledge the legitimacy ‘resource’ women bring to the 
board; and thirdly, women act as valuable role models in certain contexts and can link the 
firm to a different set of resources than that of men. This echoes Blum et al. (1994) who 
posited that where executive skills were required in a professional domain where women 
were more heavily represented, women were likely to acquire a larger share of the 
management position, bringing their particular resource to the table. In summary, from a 
resource dependence perspective, firms can potentially further decrease their 
environmental uncertainty by drawing on unique contributions from women directors. 
Companies that appoint female board directors are seen as innovative and progressive. 
However, stakeholders are rarely able to adequately judge whether women are afforded the 
same influence and respect granted to their male colleagues once they are on the board.  
 
Institutionally framed board literature concerning women’s role on the board is in its 
infancy. However, as Hillman et al. (2007) acknowledged, their proposition that women 
add legitimacy, can not only be framed in a resource dependence perspective, but may also 
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be considered in light of institutional isomorphism, where women are appointed to the 
board to acquire external legitimacy in the eyes of corporate stakeholders. Similarly, 
Beckman and Philips (2005) suggest isomorphic pressures accounted for the rise in 
executive women in law firms, where there was a perceived need to reflect the 
demographic make-up of the executive ranks of important clients. Consequently, where 
focal clients had female executives, the law firm felt compelled to reflect this demographic 
composition.  
 
The last board theory to be considered is the contingency perspective as applied to women 
board directors. In tackling external contingencies or challenges, literature suggests 
women’s experiences, personality traits and points of view differ from those of male 
directors, so the board is immediately afforded pluralities of perspective (Bernardi et al., 
2006). Further examples of external contingencies where women offer particular 
contributions include identifying untapped consumer product opportunities for the female 
customer segment (Singh et al., 2001). Boards may also face a supply-side shortfall of 
male directors with CEO experience, the favoured candidates for board directorships. 
Burke (1999) argues corporate boards need more female directors as the available male 
CEO talent-pool of potential directors is insufficient to cope with demand. Current 
directors lack time to take on more board directorships and there is a pool of well qualified, 
available female talent from which companies can recruit female directors. Internal 
contingencies where women are uniquely positioned to contribute include acting as role 
models to younger, ambitious women thereby helping companies retain and foster future 
managerial talent (Singh et al., 2001).  
 
A final conceptual perspective, which permeates every board irrespective of management 
theory allegiance, is the impact on the board’s team dynamics by the appointment of 
female directors. Bringing women into an all-male environment may change the dynamics 
of the group (Marshall, 1995). An important tranche of work in this domain is provided by 
Westphal and colleagues, who in a series of studies explored interpersonal sociological 
phenomena in the board room, focusing on the role, status, and board dynamics associated 
with minority directors. Westphal and Milton (2000) posited that increased gender 
diversity in the board room lowered social cohesion amongst the group, which resulted in a 
more fragmented working group. In such circumstances, social barriers within the group 
would prevent minority directors, such as women, from voicing their opinion. Westphal 
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and Milton (2000) contended that women would be viewed as ‘outsiders’ to the 
demographic majority, causing ostracism and ineffective working relationships. Westphal 
and Stern (2006, 2007) suggested that women minority directors faced additional 
challenges in effectively operating at board level, as they often lacked the elite or Ivy 
League educational credentials their male counterparts had, and which created a strong 
bond of kinship amongst male directors. Consequently, the authors suggested women 
might have to employ more opinion-conformity and other forms of ingratiatory behaviour 
to achieve the same impact as men. Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) assessed women’s 
presence in the board room in light of social identity theory. This theoretical framework 
suggests that in a board environment where white, middle-aged male directors prevail, the 
men will see themselves as professional peers, colleagues and friends. Women are not 
perceived as professional equals as they have traditionally entered the men’s sphere as 
support staff or spouses. The theoretical concept further suggests that male directors will 
foster support and knowledge amongst themselves to the exclusion of female peers, 
creating ‘in-groups’ from which women may find themselves barred. Singh and 
Vinnicombe (2004) further offered that it is often the case that members of an elite group 
see performance amongst themselves as higher than those not considered part of the clique. 
This results in female directors having to perform not only as well as, but often better than 
their male colleagues to be noticed. Adams and Flynn (2005) discussed whether women 
once on the board, were subjected to informal exclusionary practices manifested in, for 
example, debates about sporting results where women may have less of an interest and 
therefore less to contribute. Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) referred to evidence of 
homosocial reproduction where like promote like and “board members maintain a degree 
of homogeneity in member values, attitudes and status” (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994, p 
1471) which undermines the explicit efforts of diversifying the board’s views, perspectives 
and competencies in order to promote enhanced governance. Westphal and Milton (2000) 
argue that it is essential for women to break into the ‘in-group’ referred to by Singh and 
Vinnicombe (2004) if they are to execute their role on the board effectively. If the board 
collectively fails to integrate and operate as a team, communications issues may be 
experienced and increased team turnover and lower social cohesion may ensue, a reality 
more frequently observed with diverse groups (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2003).  
 
Theoretical literature to date has emphasised the positive contribution women corporate 
board directors can make by offering capabilities, skills and insights that add to the board’s 
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collective talent. Literature reflects the view that women can enhance the board’s 
monitoring and control function and be better corporate stewards, connect the firm with a 
broader set of resources through different sets of contact networks, and provide firms with 
legitimacy. When considering the board’s working relationships, scholars suggest the 
board’s working relationships and internal dynamics may change in response to more 
women board directors, and that increased gender demography may pose challenges to 
inter-personal relationships and group cohesion.  
 
2.2.2 Empirical research on female board directors 
Empirical research on female presence on corporate boards has done much to enhance our 
appreciation of the extent of female board participation and its variation across countries 
and time. Research to date highlights how many female board directors there are, where 
they are and what prerequisites they had to fulfil to be considered for board directorships. 
Some scholars have also tried to establish whether there is a link between female board 
directors and performance outcomes.  
 
By far the largest body of existing research documents the degree of female board 
representation. Significant clusters of research have assessed the place of women on 
corporate boards in the United Kingdom, United States and Canada for some time (Burke, 
1999; Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Singh et al., 2001, 2004; Adams and Flynn, 2005; Arfken 
et al., 2004). Recent studies have addressed women’s prevalence on the board in other 
national contexts such as Spain (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008), Denmark (Smith et 
al., 2006) and Switzerland (Ruigrok et al., 2007).  These studies have collectively revealed 
large and often persistent differences in the share of board seats occupied by women 
compared with men across countries. These studies centre on similar objectives, mapping 
the number of female board directors, but employ a range of sampling frames and 
methodologies that make cross-country comparisons difficult to make. In the UK, studies 
have focused primarily on the London Stock Exchange’s set of largest listed companies, 
known as the FTSE however, scholars have differed in the number of companies they have 
included in their analysis. Conyon and Mallin (1997) included the largest 350 companies 
on the FTSE, known as FTSE 350, whilst Singh et al. (2001, 2004) narrowed their research 
down to the 100 largest companies, the FTSE 100. These three studies also relied on data 
from different commercial data providers in finding the number of female board directors. 
Similar methodological differences become apparent in the North American based studies. 
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Farrell and Hersch (2005) based their study on the Fortune 500 and the Services 500 list, 
whilst regional studies conducted by Arfken et al. (2004) and Adams and Flynn (2005) in 
Tennessee and Massachusetts respectively used the Boston Globe top 100 public 
companies for Massachusetts and Dun and Bradstreet sources to identify the Tennessee 
companies, where 102 companies were included in total. Finally, Burke (1999) tracked the 
progress of Canadian female board directors, and used a dataset of Business Top 1000 
Canadian companies in his study.  
 
The studies discussed here do not only differ in sampling terms, but slight differences also 
become apparent in their choice of methodological approach. Conyon and Mallin (1997) 
provide absolute numbers of female board directors as well as average and percentage 
calculations. Singh et al. (2001) offer similar analysis, but they also chart the development 
of the number of female board directors over time. Farrell and Hersch (2005) presented a 
similar numeric overview of female board representation as did Adams and Flynn (2005) 
and Arfken et al. (2004).  Additionally, Adams and Flynn (2005) include some industrial 
breakdown of female board representation as well some comparative numbers for other 
U.S. states. Although these descriptive studies add to the extant understanding of country-
level patterns of female corporate board membership, they have all been drawn from a 
reasonably narrow range of countries and very little comparative descriptive work has been 
done to understand whether patterns of female board participation are uniform across 
countries and industries. To begin to remedy this situation, cross-national variation in the 
prevalence of women on the board is the subject of chapter 5, where between-country 
differences will be explored, as well as variance between and within industries and 
countries.  
 
A small but important body of research has established that industry characteristics 
influence the degree to which women acquire corporate board directorships. Harrigan 
(1981) investigated the prevalence of women on the board for a sample of 112 companies 
and found evidence that women were better represented in industries that catered to the 
female consumer market, such as the cosmetics and services firms and financial 
institutions. Elgart (1983) in contrast found that women were better represented in the 
food, publishing and the paper & packaging sector. His study was based on the Fortune 
500 list of firms.  In a similar study in the UK, Brammer et al. (2007) used a data set of 543 
companies listed on the FTSE to establish if industry was related to the share of board seats 
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held by women. The authors concluded that women were more broadly represented in 
retail, utilities, media and high-street banking, leading the authors to suggest that industry’s 
proximity to the final consumer influenced the associated prevalence of female corporate 
board directors.  Similar findings were uncovered by Fryxell and Lerner (1989) for a set of 
European wide firms. Hillman et al. (2007) drawing on a sample of over 1,000 large US 
firms, established that the share of female employees working in a given economic sector 
was related to the degree to which women held board directorships in the same industry.  
 
To complement the body of research outlining the geographic and industry prevalence of 
female board directors, some scholars have focused on identifying what formal educational 
attainment and experiential characteristics women need to ascend the board. Burke (1997), 
Sheridan (2001) and Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) surveyed female board directors in 
Canada, Australia and the UK respectively, and higher education attainment in the form of 
university degrees was prevalent amongst the female directors in all three countries as well 
as extensive business experience. 
 
Previous CEO experience and previous international assignments have traditionally been 
seen as key requirements to be assessed for board directorships (Singh and Vinnicombe, 
2004; Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004). Women are much 
less likely than men to be CEOs (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004) and they often 
encounter gender-specific difficulties in acquiring international experience (Linehan and 
Walsh, 1999). Consequently, the experience women bring to the boardroom is likely to be 
different from that of their male counterparts (Adams and Flynn, 2005). Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria (2004) researched female executive directors and found that boards were not 
willing to give them the same influence as male counterparts and they concluded that: 
“women are far less likely to be in the running for future CEO positions than 
men…because of their lower status and utilisation within the highest ranks of corporate 
insiders” (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004, p 341). Conyon and Mallin (1997) note that 
women often have different, but equally relevant, experience compared with their male 
colleagues by the time they are nominated for board directorships.  
 
As noted above, international experience is another oft cited prerequisite for taking on 
board directorships (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Caligiuri and Tung, 1999), but women 
often encounter obstacles in acquiring this experience. Linehan and Walsh (1999) found 
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from their research of female expatriate managers, that women felt their gender was still 
the biggest barrier to an international posting. Women were often assumed to be 
uninterested in foreign assignments and where this assumption was prevalent the women 
who participated in the study thought it unlikely the company would invest the necessary 
resources to develop female managerial talent for international work, which again would 
bring the women the “…power and opportunity” (Walsh, 1999, p 528) needed to make the 
next step towards the boardroom. Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) conclude that even though 
women possess sufficient educational qualifications and relevant professional experience 
“…they continue to be blocked in their rise to the top” (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994, p 
1471). 
 
Even if women attain the formal and professional prerequisites for board directorships, 
they face a number of organisational barriers en route to these, including opaque 
recruitment processes, insufficient career development opportunities and lower 
remuneration (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). Sheridan (2001) surveyed Australian female 
board directors’ on their experiences and from the results concluded that as well as relevant 
and professional experience, the women’s contact network was a crucial lever in securing 
their board positions. Sheridan and Milgate (2005) specifically set out to determine 
whether the board recruitment process was different for women and men. However, men 
and women reported similar perceptions of what was required for board directorships: a 
good performance record, a good comprehension of business principles and a network of 
contacts. Men and women differed in their need for profile. “…women needed…their 
credibility to be reinforced by having a high public profile” (Sheridan and Milgate, 2005, p 
853). Gaining this profile and becoming a known entity on the CEO and board director 
circuit can prove challenging for women. Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) found that women 
were well qualified to take up the relevant positions on the board, and rather than focus on 
gaining more experience women should learn to understand the processes better “…by 
which powerful individuals make staffing choices” (p 1471).  The Cadbury Report (1992) 
and the Higgs Report (2003) both recommended the adoption of nomination committees, 
which should bring transparency to the board selection process and ensure a fairer 
treatment of all potential board candidates, but perhaps especially women. Conyon and 
Mallin (1997) refer to research done at top management level of 24 of UK’s largest 
companies and only nine had adopted the recommended nomination committee,  the 
remaining 15 were undetermined as to whether nomination committees would be used. 
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Research has thus mapped the prevalence of female board directors in particular countries 
and investigated the know-how women must possess in order to be nominated for, and 
selected to, board positions and the recruitment process women must navigate to access the 
corporate board. In addition to the necessary academic and professional credentials, 
women must develop a strong contact network to secure their seat on the corporate board.  
Once on the board, studies have attempted to determine what women’s roles are and what 
they contribute. Three notable studies have helped our understanding of women’s place on 
the board and its associated board committees. Kesner (1988) conducted the first study, 
and Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) and Peterson and Philpot (2007) conducted the second 
and the third where both studies revisited Kesner’s original work. Kesner (1988) conducted 
an analysis of board committees’ composition in terms of gender, tenure and occupational 
background. The sample used covered 250 of Fortune 500’s companies. Kesner concluded 
that extensive business experience coupled with long tenure were conducive to board 
committee membership. Experiential diversity was also deemed an asset to board 
committees. With regard to gender diversity she claims ”observed differences in type, 
tenure and occupation may actually enhance a board; it is doubtful that the same argument 
applies to the variable gender” (Kesner, 1988, p 79). Yet, Kesner concluded that “the 
findings of this study clearly indicated that woman are not window dressing but do hold 
important positions on the boards of large corporations” (Kesner, 1988, p 80). 
 
Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) re-visited Kesner’s work and found different results. They 
concluded that men were preferred on the compensation, executive and finance 
committees, whilst women were preferred on the public affairs committee, which 
according to the authors is concerned with such issues as corporate social performance, 
playing to the ‘feminine’ and ‘soft’ issues associated with women rather than “…the more 
hard core work deemed more central to governance” (p 1465). The authors conclude the 
results” indicate the pervasive presence of sex-based bias in the selection of committee 
members” (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994, p 1465).  Whilst Kesner (1988) argues that 
women’s lack of appropriate characteristics explained their absence from core governance 
functions, Bilimoria and Pinderit found that “women are systematically disadvantaged in 
their odds of executive committee membership…Overall…this study indicates sex-based 
direct or interactive effects on the membership of all committees examined, after the 
experienced-based differences between male and female directors are accounted for” 
  44 
(Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994, p 1469). Conyon and Mallin (1997) in their review of female 
board participation of FTSE 350 companies found that of the eligible women on the board, 
50 percent of them were involved in board committee work.  
 
Peterson and Philpot (2007) studied the firms on the Fortune 500 list from 2003. Using a 
sample of 487 firms, they found that women were represented on the board of 88 percent 
of the firms in the sample, and further that women were less likely to serve on the 
executive committee and more likely to be represented on the committees concerned with 
public affairs. These studies paint a picture where women are increasingly playing a role 
on the board’s sub-committees, but where the more important committees tasked with 
regulatory compliance, finance and remuneration appear to remain predominantly 
masculine in composition.   
 
Scholars have reviewed proposed links between a diverse board and improved corporate 
performance (Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Smith et al., 2006; Van der Walt et al., 2006; 
Erhardt et al., 2003). Results of this research have been mixed. Erhardt et al. (2003) 
investigated the impact of demographic board diversity on a firm’s financial performance. 
Using correlation and regression analysis the authors reviewed board diversity and firm 
financial performance for 112 large US companies. Diversity was measured in terms of 
ethnic minority and gender representation at board level. Results indicated a positive 
influence on return on assets and return on investment, leading the authors to conclude that 
the organisation as a whole benefited from pluralities of view at board level. What the 
study does not say is what impact women and ethnic minorities have when disaggregated. 
It is therefore not possible to decipher whether women or ethnic minorities contribute more 
or less positively to performance than the other. Similarly, Smith et al. (2006) investigated 
the relationship between top management and board level presence of women and financial 
performance for the 2,500 largest Danish firms. They concluded that university educated 
female CEOs had a positive influence on performance, whilst non-university educated 
female CEOs had a less significant positive impact. Female staff-elected board members 
were found to have a positive influence on performance; however this positive impact was 
not reflective of other female board members. The authors hypothesised that this was 
because other female board members may owe their directorship to family ties rather than 
qualifications. The authors conclude that firms should attract and hire more qualified 
women into the top management ranks to build a pool of qualified female board talent. 
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Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Van der Walt et al. (2006) found less positive results from 
their research into board diversity and performance. Farrell and Hersch (2005) used the 
Fortune 500 and the Services 500 list for their time series analysis, which spanned a decade 
from 1990-2000, to investigate women’s appointments to boards and its impact. The 
authors also employed event study analysis to newspaper announcements of women’s 
appointment to corporate boards. The authors failed to identify evidence to support the 
contention that adding women to the board is a value additive strategy. Van der Walt et al. 
(2006) likewise concluded that diverse boards are not necessarily synonymous with better 
boards. They investigated whether board level diversity improved financial performance 
when companies were faced with a strategically challenging environment. Drawing on a 
sample of New Zealand listed companies, Van der Walt et al. (2006) concluded that whilst 
representation and equity might be valid arguments for a diverse board, improved handling 
of strategic complexity was not. That being said, gender was only one of eight factors 
included in the diversity measure. Contrary to the findings by Van der Walt et al. (2006), 
Francoeur et al. (2007) found that firms operating in complex environments experienced 
some financial benefits from having more women on their boards.  
 
Empirical research on female board directors reveals a multifaceted picture where women 
must show strong formal educational credentials as well as extensive experience, and 
importantly a substantial and active network of relevant business contacts and a high 
profile, to be contenders for corporate board positions. Qualifications and experiences 
aside, women appear to face additional hurdles in breaking into the social sphere of largely 
male corporate directors, a step deemed essential if women are to become a known entity 
to those influencing board appointments. Once on the board it appears women do not 
experience complete equity in their roles, the influence they are able to exert and in their 
treatment. Furthermore, research suggests diverse boards may not always be beneficial.  
 
What the literature on corporate boards in general, and on female board directors in 
particular, has largely omitted to explore in a systematic fashion is the wider institutional 
context within which firms operate, and the macro, meso and micro level drivers that 
enable or prevent women from acquiring corporate board directorships. The literature has 
also explored a relatively narrow range of countries and consequently a limited set of 
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corporate governance contexts. The next section details a succinct research agenda that 
seeks to address these gaps in the literature.  
 
2.3 Developing a research agenda 
This section builds a research agenda from the themes that are either entirely absent from 
the literature on women board directors, or that could benefit from further enquiry. The 
literatures reviewed here have done much to cast light on the role, importance, and impacts 
of boards of directors and of the particular contributions and extent of participation of 
female directors (Dalton et al., 1998; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Denis and McConnell, 2003; 
Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). However, extant research has concentrated upon a 
relatively well defined set of research questions, and in the remainder of this section the 
case is set out for a need to widen and deepen the field of research concerning female 
board participation in order to shed light on several significant contemporary debates. In 
particular five avenues of future research are outlined. This research agenda aims to 
address issues that are believed to have the capacity to significantly enhance extant 
appreciation of the role and importance of female participation on corporate boards. Each 
of these broad paths encompasses several research questions that build on earlier studies.  
 
2.3.1  Institutional influences on women on the board 
As noted previously in this analysis, the vast majority of empirical studies on female board 
participation centre on numerically mapping the number of female directors in a few 
western commercial centres such as the US, UK and Canada (Singh et al., 2001; Farrell 
and Hersch, 2005; Burke, 1999). These studies provide an important starting point for 
subsequent research into gender diversity at board level. However, as they differ 
methodologically, use a variety of sampling frames, and are largely single-year cross-
sectional studies, it is very difficult to make cross-country longitudinal comparisons to 
develop a picture of the demography has changed over time. An international comparative 
approach to board research is becoming increasingly important as business becomes ever 
more global in nature and reach. Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest that future research 
considers similarities and differences in governance practices in a more international 
perspective to assess what, if any, practical implications such differences have for the 
board, its operations and firm performance. To gain a broader international starting point 
for researching the progress of female board directors, a coherent picture is required 
outlining the number of women across major trading economies in Europe and American, 
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as well as Asia, and Africa. Such an approach is capable of shedding more light on the 
processes through which board diversity changes and can help gauge the impact of a policy 
or governance initiative, and assess whether implemented programmes have the desired 
effect in furthering the number of qualified female board directors. 
 
With the exception of Terjesen and Singh (2008), there are virtually no studies into how 
national characteristics such as culture, legislation, and governance practices etc. influence 
female board presence. A systematic assessment of how the national institutional 
environment, reflected in characteristics such as demographics, freedom of expression, 
educational attainment, economic and political indicators, influence women’s progress to 
the board can help identify important country level predispositions necessary to foster 
female board talent successfully. Similarly, the broader institutional nature and character of 
industries remain an underdeveloped theme in research on women board directors.  
Understanding sector wide institutional differences reflected in industry structure, working 
practices, demography and culture can complement and extend research findings from the 
national level and offer a more holistic view of what enables women to acquire board 
directorships.  
 
Such an assessment combined with a systematic international review of female board 
directors has the potential to offer important insights into the underlying phenomenon of 
women’s absence from the board room. A study of this kind can begin to highlight what 
country and industry-specific factors may be more conducive to female board participation 
and shed light on what initiatives may prove most effective in increasing female corporate 
board representation. Furthermore, it can help indicate the likely future movement of 
female board directorship in light of current social, educational and professional provisions 
for women, identify policies, and help determine whether corporate or country-specific 
factors play the deciding role in determining women’s presence on the board.   
 
Such research would also require a theoretical framing that successfully encompass the 
broader institutional environment. The recognition by some scholars (Hillman et al., 2007) 
that elements of institutional theory may be of pertinence in accounting for the prevalence 
of women on the board, may be indicative of an emerging perception that board level 
theories can be usefully supplemented by considering other theories not confined only to 
corporate boards, but which instead recognise the contexts within which firms operate. 
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Institutional theory as applied to board research to date (ibid) only encompass a particular 
element of what is a broader and more integrated theory which may be usefully considered 
as a complementary or alternative theoretical framing to studies of women on the board.  
 
2.3.2 Affirmative action, gender diversity and firm performance 
Continuing the theme of promoting interest in viewing female participation in corporate 
boards as being, in part, related to country-specific factors, the second proposed research 
path addresses a particular institutional response to perceived discrimination against 
women: affirmative action. Affirmative action has become an emerging phenomenon in 
corporate board diversity theory (Thomsen et al., 2005; Burke and Mattis, 2000). Some 
countries such as Norway have implemented affirmative action to introduce more women 
onto the corporate board, and other countries are exploring similar measures (Terjesen and 
Singh, 2008; Thomson, 2005). This trend is interesting and has the potential to markedly 
increase the prevalence of female corporate board directors. However, the broad time 
period covered in this thesis does not coincide with a time frame in which active 
affirmative action legislation was systematically enforced at corporate board level, so it is 
not reflected in the thesis, but as an emerging trend in corporate board diversity and 
corporate governance practice, it holds great promise as an important and interesting 
avenue for research going forward.  
 
Affirmative action is defined as efforts to help a group of people who suffer from 
discrimination (Soanes and Stevenson, 2006). Affirmative action initiatives are often 
aimed at benefiting women and ethnic minorities and may be adopted voluntarily by 
organisations or enforced through legislation (Taylor-Carter et al., 1995). Norway took the 
radical step of introducing affirmative action legislation to ensure an appropriate level of 
female board participation. By 2007, 40 percent of all board directorships in Norwegian 
publicly restricted companies had to be women (Det Kongelige Barne og Famlie 
Departement, 2002). As Norway was one of the first countries to introduce affirmative 
action to encompass such a specific segment of societal power as the corporate board, very 
little research exists assessing its implications. The research that is available on affirmative 
action focuses on management and rank and file employees more generally (Slack, 1987; 
Holzer and Neumarket, 2000; Taylor-Carter et al., 1995; Heilman et al., 1997; French, 
2001). Whilst not specifically targeting the board of directors, some of the research 
findings seem applicable to the board too. The research results are mixed. At the company 
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level, Taylor-Carter et al. (1995) identified a risk with exclusive focus on filling required 
quotas associated with affirmative action initiatives, rather than systematically assessing its 
hiring, training and development, resulting in no lasting systemic changes to attitudes, 
corporate culture and perception of women in the workplace. On an individual level, 
women associated with affirmative action initiatives are often seen as incompetent 
regardless of their qualifications or competencies (Heilman et al., 1997). Consequently, 
women are not always enamoured with affirmative action initiatives designed to benefit 
themselves (Taylor-Carter et al., 1995). They observe that the more male the position in 
question is seen to be, the more incongruence there appears to be between the gender 
stereotype and the role: “…strong sex-typing of jobs serves to exacerbate the negative 
attributes made about females who are brought into the organization as a result of the 
policies” (Taylor-Carter et al., 1995, p 137). Given the traditional male environment 
prevalent at board level, it is reasonable to expect resistance and antagonism to women 
recruited to corporate boards through legislated affirmative action quotas. Affirmative 
action initiatives to date have largely been the domain of public institutions, such as higher 
education, government and other civic institutions, though policies have also extended to 
the private sector (Massey, 2004). Norway’s decision to legislate such a specific aspect of 
what might be considered a corporate governance issue, meant that the Norwegian 
government is now directly dictating parts of the rules otherwise considered to be at the 
discretion of shareholders. As far as it has been able to ascertain there is very little 
precedence for affirmative action to this extent in the corporate board room, so its impact is 
untested. A valuable line of enquiry is therefore whether affirmative action works in such a 
setting, what is the impact on corporate performance in terms of financial results, share 
price evaluation and strategic progress. A further line of enquiry would be to investigate 
how affirmative action at board level works on an operational level. Is the pool of qualified 
female board directors increased, or are current female board directors simply taking on 
more directorial posts? An important policy-informing contribution this research may 
make is to establish what the possible or likely unintended consequences are of such an 
affirmative action initiative. This may help policy advisors and practitioners alike make 
sense of the likely direction gender diversity will take in this particular setting.   
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2.3.3 Nomination committees and women corporate board directors 
The third proposed topic of research relates to the role played by the nomination committee 
in increasing the proportion of board seats held by women. The Higgs Review (2003) 
highlighted the nomination committee as an important corporate governance lever that 
could usefully be employed in bringing more women onto the board, by looking “beyond 
the usual suspects” (p 46) of Caucasian males to identify a more diverse set of board 
candidates, including women. The nomination committee is deemed to bring due process 
and transparency to the recruitment of non-executive directors. The Higgs Review 
recommends that the nomination committee should be composed in the majority of non-
executive directors to limit the potential for candidate recommendations from the ‘old-boys 
network’ or the ‘usual suspects’. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) in their research into the 
CEO’s involvement in the selection of new board directors found that where the CEO 
participated in the nomination committee process, the use of independent directors 
subsequently decreased. This research suggests that nomination committee composition 
matters for board composition and that the nomination committee does play an influential 
role in who is or is not appointed to the board. So far, limited research has been done into 
the role of the nomination committee, particularly the extent to which it is successfully 
used to place more women directors on the board. Prior research on the nomination 
committee has focused on the impact of adopting a nomination committee on the 
composition, independence and quality of the board (Ruigrok et al., 2007; Vafeas, 1999), 
financial performance (Carter et al., 2001), and the likelihood of women gaining access to 
the board committees, including the nomination committee (Kesner, 1988; Bilimoria and 
Piderit, 1994). However, no study has explicitly investigated whether firms that have 
nomination committees also have more women on their boards and similarly whether the 
gender composition of the nomination committee itself influences the degree to which 
women are added to the corporate board.  
 
2.3.4 Female executives’ preferences, motivations and attitudes 
The next proposed research avenue stems from the observation that much of the literature 
concerning women’s participation on corporate boards focuses on why companies appear 
not to be prepared to appoint more female board directors (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2001; 
Hillman and Cannella, 2002; Sheridan, 2001; Burke, 1997) and on what can be done to 
change their view and see the many benefits women may bring to the corporate board 
(Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Bilimoria, 2000; Adam and Flynn, 2005; Burke, 1999; 
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Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Thomson et al., 2005). In that sense, the extant literature is 
‘demand-focused’ and says comparatively little about the possible attitudes, preferences 
and motivations of women that might potentially be suitable for board directorships. 
 
An important, but small, body of literature focuses on women’s motivations, 
preconceptions and expectations associated with attaining board directorships (Sheridan, 
2002; Sheridan and Millgate, 2005; Singh et al., 2002; Burke, 1997). Sheridan (2002) 
found that women’s motivations for pursuing board directorships included an interest in 
the particular company, a sense of personal satisfaction and professional development, 
findings that echoed Burke’s (1997) results. Singh et al. (2002) researched promotion and 
career aspirations in light of Impression Management Theory, which studies the processes 
and manners in which people seek to influence others’ perception of them. They found that 
women were especially reluctant to put themselves forward and play “the organizational 
game” (p 77) preferring instead to rely on formal procedures of promotion. There is 
opportunity for further research into women’s career ambitions and the board recruitment 
process as it impacts women. Studies have concluded that the progress of women into 
executive rank, and by inference the board, will continue to be slow if advancement 
continues at the current rate (Kilian et al., 2005; Fairfax, 2005; and Ogden et al., 2006). 
The literature appears implicitly to assume that all women in senior management positions 
covet board directorships. Senior managerial women may see this as a natural next career-
progressing step, however it is none the less an assumption that would benefit from 
empirical scrutiny. This will enable a more accurate forecast of the female board director 
pipeline. In the extreme case that women in general are not found to covet board positions, 
the entire problem of female board representation changes from being an issue of equity to 
one of economic competitiveness. A research opportunity also presents itself at the lower 
levels of the corporate hierarchy. To senior female managerial talent, executive positions 
may be an aspiration; however, to ensure a continued supply of professional female 
potential, women at every level of the organisation must aspire to climbing the career 
ladder. Unearthing younger women’s career aspirations will enable companies to facilitate 
their progress better up through the corporate hierarchy, and eventually foster well 
qualified, motivated female board talent.  
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2.3.5 Women in the board room  
As outlined in this review, the majority of empirical research into female board 
representation focuses on numerically charting the number of female board directors. To 
date, no study the author is aware of assesses the actual impact women have in the board 
room. As discussed, some conceptual literature on female board participation suggests that 
women make for more effective board directors, take their board roles more seriously and 
encourage wider and more robust debates. Scholars have long noted that empirical research 
on board process and firm performance is in short supply (Pettigrew 1992). This is 
primarily due to difficulties associated with gaining access to the board. Kahl (1957) 
suggested that people in power are unlikely to invite scholars to observe how they 
exercised that power over others, whilst Burke suggested the board is shrouded in “…a veil 
of privacy or secrecy” (Burke, 1994, p 3) which the board is anxious to maintain. Recently, 
corporate governance reviews and reforms have placed an increased focus on personal 
liability and an associated potential for litigation. This potential for litigation may be a 
contributing factor to board’s reluctance to admit outsiders in to observe how they perform 
their custodial duties (Bostrom, 2003; Daily et al., 2003; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) 
However, these obstacles to board room access should not be a deterrent of such 
magnitude as to dismiss attempts at pursuing empirical work in this field. Methodological 
means notwithstanding, interesting insight into real nature of female contributions on the 
board may be made from qualitative studies into women’s role on the board, where they 
contribute, the manner in which they do, the approach they take to the work and what the 
company and the women themselves stand to gain from their involvement on the highest 
decision-making corporate body.  
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
Extant literature on female corporate board directors has made substantial advances in our 
understanding of what drives women’s participation at the corporate board level. 
Conceptual and theoretical scholarship has illustrated the positive contribution women can 
make to board proceedings and firm performance and highlighted the professional 
requirements women must fulfil to successfully ascend the corporate board. Most research 
into women’s prevalence on boards to date has been framed in board level theories. 
Notwithstanding the advances that have been made in the wake of these theories, 
opportunities for further conceptual development and empirical research present 
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themselves in a number of areas, relating to institutional context, particular corporate 
governance mechanisms and alternative conceptual perspectives.   
 
This chapter addressed three objectives: It assessed the dominant themes in the broader 
empirical and conceptual board literature.  Secondly, it provided a review of the literature 
on women corporate board directors, and third it articulated a research agenda. The next 
chapter develops the conceptual framework for this thesis.  
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3. Women on the corporate board: An institutional perspective 
The previous chapter made two important observations on the literature which has 
evaluated the prevalence and role of women on the board to date:  Firstly, the dominant 
theoretical perspectives employed thus far have been board level theories; in particular 
agency, stewardship and resource dependence theory have dominated research. The second 
observation relates to the analytical levels observed in the literature. The majority of 
studies to date are single-level in nature and usually focused on firm or industry level. To 
broaden our understanding of why women are able to acquire corporate board directorships 
in some contexts, but not in others, it is similarly necessary to widen the theoretical 
perspective beyond board level theories, to take account of broader contextual influences. 
To do so, the conceptual framework developed in this chapter is informed by institutional 
theory and draws particularly on Scott’s (1995) synthesis and articulation of institutional 
theory. This chapter has three key objectives: firstly, to review the disciplinary foundations 
of institutional theory and to establish a clear picture of the multi-disciplinary strands of 
theory that informs it. The second objective is to delineate Scott’s conception of  
institutional theory as reflected in this three institutional ‘pillars’ and the final objective is 
to apply the theoretical logic of these three pillars to the study of women’s prevalence on 
the corporate board of directors and develop a multi-level conceptual framework. Each 
objective will be addressed in turn. 
 
3.1. Institutional theory 
This section provides a succinct view of the analytical heritage of institutional theory.  This 
section does not attempt to provide a definitive review of institutional theory, but focuses 
instead on some of the core elements that are central to the framework developed by Scott 
(1995) and more broadly applicable to the study of women’s prevalence on corporate 
boards. (For more comprehensive literature reviews of institutional analysis see for 
example Heugens and Lander, 2009; Scott, 1987; Dugger, 1988; Hodgson, 2007; Stern and 
Barley, 1996).  
 
3.1.1. The disciplinary foundations of institutional theory 
Institutional theory covers a “sprawling literature” (Thelen, 1999, p 370) characterised by 
pluralities and dichotomies of perspective, making definite distinctions and categorisations 
difficult to make. Institutional theory emerged from these three separate but related 
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academic disciplines: sociology, economics and political science. Institutional theorists in 
sociology were particularly concerned with understanding, characterising and describing 
human behaviour (see for example Cooley, 1897, 1902, 1956; Hughes, 1937; Durkheim, 
1949; Weber, 1947, 1968), whilst political scientists researched national governance 
systems and the role of the state in directing action (Wilson, 1887; Willoughby, 1898, 
1901a, 1901b; Catlin, 1927; Dahl, 1961). Institutional economics challenged some of the 
fundamental assumptions of economic models, such as the pattern of human behaviour 
implicit in much economic theory, and brought attention to the particular characteristics of 
the individual transaction, and ultimately how the context within which transactions took 
place influenced the character, nature and type of the economic system (Veblen, 1909; 
Commons, 1932; North, 1981; Williamson, 1985; Whitley, 1992).  
 
The following outline of the salient facets of institutional theory from sociology, political 
science and economics focuses on scholars of particular importance to the framework 
proposed by Scott (1995). No distinction or discussion is made of categorisation of 
particular theorists as ‘old’, ‘new’ or ‘neo’. Next, the disciplinary foundations of 
sociologically grounded institutional theory are explored, then those of political science 
and lastly economics.  
 
Institutional theorists in sociology have long been concerned with influences on human 
behaviour, and in particular contextual influences on behaviour and social relations, such 
as norms, values, culturally supported and taken-for-granted assumptions, and how 
behavioural patterns become established and endure (Parsons and Barber, 1948; Durkheim, 
1981; Weber, 1981; Jepperson, 1991). An institution has been defined in a myriad ways in 
sociology, each definition reflecting the individual scholar’s particular interest or bias 
(Durkheim, 2005; Lockwood, 1956; Ward, 1896). However, common elements across the 
spectrum are the notions of consistent pervasive behaviour, the role played by norms, 
values and the cultural influence of habitual assumptions on ‘how things are done’ and 
wider contextual influences. Drawing on the conceptions of institutions found in extant 
scholarly sociological literature Barley and Tolbert (1997) define an institution as “shared 
rules and typefications that identify categories of social actors and their appropriate 
activities and relationships” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997, p 96). The process by which such 
shared rules and common understandings of behavioural norms develop is referred to as 
the process of institutionalization (Jepperson, 1991). Sociological literature offers 
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numerous definitions of this process, with similar themes emerging, such as the rule-like 
status behaviour takes on in particular circumstances, with clearly defined normative 
expectations of what constitutes acceptable behaviour, a need for conformity and the 
development of a common understanding of what is “appropriate and fundamentally 
meaningful behaviour” (Zucker, 1983, p 5). In Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) definition of an 
institution, the behavioural pattern that is established as a result of the shared rules and 
typifications, acquires a status of legitimacy and propriety. “Institutionalization is both a 
process and a property variable. It is the process by which individual actors transmit what 
is socially defined as real and, at the same time, at any point in the process the meaning of 
an act can be defined as more or less taken-for-granted part of this social reality. 
Institutionalized acts then, must be perceived as both objective and exterior” (Zucker, 
1977, p 728).  
 
Early scholars of institutional theory in sociology such as Cooley (1902) and Hughes 
(1937, 1945) saw the interplay between social structures and how “society makes the man, 
and how the man makes society” (Cooley, 1897, p 2) as important to understanding human 
behaviour and identity. Cooley argued that objective institutions such as the church and 
government were not external to the individual, but were maintained, developed and 
reinforced through continued human interaction with these institutions; “Individuals are 
always the cause as well as the effect of institutions” (Cooley, 1956, p 313).  Hughes 
(1937) identified professional positions of power such as that of executive directors, and 
professional occupations such as doctors and lawyers, as a particularly important force in 
reinforcing behaviour. Certain positions of authority, he argued, had established roles and 
rituals associated with them whereby professionals inhabiting these roles become “within 
the limits of their office, especially responsible for the fate of their fellows, and for the 
integrity of their communities” (Hughes, 1937, p 405). Such roles and accepted patterns of 
behaviour as identified by Cooley and Hughes, were the object of study of Durkheim.  
 
Durkheim (1949) originally set out to explore the basis of social order, and in the course of 
his work came to emphasise the role and importance of normative and symbolic belief 
systems. Such belief patterns informed individual behaviour by being seen as facts; they 
were external to the person, but the person concerned felt normatively obliged to conform 
and thus behaved according to these ‘social facts’. Weber complemented this view with 
what he termed ‘social actions’ (1924; 1968; 1981). Making the connection between 
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meaning and action, Weber saw social action occurring wherever “human action is 
subjectively related in meaning [original italics] to the behaviour of others” (Weber, 1981, 
p 159). He proposed that individuals acted according to particular norms of expected 
behaviour in a given social situation partly because coercive pressures would restrain 
deviant behaviour if it were to take place, and partly because the individual implicitly 
accepted the social norms and meanings attached to them, when he or she engaged in a 
given social interaction.  
 
Focusing at the organisational level, Selznick (1957) argued, organisations took on a more 
intrinsic role, and became “infused with value beyond the technical task at hand” 
(Selznick, 1957, p 17). Organisations were no longer just an inanimate source of income 
for its employees; they also derived meaning and value from their engagement with the 
organisations. Berger and Luckmann (1967) continued in a similar vein. Attaching 
importance to meaning and behaviour they saw humans as capable of constructing their 
own reality, stressing the focal role of cognition. Rather than seeing actors as behaving in a 
passive manner, meekly following institutional pressures and norms, Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) recognised that individual action was influenced by how actors 
cognitively interpreted the world around them and how they chose to respond, and from 
thence created their reality.  From Berger and Luckmann’s insights, Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) suggested that organisational structure reflected an individual’s socially constructed 
reality, and organisations institutionalised practices that reflected culturally determined 
values rather than forms of efficiency. Rather than just focusing on the organisation as a 
technically sophisticated instrument for efficient output, Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
highlighted the role played by cultural rules in constructing a complementary basis for 
organisations. They suggested that cultural practices provided another basis for 
organisational isomorphism, the process by which institutions adopt practices that are 
pervasive in the environment within which they operate. Previously, isomorphic adaptation 
had generally been associated with technical efficiency, but Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
suggested instead that cultural isomorphism allowed organisations to be more directly 
responsive to their environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) looked more closely at this 
process of isomorphism and identified three different forms of isomorphism, mimetic, 
coercive and normative. They argued different circumstances would engender different 
forms of isomorphism, but that irrespective of which isomorphic process was at play, 
organisations were likely to conform to institutional expectations to gain legitimacy, rather 
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than necessarily improve performance. “…legitimacy will be determined by the amount of 
consensus…regarding the appropriateness of the means selected to achieve the desired 
ends” (Scott, 1991, p 170). 
 
Institutional theorists in sociology outlined the salient characteristics of human behaviour 
and linked behaviour to the organisational context. In particular scholars connected the 
“web of values, norms, rules, beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions” (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997, p 94) inherent in organisational practice to the observed patterns of 
individual actions and detailed the process by which this happened: the process of 
institutionalisation. Next, institutional theory as reflected in political science is explored. 
 
The role and nature of governance systems and how politics influence action are themes 
from political science that are important elements of institutional theory. As in sociology, 
the notion of an institution in political science is multifaceted, and definitions vary slightly 
depending on the scholar’s particular allegiance (March, 1962; Tashjean, 1973). A 
definition that seems to capture a number of the most salient elements of political 
institutions emphasised in literature, such as the role of rules of conduct, repertoires, order, 
the state and procedures (Dahl, 1959; March and Olsen, 1989; Whitley, 2007; North et al., 
2007), is that provided by Hall and Taylor (1996), who defined an institution in the 
political science realm as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in organizational structure of the polity or political economy. They can range 
from the rules of a constitutional order….to the conventions governing trade-union 
behaviour” (p 6).    
 
Early political scientists concerned themselves largely with descriptive comparative studies 
of different governance systems, the role of law and moral philosophy (Scott, 1995). These 
scholars attached great importance to understanding the historical origin of different 
political systems and how varieties of governance systems responded to challenges. 
Political scientists such as Burgess, Wilson and Willoughby were influential in this work. 
Willoughby wrote a series on the particulars of French labour laws (1898, 1901a, 1901b) 
and the governance of American industry (1901c, 1905). Wilson analysed systems of 
politics, governance and administration (1887), and Burgess (1886) wrote on constitutional 
law and moral philosophy. These political institutional scholars helped chart political 
waters and provided rich descriptive work detailing governance systems.  
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Despite the careful analysis of these national political structures, it became increasingly 
clear in the 1920s and 1930s that there were political powers and elements at play that the 
early institutional scholars in political science had failed to account for, such as the 
collapse of the German democracy and the rise of fascism and the emergence of the USA 
as a ‘superpower’ (Blyth and Varghese, 1999).  In 1945 the American Social Research 
Council also strongly argued that political science research should be concerned with the 
study of political behaviour, “with the object of formulating and testing hypotheses, 
concerning uniformities of behaviour in different institutional settings” (Dahl, 1961, p 
764). In response to these changes and inherent shortcomings in the descriptive work that 
had gone before, political science turned to the individual as a unit of analysis, and in 
particular an individual’s political behaviour. This ushered in the area of behaviouralism in 
political science (Kim, 1965; Blyth and Varghese, 1999; Scott, 1995).  The lens shifted 
from institutional structures to what political behaviours individuals adopted, and what 
distributive effect this engendered (March and Olsen, 1989). The subject of political 
science was no longer the state but the individual (Catlin, 1927). Dahl (1961) summarised 
the major achievements of the behaviouralist approach as providing better insight and 
understanding into: voting behaviour, political participation and “understanding the 
psychological characteristics of homo politicus [original italics]” (Dahl, 1961, p 769).  In 
parallel with the rise of behaviouralism, comparative politics continued in the political 
science domain, which trumpeted the virtues of the ‘advanced states’ like that of the US 
and suggested that other less developed nations failed to progress due to lack of 
appropriate institutional structures (Parsons, 1951). Until the 1960s the behaviouralist and 
the comparative strand of political science continued to develop. In the 1960s and 1970s 
when social upheaval and financial stagnation caused a loss of belief in the dominant 
political theories, an interest in rational choice emerged as an alternative to the 
behaviouralist approach (Blyth and Varghese, 1999).  
 
 Recent work in political science concerned with institutions has, according to Scott 
(1995), continued along two specific lines of academic enquiry. One is concerned with 
detailed analytical, and often comparative, work of governance systems, similar to that of 
early institutional theorists in political science, while scholars such as March and Olsen 
(1989, 1994, 2000), Hall and Soskice (2001), and Whitley (1992, 1999, 2000) argue 
political institutions include elements of both a formal and an informal nature that direct 
behaviour and choice. Specifically, institutions constrain behaviour and delineate what 
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options are available to the individual (Scott, 1995). Political institutions provide the 
context for constraining and empowering behaviour, and political actors such as the state 
are influential in shaping human behaviour. The second line of academic enquiry is that of 
rational choice theory.  
 
Rational choice theorists view governance and rules systems as institutions and explain the 
origin of institutions by reference to the original intended purpose of the institution 
(Weingast, 1979; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). Rational actors, looking to realise personal 
ambitions or goals, create institutions with a view to solving specific preference dilemmas 
and achieve their individual desired outcomes (Moe, 1990; Scott, 1995). This approach to 
thinking about institutions is not dissimilar to that seen in institutional economics, which 
will be discussed next, but the particular characteristics of political institutions differ from 
economics. In political science decisions revolve around the interest of the public and those 
emphasised in the context of such frameworks as majority rules, whilst in economics, 
market transactions emphasise the need to satisfy supply and demand.  Political science 
thus articulated some of the wider societal contexts within which institutions such as the 
state operate, and illuminated the process by which decisions are made and by association, 
outcomes instigated through rational choice theory.  
 
The rational choice theorists and the historically focused political scientists concur on the 
importance of institutions in the domain of political science and agree that “institutions 
provide the strategic context within which political actors make policy choices” (Steinmo 
and Tolbert, 1992, p 165) but they differ in their view of whether people create institutions 
or institutions shape individual behaviour and choice.  
 
Early institutional theorists in political science built the foundations of what is today an 
important and continued heritage in governance, that of comparative politics. This 
engendered an understanding of the nature and role of national governance as institutional 
context. Subsequently, behaviouralists illuminated how the individual and the state 
influenced, and were influenced by, this institutional context, and how this symbiosis 
influenced behaviour, directed action, and opened up the debate, which is still ongoing, of 
whether institutions constrained or enabled action. Next, the third discipline from which 
institutional theory emerged is discussed. 
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Pioneering institutional economists were also concerned with individual behaviour, 
especially in the context of commercial transactions. The early origins of institutional 
economics stemmed from dissatisfaction with the dominant economic model of the time: 
that of the utility-maximising rational man, who possessed perfect information, traded in a 
perfectly competitive environment where transactions were costless, supply infinite and 
national character non-existent (Furubotn and Richter, 2008; Scott, 1995: Mayhew, 1987).  
Scholars began questioning the assumption of the rational, utility-maximising man in 
particular. The assumptions inherent in this premise, they argued, were removed from 
reality and did not reflect the actual decision-making process that took place when people 
decided to trade. Instead habit and innate routine and taken-for-granted behaviours played 
a more dominant role in economic decision-making. Consumers for example, did not make 
decisions on consumption in a rational vacuum (Veblen, 1909). Culture, internalised 
preferences and wider societal constructs such as the legal framework played a role in the 
economic process (Veblen, 1908; Commons, 1924, 1932; Parsons, 1941; Duesenberry, 
1949; Hodgson, 1998).  
 
Veblen (1908) and Commons (1924, 1932) suggested that the focus should be on the 
individual economic transactions, the wider institutional environment, and the ‘rules of 
conduct’ that governed such an exchange. These rules of conduct Commons (1924) argued 
are social institutions. In Common’s (1932) words institutional economics is the 
“collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual action” (p 50). Veblen 
and Commons both departed from the traditional ideas of economics. In particular, Veblen 
spoke of the integrated nature of human existence, “in the economic respect, man has never 
lived an isolated self-sufficient life as an individual, either actually or potentially…the 
phenomena of human life occurs only in this form…[existence] is a matter of knowledge, 
usage, habits of life and habits of thought” (Veblen, 1908, p 518). This body of intrinsic 
knowledge that people carry with them informs and shapes transactions.  
 
The role and importance of the transaction as a unit of analysis in economics became 
increasingly important in institutional economic theory. Coase and Williamson in 
particular pursued the transaction as a focal unit of analysis. Coase (1937) questioned why 
certain transactions took place within the firm, whilst others were carried out in the market 
place and concluded that the price mechanism in the market place in certain cases offered a 
more costly option than conducting the business in-house. Following Coase (1937) a hiatus 
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in the development of institutional economics followed, which led scholars like Boulding 
(1957) to suggest that it was a theoretical interlude “an interlude, it is true, of considerable 
interest, and one which made real, if small, contributions to the mainstream of economic 
thought” (p 1). Rather than being an interlude, institutional economics re-emerged to 
prominence when Williamson (1985) extended Coase’s work to include wider frameworks 
of governance and emphasised the notion of bounded rationality. Where previously 
individuals had been assumed to possess perfect knowledge and make rational decisions 
based on this perfect insight, bounded rationality accepted human fallibility. Bounded 
rationality recognised that decisions were not made based on perfect knowledge, but the 
available knowledge and that a less rational aspect, such as opportunism, may play a part 
in the economic transaction-making process. From this perspective Williamson (1985) saw 
institutional economics as concerned with organising “transactions so as to economize on 
bounded rationality, while simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of 
opportunism” (p 32). An important safeguard in this respect was property rights, which 
according to North (1991) were fundamental to economic activity as “a capital market 
entails security of property rights over time, and will simply not evolve where political 
rulers can arbitrarily seize assets or radically alter their value” (ibid. p 101).  North focused 
on the structure and institutions of economics as they related to performance of economic 
systems over time (North, 1978, 1981; Furubotn and Richter, 2008).  According to North, 
the institutional environment defined property rights, and if it were not for institutionally 
grounded property rights, economic exchange would cease (North, 1971; Richter and 
Furubotn, 2008).  
 
Institutional economics represented a very different view of economic theory from that 
observed in the classic version of it. Instead of assuming the consumer was rational and 
focused on maximising utility, institutional economics recognised the role played by the 
limits of humans’ cognitive ability, the role played by culture, habits and social rules. In 
the institutional view of economics, transactions were no longer costless and could not 
easily be disentangled from their context. Rather, where and how transactions took place 
was in part a result of the prevailing institutional environment, the provision of adequate 
governance and legal provisions such as property law, and habitualised behaviour.   
 
Hence, institutional theory developed from three distinct but related academic disciplines. 
This section has highlighted elements of institutional theory that informed Scott’s (1995) 
 64 
synthesis. The sociological view of institutional theory emphasised the role played by 
actors in creating and maintaining patterns of values and behaviours that constrained and 
enabled action. The political science strand of institutional theory emphasised the 
importance of political systems as context and the role of rational choice, collective action 
and associated outcomes of action, whilst institutional economics has sought to incorporate 
more realistic assumptions of human interaction in transactions and governance and to 
place the transaction in a broader institutional context. Whilst disparate in many regards, 
institutional theory as reflected in sociology, political science and economics, is concerned 
with human behaviour, their values, beliefs and norms inform, guide and foster their 
actions, habits and interactions.  
 
3.2. Scott’s Pillars 
Recognising the “sprawling” yet related nature of institutional theory as articulated in 
economics, political science and sociology, Scott (1995) identified the need for 
assimilating elements of commonality and complementarity across the facets of 
institutional theory, to better harness its latent conceptual strength. To that end he 
synthesised the disparate strands into a coherent framework. Scott (1995) defines 
institutional theory as consisting of “cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions 
are transported by various carriers – symbolic and relational systems and routines – and 
they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction” (p 33). Scott’s (1995) framework has 
successfully been applied in management research on corporate governance (Judge et al., 
2008), logistics management (Koulikoff-Souviron and Harrison, 2008) and international 
business (Trevino et al., 2008). The regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive structures, 
or “pillars” as Scott refers to them, included in the above definition form the core elements 
of his framework. These pillars represent the manifestations of the various academic 
elements encapsulated in institutional theory as thus described. The regulative pillar 
reflects elements of institutional thought in economics and political science, in particular 
an emphasis on the role played by rules of law and governance systems, such as legally 
sanctioned property rights highlighted by North (1978). The normative and cultural-
cognitive pillars draw more heavily on the sociological heritage reflecting the importance 
of societal norms (Durkheim, 1974; Weber, 1947, 1968), culturally bound contexts 
(Veblen, 1909) and human cognition (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Each pillar supports a 
particular strand of institutional theory, and collectively the three pillars offer a more 
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complete understanding of institutions. Depending on scholarly focus, authors have placed 
different emphasis on the three pillars in their research (Scott, 1995). 
Figure 3.1 Scott's framework of institutional theory* 
 Regulative Normative Cultural-
Cognitive** 
Emphasis 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken for granted 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, laws and 
sanctions 
Certification, 
accreditation 
Prevalence, 
isomorphism 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally 
supported, 
conceptually correct 
*Adopted from Scott, 1995, p 35 with permission from the publisher.  ** The Cultural-Cognitive pillar is 
referred to as the cognitive pillar in Scott (1995), but in subsequent work he refers to the pillar as the 
cultural-cognitive pillar (see Scott, W. R. (2003). "Institutional carriers: reviewing modes of transporting 
ideas over time and space and considering their consequences." Industrial and Corporate Change 12(4): 
879-89). 
 
Next, the three institutional pillars will be discussed in turn, starting with the regulative 
pillar, followed by the normative and finally the cultural-cognitive pillar.  
 
The regulative pillar highlights the value of rules and laws for efficiently enforcing 
acceptable behaviour and establishing a predictable context for institutions. Scott (1995) 
argues that the regulative pillar is the most pervasive in the literature and that all scholars 
concerned with institutional theory are concerned with the way in which it “constrains and 
regularizes behaviour” (p 35). The regulative pillar is thought to be particularly salient to 
economists and academics with a particular interest in market forces and competitive 
interaction (ibid). It draws on the notion or ‘rules of conduct’ and process of decision-
making from early institutional theory in economics and political science to understand 
how the various interests at play in the market place are able to negotiate outcomes that 
satisfy the many competing parties. Corporate governance mechanisms and statutory 
bodies concerned with regulating financial markets and industry competitiveness in 
particular play a pivotal role in attempting to control market forces (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; LaPorta et al., 1999; Bebchuk and Roe, 1999).  From a regulative view, for 
organisations and corporations to gain legitimacy they have to comply with prevailing 
applicable laws. The mechanism by which judicial legitimacy is attained is through 
coercive pressures, such as legal sanctions enforceable by law. Firms and organizations 
that fail to adhere to relevant laws may be punished. This could result in financial losses, 
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loss of reputation, esteem and even closure.  Corporations therefore have a dual imperative 
to comply: to legitimate the business from a regulative perspective, and to enhance the 
prospects for the continuity of the firm as a going concern (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995).   
 
Whereas the regulative pillar highlights the role played by laws, rules and governance 
efficiency, the normative pillar draws on values and norms. Building on the work of 
institutional theorists in sociology such as Durkheim (1949), Parsons (1937, 1951) and 
Selznick (1948, 1957) the normative pillar is concerned with normative rules and how 
behaviour is informed and shaped by prescriptive and obligatory societal influences. Scott 
(1995) draws a distinction between norms and values, seeing norms as specifying “how 
things should be done” (p 37) and values as “conceptions of the preferred or desirable 
together with the standards to which existing structures or behaviour can be compared and 
assessed” (p 37); in other words, values delineate the goals, norms specify how to achieve 
them. The normative pillar is anchored in appropriateness, what society perceives as due 
behaviour for any given situation. Under the normative pillar, Scott (1995) identifies a 
particular set of norms and values that are only of relevance to a subset of the actors under 
analysis; these values and norms constitute roles. Roles are clearly defined expectations of 
behaviour and action by individuals who either inhabit particular positions of authority or 
who sit in particular positions of power and influence. Previous examples of such roles 
include those accorded radiologists and radiological technologists in major teaching 
hospitals (Barley, 1986). These roles provide a clear blue-print for what is expected from 
an individual and compliance is often a requisite for success. Scott (1995) suggests these 
roles are “prescriptions - normative expectations - of what the actors are supposed to do” 
(ibid. p 38) in a given context. Drawing on moral as its basis for legitimacy, where the 
regulative pillar was legally sanctioned, normative institutions are value-laden and 
concerned with what is ‘the right thing to do’ in any given situation (Suchman, 1995; 
Scott, 1995; Greenwood et al., 2002). Organisations acquire normative legitimacy by 
adhering to industry standards and acquiring recognition, membership, certification and 
accreditation by influential industry bodies. Normative legitimacy signals that 
organisations are doing ‘the right thing’ (Ruef and Scott, 1998).  
 
Influenced by Berger and Luckmann’s (1968) work on social order and Zucker’s (1987) 
research into hierarchy, behaviour and power, the focus of the cognitive pillar is on actors’ 
interpretation and negotiation of, and actions within, their environment, the “rules that 
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constitute the nature of reality and frames through which meaning is made” (Scott, 1995, 
40). The cognitive pillar stresses the importance of symbols, signs, language and culture 
for the construction of meaning. Berger and Kellner (1965) argued such social institutions 
were central to the creation of social stability, “they are the culturally produced forms by 
which human activity is given coherence and continuity” (p 112). It is in the context of this 
framework of continuity and stability that individuals create meaning and negotiate their 
reality. An important cognitive element in this process of coherence and continuity is the 
notion of constitutive rules. Constitutive rules were articulated by Searle (1969), where he 
suggested individuals created categories and constructed typifications in their mind and 
allocated subjective experiences to these categories and typifications. Constitutive rules 
can be relevant not only to experiences, but also physical objects and sensations (Searle, 
1969; D’Andrade, 1984; Scott, 1995) D’Andrade (1984) illustrated the concept of 
constitutive rules by arguing “without the system of constitutive rules called football, the 
behaviours of scoring, blocking, passing and so on would not exist” (p 94), and by creating 
these cognitive rules, people create reality (D’Andrade, 1984). Constitutive rules offer a 
cognitive mechanism for social interaction as they provide a guide for what an individual 
sees as appropriate action in any given situation (Wicks, 2002). 
 
As the normative and cultural cognitive pillars are largely informed by the same body of 
mainly sociological literature, there are elements of overlap between them. However, there 
are also important elements that separate them. The normative pillar takes a more rigid 
view stressing the centrality of defined roles, whilst the cognitive pillar emphasises the 
individual subjective interpretation of what constitutes the right course of action in any 
given situation. Despite the emphasis on the subjective interpretation and negotiation of a 
given situation under the cultural-cognitive pillar, certain patterns of behaviour and 
collective structures are consistently found across countries. The cognitive pillar suggests 
the widespread adoption of such structures is due to mimetic isomorphism, whereby others, 
be they collectives or individuals, adopt structures that are perceived to be effective or that 
enable conformity and legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such consistency is 
grounded in the ‘taken-for-granted’ nature of prevailing practices which if adopted, 
encourage an appreciation of how the actor or organisation fits into society (Aldrich and 
Fiol, 1994). The cultural-cognitive pillar accounts for the cultural, innate, subjective views 
of institutions and emphasises “the socially mediated construction of a common framework 
of meaning” (Scott, 1995, p 45).  
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Institutional carriers 
So far this chapter has reviewed the disciplinary foundations of institutional theory and 
articulated the analytical framework Scott (1995) built based on these related facets of 
institutional theory. The second part of Scott’s framework, as highlighted in his definition 
of institutional theory, relates to carriers of institutions, and to complete the explication of 
Scott’s framework, carriers are briefly described here.  
 
Institutional carriers represent the mechanisms through which institutions are transported 
between actors and collectives across boundaries, jurisdictions and societal levels (Scott, 
1995; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Thornton, 2002).  Unlike the term ‘institutional theory’ 
there is no oft cited, succinct and final definition of what constitutes a carrier. Jepperson 
(1991) first employed the term carrier in talking about “informally organized 
institutionalization” (p 150), suggesting carriers enable institutionalisation. He refers to 
three types of carriers: regimes, cultures and organizations. By regimes, Jepperson talks of 
institutionalisation through formal regimes such as legislative bodies enforced by 
monitoring and sanctions, whilst culture is “customary and conventional in character” and 
they are not subjected to formal monitoring by laws (ibid, p 150). Organizations are formal 
embodiments and transmitters of institutions. Regimes and culture on the other hand, are 
not dependent on formal organisational structures; instead they rely on individuals as 
repositories and conveyers of institutions. Scott (1995, 2003) modifies Jepperson’s view 
and talks of symbolic systems, relational systems and routines. Looking beyond the 
semantics, both scholars draw attention to the social structures that actors take their 
behavioural cues from, actors being the embodiment of the prevailing institutional 
landscape within which they operate; “while multiple modes of transmission exists, among 
the most influential are the human actors” (Scott, 2008, p 227).  
 
The multi-level nature of institutions 
So far, the topic of the domains over which institutional influences apply has been over-
looked; this will be dealt with next. It is imperative to recognise that institutional logics 
apply across levels of analysis, be they of a regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive 
origin, and irrespective of which institutional carriers are engaged. Scott (1995) refers to 
these levels as jurisdictions, and highlights that the focal level of analysis depends on the 
nature of the phenomenon being analysed, whether of a macro, meso or micro nature. The 
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notion of jurisdictions explicates that interconnected nature between “the zones of 
contracting and exchange between legally defined organizations, between organizations 
and communities and within organizations” (Blau, 1996, p 174). Extant research 
employing institutional analysis has successfully investigated phenomena at the multi-
country (see for example Bruce et al., 2005; Mazza and Pedersen, 2004), societal (see for 
example Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), firm (see for example Tan and Jun, 2007) and firm 
sub-unit level (Westphal et al., 2001, Westphal and Milton, 2002).  
 
The application of the institutional pillars to multiple levels of analysis highlights the 
nested nature of institutions. Organizational sub-units, entire organizations, communities or 
nation states are influenced by one another. Lawrence and Suddaby (1997) argue that if 
researchers are to understand the characteristics of an object of study, irrespective of the 
institutional level at which it occurs, they must appreciate the nested nature of institutions, 
and thus the jurisdictional levels that influence, and are influenced by, the level at which 
the study is focused. A particular strength of Scott’s (1995) three pillars is the 
encapsulation of a range of conceptualisations of institutions. The many varieties of 
institutional theory contained within the three pillars means the theoretical framework is 
applicable across a wider range of analytical levels, time frames, sample sizes and spaces.  
 
Summary 
In conclusion, institutions are multifaceted and originate in, and apply to, a variety of 
settings and through a variety of processes. Institutions constrain and enable action, define 
a firm’s context with its wider environment and enable the creation and maintenance of 
firms and markets.  There are three dominant types of institutions: regulative, normative 
and culturally framed institutions that address different aspects of institutional theory. The 
regulative pillar defines the legislative and rules-based aspects of a firm’s environment, 
covering those institutions that are coercively enforced. The normative pillar relies on 
values and morally governed behaviour that emanate from a sense of social obligation. 
Under the normative pillar the notion of roles emerges, where clearly defined patterns of 
behaviour associated with particular jobs or societal positions are adhered to. The cultural-
cognitive pillar on the other hand relies on taken-for-granted assumptions of how things 
are done, and emphasises the role played by cognition both in individuals’ definition of 
what constitutes reality  and also in how they decide to respond to this reality 
behaviourally.  Institutions operate at a number of societal levels, and they apply at the 
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national, industry and firm level. Specifically, the multiplicity of jurisdictions over which 
institutions play a role makes institutional theory a promising framework for understanding 
the various influences on the prevalence of women on the corporate board of directors in 
an international perspective.  
 
3.3. Institutions & women on the board 
Having outlined the key elements of an institutional theory approach, the time has come to 
apply Scott’s (1995) institutional perspective to explaining variation in the prevalence of 
women on corporate boards, drawing together a coherent multi-level research framework.  
 
As highlighted in the literature review, extant literature on female board directors has 
researched questions surrounding women’s place on the board at either the individual 
(Sheridan and Milgate, 2003, 2005), board, firm, industry (Ruigrok et al., 2007; Hillman et 
al., 2007; Brammer et al., 2007; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Peterson and Philpot, 2006) 
or national level (Terjesen and Singh, 2008; Grosvold et al., 2008) and conceptually 
research has largely been grounded in board level or individual level theories, such as 
agency and resource dependence theory (Francouer et al., 2008; Hillman et al., 2007; 
Peterson and Philpot, 2006; Ruigrok et al., 2007). The multiplicity of potential influences 
on the prevalence of women on corporate boards suggests that a research framework is 
required which moves away from the single-level perspective that has so far been pursued, 
to encompass Scott’s (1995) three pillars which operate at multiple, interrelated levels of 
analysis. Consonant with Scott’s conceptualisation of institutional theory, here it is argued 
that the prevalence of women on the corporate board of directors should be considered in 
the context of institutional processes at the national, industry and firm level. To further 
academic understanding of this phenomenon, a proposed nested research framework, 
informed by institutional theory is outlined below, where a proposition is made for each 
pillar at each level of analysis. 
 
3.3.1. National level institutions and women corporate board directors 
At heart, the argument put forth herein is that scholars who have researched the gender 
composition of corporate boards have largely failed to ‘contextualise’ their research 
(Terjesen and Singh, 2008), and in particular the importance of national level institutional 
factors in accounting for some of the differences observed in the prevailing gender 
demography of corporate boards has been overlooked.  In this section it is argued that the 
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role national level institutions may play is significant in shaping the gender constitution of 
corporate boards.  
 
Elements of the regulative pillar have been found to impact a range of corporate 
governance facets, including corporate legitimacy (Judge et al., 2009), corporate board 
structure (Li and Harrison, 2008), executive pay (Bruce et al., 2005) and national transition 
and change (Jonnergard et al., 2004; Peng, 2004). Despite successful research into the 
effects of country-specific institutional arrangements in the corporate governance domain, 
the potential impact of national level institutions on prevalence of female corporate board 
directors is largely unexplored. Here, the role played by the regulative pillar is discussed 
with reference to two particular salient facets of the regulative environment: the 
enforcement of gender equality legislation and the proportion elected parliamentary 
positions occupied by women.  
 
Scholarly research that directly assesses the role of regulative institutions and the 
proportion of female board directors is limited.  Evidence of the role played by the 
regulative pillar in promoting women on the board was found by Terjesen and Singh 
(2008) who explored the role of societal factors, including women’s dominance in political 
positions, the enforcement of gender equitable pay structures and the role of political 
liberation for the prevalence of women on the board. Their findings suggested women in 
recently democratized countries such as those of the former Eastern European bloc had a 
better chance of gaining board directorships than women in more established western 
democracies, suggesting where gender equality had been actively pursued in established 
democracies, women decided to focus on political rather than commercial careers. Agrawal 
and Knoeber (2001) explored whether female board directors served on the boards of 
corporations that were under particular public pressure to have a more gender diverse 
board.  The authors found an increasing trend in the predominance of female board 
directors over time, but nothing to suggest that firms or industries subjected to political 
pressure for more diverse boards had more women directors. However, no other studies the 
author is aware of explicitly investigate regulative determinants of women’s prevalence on 
the board of directors.   
 
The recent rise in the involvement of the state in the governance of business, and in 
particular the rise of legislation and corporate governance frameworks specifically 
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encompassing the role of the corporate board of directors, suggests facets of the regulatory 
pillar are increasingly shaping board demography (Cahan and Wilkinson, 1999; Valenti, 
2008). In particular, the gender profile of the corporate board has been scrutinised. 
Influential corporate governance reviews, such as the Higgs Review (2003), assessed the 
characteristics of UK board rooms and concluded there was a serious lack of women, 
which undermined firms’ expressed desire to improve their corporate governance 
practices. Legislation, corporate governance best practice and industry coercion have all 
influenced women’s rate of board room participation and are examples of symbolic system 
carriers under the regulative pillar (Scott, 2003; Valenti, 2008). Legislation has influenced 
the gender composition of corporate boards directly and indirectly. Legislation specifically 
aimed at the demography of the corporate board of directors has been passed in Norway 
and Spain (Det Kongelige Barne og Familie Departement, 2002; Reier, 2008). Indirectly, 
the enforcement of strong and efficient gender equality laws, such as the application of 
civil-rights legislation to university admission in the US which resulted in women pursuing 
business careers and MBAs to a greater degree (Schneer and Reitman, 1994), has played a 
contributing role in changing the gender profile of the corporate board of directors.  
 
However, the efficacy of the regulative pillar rests in part on its legitimacy. The successful 
enforcement of affirmative action, gender equality laws and corporate governance 
frameworks rests on the country’s ability to put these measures into effect. As such, the 
regulative pillar makes explicit the role of the state in institutional theory, “Because 
ultimately a third party must always involve the state as a source of coercion, a theory of 
institutions also inevitably involves an analysis of the political structure of society and the 
degree to which that political structure provides a framework of effective enforcement” 
(North, 1990, p 64). As this study is concerned with largely developed, or rapidly 
developing countries, where gender equitable legislation is common, the manifestation of 
the regulative pillar places emphasis on how effectively such legislation is enforced.   
 
Another manifestation of the regulative pillar is the degree to which women are afforded 
the same opportunities as men in parliament. By appointing women into ministerial 
positions, women are able to influence the very legislative process that governs national 
gender equality. Women continue to fall behind men in acquiring political influence and 
civic positions of power, partly as a result of the prevailing national institutional 
environment which may associate men with power and partly due to cultural path 
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dependence (Shaul, 1982; Considine and Deutchman, 1994). Studies of Russia and 
Ukraine (Andreenkova, 2002), Arab societies (Ashraf, 2003), and Hungary and Romania 
(Chiva, 2005) all draw similar conclusions about the importance of national institutional 
factors such as welfare and social policy for enabling women to acquire seats of influence. 
Where women are afforded positions of political power they may be able to exert pressure 
on legislators to make gender equitable policies and welfare provisions that benefit women 
a priority. In the political domain as in the corporate domain, rates of female parliamentary 
participation differ substantially (Terjesen and Singh, 2008).  Countries that promote 
women into senior positions of national power are thought to be more likely to promote 
women as equal peers to men and work to accord them similar positions in the private 
sector. Research by Kenworthy and Malami (1999) which looked at women’s rate of 
parliamentary representation across 20 countries found that countries where a larger 
proportion of women were employed in professional jobs also had a higher number of 
elected female members of parliament.  Conversely the authors found that countries where 
women are kept out of the national seats of power also had fewer female professionals.  
Drawing on the above discussion of the effective enforcement of gender equality 
legislation and the election and promotion of women parliamentarians as representative 
institutions of the regulative pillar, it follows that 
 
Proposition 1: Countries that enforce gender equality legislation ensuring improved 
access for women into education, work and positions of political power have more women 
on their boards.  
 
The normative pillar reflects the values and norms that permeate a society, which again 
will be indicative of how women are viewed as professionals and the degree to which they 
are deemed capable of taking on board level responsibility. The institution of religion is a 
powerful source of values in many countries. As well as delineating what is right and what 
is wrong, religion also articulates how women should be viewed and treated within society 
and whether their sphere of influence should be confined to home and family, or whether 
they are perceived to have a role to play in the wider society, through for instance, 
commercial work (Mazrui, 1997). All the dominant world religions define the role of 
women in society and delineate the parameters work and economic activity. Christianity, in 
particular protestant segment of Christianity, is perhaps most well known for its emphasis 
on industrious activities and the virtue of work (Weber, 1905; Foegen, 1979). Christianity 
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also has a well defined role for women in the workplace, resolutely insisting women have 
the same rights, wages and opportunities as men (MacLean, 1946). The Qur’an reflects the 
importance of economic enterprise, hard work and commercial activity and encourages 
Muslims to pursue work wherever they can (Abbas and Al-Owaihan, 2008). This call to 
labour is not just aimed at men, but women too. Whilst women in Islam are tasked with the 
overarching responsibility for the home and children, women are allowed and encouraged 
to make a difference in society (Omar and Davidson, 2001, 47). The dominant Eastern 
religions, Buddhism, Hinduism and Chinese Folk Religion, the latter encompassing many 
elements of the two former, place emphasis on intrinsic well being, cooperation, 
compassion and perseverance (Alexandrin, 1993; Chow, 2007). Women’s role in 
Hinduism is largely framed in terms of being good wives and mothers and being 
subservient to their male family members (Tomalin, 2006). Investigating the role played by 
national religious adherence may therefore contribute to a fuller understanding as to why 
there are more women on the corporate board of directors in some countries compared with 
others.  
 
Another outlet for national values is the education system (Morris and Cogan, 2001; Osler 
and Starkey, 2001). Ingrained in national curriculum and teaching practices are values and 
norms, reflective of country-specific views on what constitute important normative 
considerations (Pike, 2000). The educational system has also been deemed to be an 
institution in its own right (Meyer, 1977). Higher education degrees create an elite of more 
qualified individuals who are socialised into aspiring to higher roles and more influence in 
society, compared with those who are less educated (ibid). As extant research in chapter 2 
showed, women board directors often have university and postgraduate qualifications, 
making them part of the educated elite.  Assessing the degree to which women enter higher 
education in a given country will provide an indicator of the degree to which a country 
believes women should have access to, and be encouraged to participate in, further 
education with a view to pursue meaningful professional careers outside the domestic 
realm.  
 
Proposition 2: Countries that encourage female educational attainment and that practise 
religions where men and women are afforded similar status will have a larger proportion 
of female board directors.   
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National culture is a multifaceted institution, which has proved to be a strong influence on 
board structure (Li and Harrison, 2008) and corporate governance (Licht, 2001), as well as 
women’s views on work, career and self (Jacobsen and Aaltio-Marjosola, 2001). Given the 
multiplicity of culture, capturing the essence of what constitutes a particular cultural 
environment is important. Research has shown that there are common traits of what defines 
a culture cross-nationally (Aguilera et al., 2007; Barkema et al., 1996; Hofstede, 1983). 
Aspects of cultural influences, including concepts of masculinity, the degree to which job 
aspects such as “earnings, recognition, advancement and challenge…and the relative 
unimportance of…co-operation, desirable (living) area and employment security” 
(Hofstede, 1983, p 55) have been found to matter, the former being values associated with 
men and the latter with women. Other elements that shape national culture include 
perceptions of power, self, the importance of the wider community versus immediate 
family and how uncertainty and change are viewed (Hofstede, 1980; 1983; Javidan et al., 
2006) 
 
A diverse range of studies investigating various aspects of women and corporate board 
membership, cite the prevalence of a masculine boards or company culture as major 
barriers to why women make up a small proportion of board directors in most countries 
(Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Carter et al., 2003; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Nelson and 
Burke, 2000; Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). In fact, one of the major advantages of 
recruiting more female board directors is that they may help to change this masculine 
culture to become more accommodating of diversity (Burke, 1997; Carter et al., 2003; 
Erhardt et al., 2003; Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Given the historic dominance and 
continued prevalence of male board directors, boards as institutions are infused with 
masculine values (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Bilimoria, 2000; Carter et al., 2003). 
Consequently, an understanding of how cultural values, such as masculine perceptions of 
work, influence women’s chances of board directorships may shed further light on what 
contribute the particular gender patterns of corporate board of directors. 
 
Masculinity is not the only aspect of national culture that warrants investigation; notions of 
power, hierarchy, uncertainty and self-promotion are other facets of also likely to play a 
pivotal role in explaining aspects of corporate governance (Licht et al., 2005; Buck and 
Sharhim, 2005). Considering that national culture has been found to be a factor that 
influences the gender demography of corporate boards, and that other board compositional 
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factors such as proportion of inside, -or outside directors, scholarship lends credence to the 
suggestion that culture is an important factor in explaining why women do, or do not, serve 
as board directors in particular contexts. In order to successfully push the boundaries of 
research into which national level institutions help or hinder women wishing to acquire 
board directorships, research is needed into what role is played by national cultural 
institutions. Understanding how national societies’ cultural values of power, uncertainty, 
hierarchy and social perception of women can help explain why some countries appoint 
more women to their corporate boards than others. 
 
Proposition 3: Countries that place greater emphasis on cultural values associated with 
power, hierarchies, masculine values and individual achievements will have fewer female 
corporate board directors.   
 
3.3.2. Industry level institutions and women corporate board directors 
The role played by industry characteristics in influencing the prevalence of women on the 
corporate board of directors is a largely under-explored area. Institutional theory with 
respect to industry is often applied to what are called institutional fields. Institutional fields 
are broader than industries, including “those organizations that, in aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar services and products” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p 143). However, as this research is concerned with 
delineating the prevalence of women on the board of major corporations, and not tangential 
organizations not in the public commercial domain, and to maintain consistency in the 
sampling universe across national boundaries, industry will be relied upon herein to 
represent institutional fields. Such an approach has been taken by other scholars in the field 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Rothenberg, 2007).  
 
Industry characteristics have been found to influence a range of facets of corporate 
governance, such as board composition (Pfeffer, 1972; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999), 
executive compensation (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992), and industry performance 
(Wang et al., 2007).  Scholars have only recently begun to investigate the role of industry 
characteristics on the incidence of women on the board, despite research establishing that 
industry mattered for female board participation some time ago (Elgart, 1983; Harrigan, 
1981). Extant research on the influence of industry on gender diversity at board level is 
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geographically narrowly focused, predominantly centring on the UK and the US.  Hillman 
et al. (2007) researched the effect of firm and industry characteristics on the dominance of 
female corporate board directors in the US and found that as the proportion of female 
employees in an industry increased by one percent so too did the chance of there being at 
least one female on the corporate board of directors. Brammer et al. (2007) reviewed the 
UK and found that the proportion of women who made up an industry’s workforce was 
less of a predictor of board diversity than the firm’s proximity to the consumer market, 
with sectors such as retailing showing a much larger proportion of female corporate board 
directors than engineering and resource-based firms. The research that has focused on the 
role played by industry in accounting for women’s prevalence on the corporate board to 
date has made important strides in ascertaining that firm behaviour at the industry level is a 
facet of the institutional landscape worth exploring in piecing together the jigsaw on why 
women prevail in positions of power in some firms and not in others.  
 
At the industry level, the regulative pillar is reflected in legislation and governance 
initiatives that inform firm behaviour covering such areas of operations as environmental 
management (Child and Tsai, 2005; Hoffman, 1999; Delmas and Toffel, 2004) and 
stakeholder management (Griffin and Koerber, 2006). The similar response often found by 
firms in reaction to such governance directives reflects coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995), which cumulatively engenders a change in industry-wide 
behaviour. Industries subject to heavy regulation by the state such as utilities and banking 
are likely to be particularly susceptible to coercive isomorphism (Norman et al., 2007; 
Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001). Whilst there is no industry-
specific regulation the author is aware of that particularly targets board composition in 
certain industries, research suggests that where the state is a shareholder in listed 
companies, boards tend to better reflect the wider stakeholder constituency, including that 
of women (Knudsen and Pettersen, 2006; Grosvold et al., 2007; Randøy et al., 2006; 
Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). As the implementer and monitor of national laws, one of the 
state’s roles as shareholder is to ensure that the wider stakeholder constituency they 
represent, i.e. the electorate, is adequately reflected at the board level. This serves two 
needs: to legitimate the government’s stand on gender equality and act as role models for 
board diversity, thereby setting an example for the rest of the industry  Thus, the presence 
of the state on the shareholder register becomes a driver of coercive isomorphism within 
the firms in a given industry that are partly state-owned  The role of the state as a 
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shareholder is thus an important actor in assessing what industry-specific characteristics 
are likely to build a more gender-balanced board for a given industry.  
 
Proposition 4: Industries where the state is a shareholder will have a larger proportion of 
female corporate board directors. 
 
The normative pillar centres on morally governed social obligations that reflect what 
actions and behaviours are perceived to be appropriate for a given situation (Scott, 1995). 
Scott (1995) identifies normative isomorphism as the mechanism by which the normative 
pillar is transposed. Normative isomorphism “arises from standards created by 
professionals in an industry…within the same industry, participants would tend to conform 
to the same standards due to experiential similarities” (Thorsell and Cornelius, 2007, p 5). 
Trade unions help delineate the industry wide normative values that make up a positive 
working environment, and negotiate between employees and employers in situations of 
maltreatment or conflict (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). However, an alternative literature 
takes a very different view of the role of unions for women employees. From a normative 
gendered perspective, labour unions are masculine in character, reflecting male values and 
interests. In particular, trade unions have been influential in restricting women’s access to 
particular industries with some scholars suggesting labour unions have been instrumental 
in suppressing the rise of women in certain areas of employment (Caraway, 2006), 
suggesting trade unions espouse normative values that are unfriendly to women.   
 
Blum et al. (1994) found evidence that the normative context of particular industries 
influenced the proportion of women in management. Firms in the non-manufacturing 
sector had more female managers than those firms engaged in production of physical 
goods. Brammer et al. (2009, 2007) found evidence of a similar pattern in their review of 
the UK, where women showed above average presence in retail, utilities, media and 
banking, which are also industries with a large female employee base.   In the absence of 
direct evidence of the effect of normative pressures on the prevalence of women on the 
board at the industry level, extant research on corporate governance and the role of women 
in management suggest that boards are subjected to normative pressures (Peng, 2004; 
Ocasio, 1999), that industry characteristics influence women’s prevalence and reward 
levels at senior levels (Blum et al., 1994; Shenhav and Haberfeld, 1992) and that industry 
practices are subjected to normative isomorphism, cumulatively indicating that 
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understanding how the normative pillar at the industry level impacts on the prevalence of 
women on the board would narrow a substantial gap in the current knowledge of gender, 
boards and industry. 
 
Proposition 5: Industries that are less unionised and have more female employees will 
have a larger proportion of female corporate board directors.  
 
The existence of industry-specific cultures is well established in the literature (Christensen 
and Gordon, 1999; Chatman and Jehn, 1994; Phillips; 1994). Extant research has not 
explored the role of cultural-cognitive elements at the industry level as an influence on the 
gender composition of corporate boards. However, the established link between corporate 
boards, culture and cognition (Laurila and Ropponen, 2003; Ocasio, 1999) and the impact 
culture has on women’s position in a given industry (Gale, 1994; Miller, 2004; French and 
Strachen, 2007) suggests research at the juncture between board demography, gender and 
industry culture may potentially offer beneficial insights into understanding industry wide 
patterns of female corporate board representation.  
  
An industry culture in an institutional perspective can be considered as the organisational 
expression of institutional attitudes, beliefs and values (Christensen and Gordon, 1999).  
Research has shown that firms within a given industry tend to emulate each other, adopting 
practices and cultural values and strategies from peer companies, which results in what has 
been described as a ‘shared mindset’ within an industry (Phillips, 1994; Christensen and 
Gordon, 1999). Evidence suggests the mechanism that engenders the industry-wide 
adoption of cultural structures across firms is isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Carpano et al., 2003). Budros (1997) found evidence of industry culture directly impacting 
the adoption of down-sizing programmes across the industry. Westphal et al. (2001) 
investigated the degree to which corporate board ties facilitated the adoption of board 
process across corporate boards and found evidence of mimetic industry isomorphism, 
whereby board network ties facilitated the adoption of similar board processes within an 
industry. Similarly Ocasio and Kim (1999) established that industry isomorphism 
accounted for the CEO succession pattern observed in certain industries. At the industry 
level, the prevailing industry culture and views on women by firms within a given sector 
have been found to impact on whether women acquire positions of power (Gale, 1994; 
Miller, 2004; French and Strachen, 2007). Academic literature has thus established that 
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industry culture and industry isomorphism play a role in the adoption of industry-wide 
practices and in the composition of the top management team, suggesting: 
 
P6: The cultural characteristics of a given industry will influence the degree to which 
women are found on the corporate board of directors.  
 
3.3.3. Firm-level institutions and women corporate board directors 
Scott’s (1995) synthesis of institutional theory as adopted here stresses the emphasis on 
rules, regulations, power and coercion in the regulative pillar. In the context of firm 
behaviour, regulatory frameworks do not encompass only one individual firm. Whether the 
corporate governance and regulatory frameworks are ‘soft-law’ initiatives such as 
corporate governance codes mandated by for example stock exchanges, or statutes of law 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 framework, these regulatory structures do not encompass 
only a single firm. All firms operating in the sphere under the influence of the particular 
regulatory structure will be affected. It therefore becomes difficult to discuss the regulative 
pillar at the firm level, as no law or rules-based corporate governance framework applies 
only at the firm level; rather it would apply at industry or national level, both of which 
have been discussed above. Scott (1995) does suggest that the regulative pillar is the most 
widely applicable of the three pillars as it outlines how “Institutions constrain and 
regularize behaviour…regulative processes involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect 
or review others’ conformity to them, and as necessary, manipulate sanctions” (p 35), and 
states that such regulative processes may be of a formal or informal nature. This does open 
up the theoretical possibility that a firm can stipulate board-specific behaviour which can 
be monitored internally by the individual firm. It also makes it possible that the court could 
order an individual firm to recruit more female corporate board directors; however given 
the prevalence of national and industry wider governance frameworks, legislation and 
guidelines, it is suggested such initiatives particular to the firm are not widespread, and 
what is more they would be very difficult to study.  
 
Although rules and regulations encompassing board structure, behaviour, composition and 
remit are sanctioned at the national or industry level (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999; 
Baysinger and Hoskinsson, 1990; Allen, 1974; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), the 
compliance with and associated impact of particular corporate governance mechanisms 
which are voluntary in nature can be observed at the firm level. To complete the nested 
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research agenda put forth in this conceptual development, an assessment of the cultural-
cognitive and normative pillar in the context of board appointments should be evaluated. 
To that end, the next section discusses the firm-level normative research agenda item for 
the prevalence of women on the board, before the cultural-cognitive pillar is covered.  
 
The normative pillar at the board level is reflected in routines, a sense of conformity to 
ascribed roles and a performance of duty. To establish role conformity, routines and duty 
takes time. The importance of time for the structure, composition and performance of the 
corporate board of directors has been established in academic literature. The notion of time 
may take on a number of guises in the literature, be it conceptualised as director tenure and 
timing of board appointments (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; 
Johnson et al., 1993; Westphal and Zajec, 1995), contemporaneous or lagged effect on 
performance arising from board restructuring (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), temporal 
association between negative firm events and changes to the corporate board composition 
(Arthaud-day et al., 2006), or the age of corporate directors (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1995). From a normative perspective, of particular importance to the 
study of women’s prevalence on the corporate board is the role time plays in enabling or 
preventing women from acquiring corporate board directorships.   
 
Executives’ age has been found to influence a number of important firm level outcomes. 
Hitt and Barr (1989) found that younger managers were more generous in their 
remuneration of employees, whilst Rhodes (1983) showed that older managers were more 
risk averse, a finding that echoed earlier work by Vroom and Pahl (1971) and which was 
reinforced in an executive context through research carried out by Hitt and Tyler (1991). 
Westphal and Zajec (1995) investigated the role of board directors’ age in the context of 
demographic similarity on corporate boards and found that board directors recently 
recruited to the board were of a very similar age to the incumbent CEO. Wagner et al. 
(1984) posited that directors of a similar age share common professional and non-
professional bonds, and through these bonds developed a shared set of values   
 
Increased demographic diversity at the board level has been associated with a number of 
advantages such as improved decision-making, a lid on executive pay and improved 
financial performance (Erhardt et al., 2003; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). These performance 
improvements have been linked with diverse boards engaging in a more robust line of 
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questioning, more thorough discussion and analysis of results and a lessened risk of 
groupthink (Burke, 1997; Ray, 2005; Brammer et al., 2009). However all of these 
advantages depend on directors’ ability to draw on their diverse experiences, speak up and 
make their view-point heard during board meetings. Difference in age has been found to be 
a salient demographic characteristic sufficient to engender self-categorization with 
individuals of a similar age, and out-group biases towards those in a different age bracket 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Hitt and Tyler, 1991). Out-group bias has a negative impact on 
working groups where the person assigned to the out-group category is subjected to 
stereotypical attitudes and may find their views and opinions dismissed.  
 
The normative pillar is concerned with the notion of roles. Roles specify particular patterns 
of appropriate behaviour for an individual in a given situation. Extant institutional theory 
on corporate boards, anchored in sociology, finds evidence of such roles at work within the 
corporate board of directors. Westphal and Khanna (2003) identified clearly defined 
normative patterns of behaviour which board directors were expected to adhere to in 
dealing with sensitive situations at board level. Directors who were found not to comply 
with their perceived pre-defined role were subjected to social distancing by other board 
directors and might find their future directorial ambitions thwarted. Similarly, Westphal 
and Stern (2007) researched whether any particular form of boardroom behaviour was 
more conducive to assisting incumbent directors acquiring further board directorships and 
found evidence that directors who adopted a role aimed at monitoring and control were less 
likely to acquire new directorships as quickly as those who offered advice and counsel. 
Furthermore, directors who “flattered” peer directors accelerated their chances of 
subsequent board appointments. The effect was less pronounced for women and ethnic 
minority directors than white males. The authors concluded that directorial labour markets 
“reward high levels of social influence behaviour to a greater extent than they reward 
behaviour that is believed to contribute to effective corporate governance” (p 284). Similar 
results were uncovered by Westphal and Stern (2006) cumulatively giving credence to the 
belief that corporate board directors face particular blue-prints for behaviour in their role as 
corporate board directors, and that while both men and women in principal inhabit the 
same role as directors, there are subtle differences in what is required from the role 
depending on whether the actor is male or female. This led Mavin (2008) to argue 
women’s price for board participation is quiet obedience and adherence to masculine 
behavioural patterns and habits, and in their obedience to such norms, women forego the 
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opportunity to offer their contribution to the running of the firm and upholding shareholder 
interests. Furthermore, as women directors tend to be younger than male directors 
(Sheridan and Milgate, 2005; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2003), there is a danger that if they 
are appointed to the board, their age as well as their gender counts against them, and the 
widespread role pattern observed at board level, where decisions are deferred to the CEO 
or nodded through by the board may persists. 
 
Research to date suggests that older corporate board directors often develop similar norms, 
values, working practices and views (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Johnson et al., 1993). In 
part, these come from the clearly defined, though arguably not explicitly articulated, roles 
and in part are a result of conformity and homogeneity in behaviour developed over time. 
This conformity to roles and homogeneity in outlook does not favour women corporate 
board directors. 
 
Proposition 7: Boards with higher average age have a smaller proportion of female 
corporate board directors. 
 
At the firm level, the cultural-cognitive pillar is associated with firm- and boardlevel 
culture, which has been found to be a contributory factor to board decision-making (Grady, 
1999; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Cutting and Kouzmin, 2002). At the corporate 
board level culture is captured, reflected and manifested in board routine, taken-for-granted 
behavioural patterns and the adherence to established routines and scripts by sitting, 
predominantly male, directors (Westphal and Stern, 2007; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 
1989; Ocasio, 1999; Westphal and Milton, 2000).  
 
The cultural-cognitive pillar reflects the individual’s perception of what is a culturally 
supported and correct response in a given situation. To that end, scholars researching 
women’s role on the board and conceptions of the cultural-cognitive pillar have uncovered 
that women adjust their board room behaviour in line with their own perception of their 
status on the board and what they believe is expected of them (Wicks and Bradshaw, 
2000). Research further suggests that women may feel that their different experiences and 
frames of reference make them unable to join in “the gossip” (Selby, 2000, p 242) with 
male board colleagues and can in extreme cases experience a sense of alienation (Watts, 
2007). Reflecting the idea that board directors are male and the innate ‘taken-for-granted’ 
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culture of the male board room, Westphal and colleagues (Westphal and Milton, 2000; 
Westphal and Stern, 2007) conducted a series of studies into board demography and their 
research highlighted the persistent nature of favouring board director selection that 
reflected the make-up and persona of those already elected. 
 
The nomination committee is a standing committee of the corporate board of directors, 
comprising a subset of the boards’ directors and tasked with combating director selection 
that leads to demographically similar boards and instead ensures board selection is based 
on merit and made with a view to identifying individuals who embody the skills and 
competencies the board requires. Whilst nomination committees have been used by some 
corporate boards for some time (Harrison, 1987; Stiles and Taylor, 1993), the 
instrumentality of the nomination committee in appointing a diverse board has only come 
to the fore in recent years, when business scandals have raised serious questions around 
excessively homogeneous boards and the manner in which board appointments are made 
(Higgs, 2003). Whilst not generally legally mandated, the use of nomination committees is 
increasingly considered best practice and key to ensuring boards appoint beyond the “white 
males nearing retirement age with previous PLC director experience” (Higgs, 2003, p 42). 
The Higgs Review in its recommendations of corporate governance best practice, did not 
suggest the nomination committee would solve the prevailing gender inequality at board 
level, but the increased use of the nomination committee was expected to address some of 
the problems inherent in advancing women’s role on the corporate board. 
 
Institutional research has already established links between the instigation of committees 
for achieving employee diversity goals within organisations and an improved situation for 
minorities (Kalev et al., 2006). Extant literature on corporate board appointments has 
further established that a process exists whereby ‘like appoint like’ a process known as 
homosocial reproduction. Homosocial reproduction was a term popularised by Kanter 
(1977) who found evidence of men appointing other men demographically similar to 
themselves into positions of influence and power, a process which is likely to hinder, or 
make it difficult for women to attain senior managerial positions (Elliot and Smith, 2004). 
In particular Westphal and Stern (2006) found evidence of homosocial reproduction 
amongst their sample of corporate board directors. Directors who lacked elite educational 
credentials which was a source of homosocial reproduction had to make up for it with 
ingratiatory behaviour towards incumbent directors. As homosocial reproduction has been 
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found to play a role in board appointments, combining the role played by it in enabling or 
restraining women from acquiring board directorships with the perceived benefits of a 
nomination committee should offer a view of whether this corporate governance 
mechanism successfully addresses the problem of excessively homogeneous boards, or 
whether institutionalised views at the individual level prove a stronger influence on board 
appointment decisions.  
 
The nomination committee as a vehicle for engendering more gender-diverse corporate 
boards of directors remains under-explored in the extant research on women on the 
corporate board of directors. Institutional pressures for compliance and legitimacy in a 
corporate environment plagued by scandals and facing some of the toughest market 
conditions seen in generations should indicate that firms cannot afford to ignore available 
directorial talent, nor can they afford to be seen as not adhering to what the industry 
perceives as the legitimate course of action thus proposing: 
 
Proposition 8: The prevalence of women on the corporate board of directors will be 
influenced by whether the board relies on the nomination committee structure for 
identifying potential board candidates or whether is uses the incumbent board directors’ 
contact network.    
 
In aggregate, these propositions constitute a coherent conceptual framework that articulates 
a multi-level view of the institutional influences on women board directors. Diagram 3.3 is 
informed by Scott (1995) but reflects a summary of the framing developed in this chapter 
 
Figure 3.2 Summary of theoretical framework informed by Scott (1995) 
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3.4. Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed the disciplinary foundations of institutional theory, outlined 
Scott’s (1995) institutional framework and applied the framework’s logic to the topic of 
the prevalence of women on the board.  The resulting research framework effectively 
addresses the multi-level influence on the prevalence of women on the corporate board of 
directors, covering national, industry, firm unit and individual level factors affecting the 
gender balance of the board. Systematically pursuing such a research programme will 
generate a nuanced view of what the major levers are for increasing board level diversity in 
a multi-country setting. The inherent flexibility offered by Scott’s (1995) synthesis of 
institutional theory offers two distinct advantages to the study of female board 
directorships: firstly, it engenders research that can explore influences on women’s board 
participation across a range of levels of institutional influences, whether they occur at the 
national, industry, firm, firm sub-unit or individual level. Secondly, given the rich heritage 
on which Scott’s (1995) pillars of institutional theory is built, it is applicable to a wide 
range of research questions and can help illuminate a given research question from 
multiple angles.   
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4. Methodology and research strategy 
This chapter will describe and justify the research approach and method adopted in 
addressing the research opportunities that were identified in chapter 2 and further 
elaborated on and conceptualised in chapter 3. This chapter will not cover the details of the 
methods employed and samples used in the individual empirical studies conducted in the 
course of this thesis; such information will be provided alongside the study in each 
empirical chapter. Here, the intention is to provide a broad overview of how the research 
was carried out and why. This chapter has three objectives: first, to explain the cross-
national and multi-level research strategy adopted in this thesis; secondly, to discuss the 
characteristics of cross-national, multi-level research; and thirdly, to outline the data 
collection strategy. Before turning to the research strategy some terms of reference are 
defined as they related to the research presented in this thesis. 
 
Notes on terms of reference  
In referring to women or female board directors no distinction is made between whether 
they are executive directors and consequently employed by the firm on a day-to-day basis 
or whether they are non-executive directors, appointed to the board for their expertise. 
Furthermore, where employees are represented at the corporate board through board 
members selected by the employees from the firm’s rank and file workers, these employee 
board representatives are treated as equal to other executive directors, on the basis that they 
are expected participate fully in the board’s work.  
 
The terms ‘non-executive director’ and ‘outside director’ will be used interchangeably to 
denote a director who is voted in to sit on the corporate board for a defined period of time, 
and who is not a day-to-day employee of the company.  
 
Similarly, the two terms ‘executive director’ and ‘inside director’ will be used 
interchangeably. Both terms refer to a director who is employed by the company on a day-
to-day basis and who is usually on the board as a result of holding a position within the 
company that confers board membership such as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO). Where countries made extensive use of employee representatives, 
these were considered to be executive directors, as they were employed by the company on 
a day-to-day basis.  
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In reviewing extant literature on women board directors, no distinction is made between 
sex and gender. In common with most of the literature on female board representation, 
where the term “gender” is used, it is taken to denote the observable male and female sex 
characteristics at board level rather than the unobservable personality characteristics 
attributed to each sex (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Erhardt et al., 2003).  
 
4.1 The research strategy  
The research strategy adopted for this thesis is justified on the basis of the empirical 
research objectives articulated in chapter 1. These reflected two important empirical 
concerns, which centred firstly on establishing a clear and broad view of the pattern of 
international variation in the prevalence of women on the board, and secondly, on 
empirically testing the relevance of national, industry and firm-level institutional 
influences on the prevalence of women on corporate boards. To fulfil both these 
objectives, the research strategy had to be cross-nationally focused and suited to multi-
level research to take account of the broader context in which firms operate. In the context 
of the existing literature on female board directors as extensively explored in chapter 2, 
adopting a comparative, multi-level research approach is important to shed further light on 
why women ascend to the upper echelons of corporate power in some settings and not in 
others. To validate further the research strategy adopted, and to place the strategy in its 
wider empirical context, it is helpful to understand what the methodologically dominant 
perspectives have been in the literature to date. This helps clarify what the research 
strategy used in this research adds from a methodological perspective.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, a large stream of research of a substantively descriptive nature 
has provided, and continues to provide, an influential body of work in the domain of 
women on the corporate board. These studies tend to report descriptive details such as the 
percentage and mean number of female corporate board directors (for example, Conyon 
and Mallin, 1997; Singh et al., 2001; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Arfken et al., 2004), 
and offer vivid illustrations of national trends in female corporate board participation. 
 
A second body of research has empirically explored elements impacting on, and impacted 
by women board directors. Table 4.1 summarises some of the common methodological 
choices made in this literature. Popular research approaches include logistic regression 
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analysis (Hillman et al., 2007; Westphal and Stern, 2007; Terjesen and Singh, 2008; 
Bilimoria and Piderit, 1993; Peterson and Philpot, 2007), chi-square (Hillman and Cannella 
2002; Kesner, 1988; Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004), time series analysis (Francouer et 
al., 2008; Farrell and Hersch, 2005), survey research (Burke, 1997; Sheridan and Milgate, 
2003, 2005; Sheridan, 2001) as well as other less pervasive methods (Adams and Flynn, 
2005; Brammer et al., 2007). These studies do not represent the sum total of empirical 
studies on female corporate board directors, but they do represent some of the central 
works in the field, and, as such, serve as a valid illustration of the methodological avenues 
pursued to date in research on female corporate board directors.  
 
Table 4.1 highlights three important methodological characteristics of research on women 
board directors to date. Firstly, the samples used are drawn from a comparatively small 
cluster of countries; and some of these countries have been subjected to extensive 
empirical scrutiny, with 65% of the studies listed focusing on North America and the UK. 
This means much of our understanding of women’s place on the corporate board comes 
from an Anglo-American context. Given the persistent differences in the rate of female 
board participation discussed in chapter 2, and as literature suggests, and subsequent 
empirical chapters will show; findings from one institutional context are not always 
transferable to another institutionally distinct environment. Broadening the sample frame 
to include more countries is therefore vital (Peng et al., 1991; Adler, 1983). The second 
important methodological observation is the finding that research on women corporate 
board directors is largely based on relatively small samples. Over thirds of the studies 
listed in table 4.1 relies on fewer than 500 observations, including one third that relies on 
samples of less fewer 100. In general, empirical analysis that relies on larger samples is 
considered to offer more statistical power (Robson, 2002; Maxwell, 2000). Lastly, it is 
evident from table 4.1 that regression analysis is a favoured methodological approach in 
research on female board directors. Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis employ regression 
analysis, and the popularity of this approach in extant research means the studies presented 
herein not only follow in a well established tradition, but also means that the result of the 
research conducted herein can easily be placed in a meaningful comparative research 
context. Conversely, it is also clear from table 4.1 that no study to date has adopted a 
matched pairs analysis approach to any element of research of women on the board. The 
use of a matched pairs design in chapter 8 therefore represents a distinct methodological 
contribution to research on the prevalence of women on the board. 
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Table 4-1 Summary of research approaches adopted by sample of illustrative studies 
Author Year Journal Research objective Method Sample country Time frame N 
Adams, S.M. and 
Flynn, P.M. 
2005 Corporate Governance 
International Review 
Consider status of women on the board 
for firms in Massachusetts 
ANOVA Regional, US Cross-sectional 815 
Hillman, A.J. and 
Cannella, A.A. 
2002 Journal of Management Investigation of how the characteristics 
of women and racial minority board 
directors differ from that of their white 
male colleagues 
Chi-square US Longitudinal 275 
Kesner 1988 Academy of Management 
Journal 
Study of the occupation, type, tenure 
and gender characteristics of corporate 
board committee members 
Chi-square US Cross-sectional 250 
Ruigrok, W., 
Peck, S. and 
Tacheva, S.  
2007 Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Analysis of the interaction effect 
between board members' gender and 
nationality with board independence 
and size of Swiss boards 
Chi-square Switzerland Cross-sectional 210 
Zelechowski, 
D.D. and 
Bilimoria, D. 
2004 Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Study of the respective qualifications of 
male and female corporate inside 
directors 
Chi-square US Cross-sectional 52 
Brammer, S., 
Millington, A. 
and Pavlin, S. 
2007 Corporate Governance 
International Review 
Investigate ethnic and gender diversity 
of corporate boards, placing emphasis 
on links to board size and industry 
characteristics 
Correlation analysis UK Cross-sectional 4,272 
Bilimoria, D. and 
Piderit, S.K. 
1994 Academy of Management 
Journal 
Assess whether women lack the 
required experience for board 
committee membership or whether they 
are discriminated against 
Regression analysis US Cross-sectional 250 
Campbell, K and 
Minguez-Vera, A 
2007 Journal of Business Ethics Investigate link between gender 
diversity on the corporate board of 
directors and firm performance 
Regression analysis Spain Cross-sectional 68 
Harrigan, K.R. 1981 Academy of Management 
Journal 
Relevance of board structure and 
industry for prevalence of women on 
the board 
Regression analysis US Cross-sectional 112 
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Table 4-1 Summary of research approaches adopted by sample of illustrative studies cont.  
Author Year Journal Research objective Method Sample country Time frame N 
Hillman, A.J., 
Shropshire, C., 
Cannella, A.A. 
2007 Academy of Management 
Journal 
Identify organisational predictors of 
women on the board 
Regression analysis US Longitudinal 9,722 
Peterson, C. and 
Philpot, J. 
2007 Journal of Business Ethics Study the presence of women on the 
board and assess board committee roles 
for female corporate board directors 
Regression analysis US Cross-sectional 487 
Westphal, J.D. 
and Stern, I 
2007 Academy of Management 
Journal 
Assess likelihood of currently serving  
board directors attaining subsequent 
directorships based on interpersonal 
behavioural patterns 
Regression Analysis US Cross-sectional 760 
Terjesen, S. and 
Singh, V. 
2008 Journal of Business Ethics Assess role played by national context 
in promoting women to the corporate 
board of directors 
Regression analysis Various Unclear 43 
Burke, R.J. 1997 Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
A study of women's views on selection 
and benefits of serving as corporate 
board directors 
Survey Canada Cross-sectional 280 
Sheridan, A. 2001 Corporate Governance  A survey of women's experience of 
accessing board directorships and 
serving on the board of directors 
Survey Australia Cross-sectional 46 
Sheridan, A. and 
Milgate, G. 
2003 Women in Management 
Review 
Men and women’s view on the merit of 
gender homogeneous and gender 
diverse corporate board of directors 
Survey Australia Cross-sectional 97 
Sheridan, A. and 
Milgate, G. 
2005 Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Reports on what male and female 
corporate board directors deem to be 
important factors in attaining corporate 
board directorships 
Survey Australia Cross-sectional 97 
Farrell, K.A. and 
Hersch, P.L. 
2005 Journal of Corporate 
Finance 
Systematic analysis of whether gender 
impacts the selection of board directors 
Time Series Analysis US Longitudinal 309 
Francoeur, C.R, 
Labelle, 
R.,Sinclair-
Desgagne, B. 
2008 Journal of Business Ethics Investigate whether and how female 
corporate board participation influences 
firm financial performance 
Time Series Analysis Canada Longitudinal 430 
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The geographic concentration reflected in the literature review and reinforced in the 
summary of sampling frames presented in table 4.1, underlines the need to broaden the 
scope of countries included in studies of the gender composition of corporate boards to 
gain a better sense of why there is such large variation in women’s share of corporate 
board directorships. Collectively, the literature review in chapter 2, the conceptual 
framework developed in the previous chapter, and the illustration of the type of statistical 
studies that dominate the field outlined in table 4.1 point to the need for a nested, cross-
national research agenda that is multi-level in scope and method. The next section will 
address the second objective of this chapter and discuss the characteristics and 
methodological issues that may arise in such research.  
 
4.2 Research characteristics 
Cross-national research 
As the research in this thesis is concerned with cross-national comparison, it is important 
to note that while particular aspects of board composition and structure may vary across 
countries, for example countries like Germany and Norway frequently have staff 
representatives on their board of directors whilst the US and the UK do not (Weimar and 
Van Pape, 1999), many of the major functions of boards are shared across countries. 
Specifically, boards are generally responsible for setting strategic objectives, leading and 
managing the organisation so that those objectives are met, and reporting to shareholders 
and other stakeholders concerning the performance of the business. Consistent with this 
view, Epstein and Roy (2004) point out that “most agree that the board has a fiduciary duty 
to represent the corporation’s interest in protecting and creating shareholder value and 
must determine whether the company is managed well to achieve long term success” 
(Epstein and Roy, 2004, 3). The commonality in many of the board’s responsibilities, 
processes and roles and the observation by Demb and Neubauer (1992) that “boards in 
different countries are more similar than they are different “ (p 9) validate the study of 
boards in different geographical contexts (Epstein and Roy, 2004; Forbes and Milliken 
1999; Demb and Neubauer, 1992). The term “corporate board” will be used throughout the 
thesis to refer to a firm’s highest decision-making body, following Louden (1982), 
Abdullah (2006) and McKoy (2006).   
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Adopting a research strategy that includes a larger range of countries and assesses macro, 
meso and micro influences on the prevalence of women on the corporate board of directors 
offers two distinct advantages. Firstly, cross-national research helps explain the relative 
role played by national institutional factors in furthering women’s place on the board. It 
can give an indication of the degree to which country-specific institutional constellations 
work in women’s favour or not when compared with other countries. Comparative research 
may also provide some broad generalised findings relevant beyond the immediate 
parameters of the study (Brislin, 1976).   
 
Cross-national, also called comparative research can cover anything from two to a hundred 
or more countries (Kohn, 1987). Cross-national research originated in the US in the 1950s 
and has steadily grown in importance and popularity since then (Negandhi, 1975; Hantrais, 
1999).  Comparative studies are generally concerned with describing or explaining a social 
phenomenon with reference to the national environment in which the phenomenon occurs, 
and offer particular benefits to research concerned with explaining between-country 
disparities. Comparative research has risen in popularity since its inception in the 1950s, 
and is now a recognised and widely employed research approach, particularly in the social 
sciences (Hantrais, 1999; Elder, 1976). Political science and sociology, in particular, have 
used comparative research of this kind to great effect, and the last two decades have seen a 
similar rise in the use of cross-national research in management studies (Schollhammer, 
1969; Cheng, 1982; Peng et al., 1991; Baxter and Kane, 1995, Pedersen and Thomsen, 
1997; Cullen et al., 2004; Parboteeah et al., 2008). Cross-national research has also been 
used in corporate governance research to understand such matters as variations in CEO 
remuneration (Otten and Heugens, 2008; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004), hostile takeovers 
and shareholder protection (Schneper and Guilén, 2004) and ownership concentration and 
firm performance (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). However, very little cross national 
research has been conducted into women’s presence on the corporate board of directors.  
 
In its widest sense, cross-national research includes any study that transcends country 
borders (Kohn, 1987). However, the more specific view of cross-national studies, which 
reflects a broader and more operationalised view of the research approach, is characterised 
by Hantrais (1999) as the desire to “observe social phenomena across nations, to develop 
robust explanations of similarities or differences, and to attempt to assess their 
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consequences, whether it be for the purpose of testing theory, drawing lessons about best 
practice, or more straightforwardly, gaining a better understanding of how social processes 
operate” (p 93). Kohn (1983) identifies four distinct types of cross-national research: those 
studies that see the country as the object of study, those studies that use country as context 
for study, those that use countries as units of analysis, and lastly those studies that are 
transnational in character. Kohn (1983) concedes that some of these distinctions are less 
clear; however, the difference between the various types of cross-national studies centres 
on whether the country is studied with a view to understand something about the particular 
country (country as unit of analysis and country as object of study) compared to its 
neighbour, or whether the emphasis is on understanding of national context impacts on a 
given phenomenon (country as context), or whether it is to evaluate the role of a given 
country as a part of a larger international system. This thesis takes the view of country as 
context for the empirical research presented in chapter 6 and 7. This is appropriate given 
that the objective of the research is to understand the relative influence of institutional 
context on the prevalence of women on the board in a global perspective, rather than how, 
for example, Germany compares with France. The descriptive study presented in chapter 5, 
however, adopts an approach more akin to country as object of study, as the emphasis in 
this chapter is to highlight salient patterns of the prevalence of women on the board across 
countries.  
 
Comparative research of the kind conducted in this thesis is perhaps of particular 
importance to scholarship that has largely focused on the Anglo-American sampling 
universe of female corporate board directors. Adler (1983) highlighted the dominance of 
US-centred research in the management literature, pointing out that the most prevalent 
types of studies were conducted in the US by Americans, a finding largely echoed by Peng 
et al. (1991). Peng et al. (1991) noted the continued preponderance of US-based empirical 
studies in their review of cross-national research, and concluded that scholars had failed in 
their duty to provide research of a cross-national nature that appealed to the international 
stakeholder community to which business related. The authors pointed out that “a primary 
emphasis in all management theory testing must be on its meaningfulness in a global 
perspective” (Peng et al., 1991, p 104). Sampling and testing the same universe of directors 
will only provide limited explanation of the observed patterns of gender composition at the 
board level. Only by extending research to incorporate more countries, can extant research 
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on female corporate board directors be placed in perspective (Terjesen and Singh, 2008). 
Cross-national research is an opportunity to explain variability in outcomes across 
countries given that “variation in the factors of greatest interest is greater across countries 
than within any single country” (Sochalski and Aiken, 1999, 258).  
 
A further advantage offered by cross-national research is the opportunity to generalise 
(Brislin, 1976). Such generalizations highlight principles of generic management practice. 
To that end, cross-national studies in the scholarly management literature have offered 
generalised views on national culture and impact on CEOs’ management styles (Peterson, 
1972), of national cultural identity (Hofstede, 1983),  the impact of culture and social 
institutions on condoning unethical managerial behaviour (Cullen et al., 2004), and 
institutional influences on managerial gender perceptions (Parboteeah et al., 2008). 
Quantitative research often seeks to establish results that can be generalized beyond the 
confines of a given study, and in this regard cross-national research has a particularly 
important role to play. As Kohn (1987) pointed out, only by undertaking a study across 
national contexts can research establish whether empirical findings from one national 
setting truly represent a more universal phenomenon, rather than the results of national, 
historical or situational particularities. Two particular kinds of cross-national research have 
dominated the literature to date: on the one hand a case study approach comparing a given 
phenomenon in a small number of countries, on the other hand large-scale statistical 
analysis comparing a larger number of countries (Lieberman, 2005). The case study 
approach often relies on individual level, detailed data as its analytical foundation. These 
studies are often also culturally anchored, suggesting national culture is uniquely 
influencing the phenomena and consequently findings cannot be generalised (Hantrais, 
1999). Large sample studies relying on aggregated national level variables on the other 
hand, mean that a “much broader range of comparisons can be made: comparisons of 
political and economic systems, of cultures and social structures. Any comparisons we 
make within a single country are necessarily limited to the one set of political, economic, 
cultural and historical contexts represented by that particular country” (Kohn, 1987, p 
725).  
 
Despite the many benefits of cross-national research, researchers have identified a number 
of challenges inherent in carrying it out. Comparative research seeking to generate 
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generalised results has been accused of being simplistic and offering insufficient depth of 
analysis. Jackman (1985) counters this criticism, arguing “our goal is not to generate 
“comprehensive” descriptions, but rather to develop probabilistic generalizations” (p 166). 
To explore national level phenomena such as wealth, quality of life or education it is 
necessary to aggregate data from the individual level to the national level. Failure to 
aggregate would lead to statistical modelling problems, and even if modelling was 
possible, interpreting the results would prove onerous. However, in aggregating data, finer 
more granular distinctions are lost (Jackman, 1985). Hofstede’s (1983) cultural framework 
is an example of where individual level responses were collated and aggregated to national 
level variables. His framework suggests that, a person from Spain is likely to view the role 
of men and women in society as more different than a person from Sweden. However, a 
discussion with a person from either country might reveal an attitude contrary to that 
suggested by Hofstede’s framework. It is therefore important to recognise that aggregated 
measures are not exact replications of lower level variables (Hofstede, 1980; 1983; Brislin, 
1983). An inherent trade-off in conducting cross-national analysis is losing empirical 
nuance in exchange for probabilistic generalizations (Brislin, 1983). However, there is a 
danger that excessive aggregation leads to less meaningful analysis, leading Blalock (1964) 
to observe that the issue was not whether, but just “how much to oversimplify reality” (p 
8).  Such issues of data aggregation may become more acute where the aggregated measure 
relies on individual survey responses or interviews and where researchers aim to turn 
qualitative response into quantitative measures (Adler, 1983; Hofstede 1980, 1983) that 
quantify constructs such as national level social institutions. Whilst some of the empirical 
studies in this thesis use Hofstede’s cultural values which rely on qualitative data that has 
been aggregated, the majority of the variables are macro, meso or micro indicators derived 
from numeric measures and statistical sources that are generally not drawn from 
individuals’ views or opinions. Consequently, a review of the challenges associated with 
qualitative research will not be discussed; rather the remainder of this discussion will focus 
on issues associated with quantitative measures only.  
  
Cross-national studies are a useful tool in management research; however, whilst 
quantitative comparative studies can account for some auxiliary factors by the inclusion of 
error terms or dummy variables, there will always be real life events and factors that are 
not included. Statistical modelling can seldom, if ever, replicate the real world with 
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complete accuracy, but can make useful inferences from it. Causality cannot be empirically 
established (Jackman, 1985), which is why quantitative research relies on making causal 
inferences rather than empirical absolutes. “What we may observe are regularities or 
correlations, and, on the basis of prior theory and research, we may then try to place causal 
interpretations [original italics] on those observations” (Jackman, 1985, p 172). Jackman 
further suggests three reasons why causality cannot be definitely proved: firstly, as 
mentioned above, statistical methods can only model so much of real life, research can 
never be completely certain all factors have been considered. Secondly, research very 
rarely tests a full theory, “instead we focus empirically on some of the implications 
[original italics] of a theory” (Jackman, 1985, p 172). And finally, Jackman suggests that 
an articulated theory will always be richer than the quantitative method employed to test it 
can capture. If research is well considered and thoughtfully carried out, theory and research 
can come close to paralleling one another, however there will always be nuances, auxiliary 
elements and assumptions that can never be adequately reflected in the research. The 
cumulative impact of these issues of causality on the research contained herein is that 
whilst the studies have been carefully planned and conducted, they can only, as Jackman 
(1985) suggested, make theoretically informed  inferences of the institutional influences on 
the prevalence of women on the corporate board of directors.   
 
Cross-national research has developed from its inception in sociology and political science 
to become a potent research method for management research. Comparative research 
methods have been successfully applied to a range of management phenomena which has 
furthered extant understanding of managerial practices globally. Two major advantages 
afforded researchers using cross-national research are the ability to better explain the 
phenomenon under study and to generalise findings. However, generalisations and 
explanations of this nature are not panaceas, but can help make substantial inroads in 
empirical understanding that it would not be possible to achieve from a single-country 
study.  
 
This section has highlighted the definition and origin of cross-national research and 
identified some of the challenges and opportunities afforded researchers who engage in 
comparative enquiry. The next section discusses multi-level studies.  
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Multi-level studies 
Multi-level studies emerged in response to the realisation that the extant studies in 
management research had either been conducted at the micro, or the macro level and more 
complete insights and better research could come from considering multiple levels 
concurrently (Roberts et al., 1978). Despite an increased popularity of multi-level methods, 
as reflected in the decision of premier journals like the Academy of Management Journal 
to dedicate a special issue to the topic (Hitt et al., 2007), an exact definition of the research 
approach is hard to pin down. Diez-Roux (2000) described it as an “analytical approach 
that allows the simultaneous examination of the effects of group-level and individual-level 
variables on individual level outcomes” (p 171). Although this does capture much of what 
multi-level analysis is about, it seems to suggest that multi-level studies are only really 
suitable for research concerned with individual level outcomes and not individuals in 
groups. Some further common themes of what multi-level analysis is can be found in the 
literature. Specifically, three elements are persistently highlighted: firstly, multi-level 
research recognises the nested nature of social research phenomena; secondly, multi-level 
research offers better, more robust and nuanced explanations for the object under 
consideration; finally, multi-level study can successfully contribute to bridging the divide 
between macro and micro based research (Klein et al., 1999; Klein and Kozlowski, 2000; 
Hitt et al., 2007). The nested element of multi-level research refers to the observation that 
in humanities research, the object of study is frequently nested in a hierarchy of contextual 
influences. A corporate board director is nested within a company, which is nested within 
an industry. This recognition is important and relates to the other two facets of multi-level 
analysis. Firstly, by making the interrelated nature of social groups explicit, research can 
no longer ignore the wider contextual environment within which boards operate. By taking 
account of this wider environment research can begin to consider contextual variables and 
using appropriate multi-level analysis to better understand the role played by variables at 
different levels in the hierarchy. Such results should then provide better explanations and 
more robust accounts of what influences and drives the object of the study. Secondly, by 
including macro and micro level variables in a single model, the persistent gap between 
macro and micro scholarship begins to narrow.  This thesis is therefore multi-level in two 
regards. It approaches the study on women on the board in a nested perspective, and 
through a series of linked studies shows how different levels of societal analysis impact on 
the prevalence of women on the board. This thesis is also explicitly multi-level in that 
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chapter 7 conducts a fixed effect multiple regression analysis into the relative explanatory 
value of national, industry and firm-level institutional characteristics. 
 
Examples of studies that have used multi-level methods to great effect include  Doidge et 
al. (2007) evaluation of the role played by country institutions for corporate governance 
practices,  Martin et al.’s, (2007) assessment of the influence of national culture and 
institutional drivers in explaining cross-national variation in the propensity to bribe, and 
Meyer and Goes (1988) contextual analysis of whether environment and organisational 
factors influence the assimilation of innovations into organisations. The emergence of 
multi-level studies in management research has offered the chance to evaluate management 
practices in a broader and more complex context. In particular, bringing different levels of 
variables into the same model and extending theoretical conceptualisations to encompass 
micro and macro elements has enabled research to identify better explanations for a 
number of management practices (Klein et al., 1999).  
 
The advantages associated with adopting multi-level analytical methods centre on the same 
common themes discussed in the context of defining multi-level studies; multi-level 
studies straddle the historically persistent macro-micro divide, they contribute to a deeper 
and richer understanding of contextual influences on a given organisational or social 
phenomenon and can help illuminate the process by which different level variables 
influence a given object of study (Klein et al., 1999; Hitt et al., 2007). In accounting for 
such a potentially large range of hierarchical levels and types of data, multi-level models 
are complex and part of the strength inherent in multi-level models is the complexity such 
models can capture (Pettigrew, 2006; Klein et al., 1994).   
 
Klein et al. (1999) highlight the multifaceted disciplinary heritage of multi-level studies as 
a potential challenge to pursuing them. Drawing on economics, sociology and political 
science to name a few, researchers wishing to analyse a problem in a multi-level setting are 
faced with having to read through an extensive body of relevant literature. This may cause 
problems in delineating the parameters of the study and what constitutes relevant literature, 
leading the would-be researcher to consider “When is he or she to stop reading and start 
writing?” (Klein et al., 1999, 244).  The second challenge centres on paradigmatic 
allegiance. Researchers trained and used to micro level data may have no interest or 
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understanding of the impact and potential importance of macro level variables and vice 
versa. The flip side of this challenge lies in publishing. Journal reviewers may be picked to 
review a paper submission on the basis of interest alignment in terms of the general topic, 
but not method. A micro scholar may find a nested multi-level study which accounts for 
macro level influences irrelevant and uninteresting. Furthermore, given the multiplicity of 
academic disciplines multi-level studies often draw on and the wide range of levels 
included for study, finding an appropriate scholarly outlet for the work may be a challenge. 
“Interdisciplinary and multi-level work may paradoxically be at home everywhere and 
nowhere: of some interest and appeal to some journals but of central interest and appeal to 
none” (Klein et al., 1999, 244). On balance, given the surge in interest, use and publication 
of studies that embrace multi-level approaches to studies, its benefits appear comfortably 
to outweigh its challenges (Hitt et al. 2007). 
 
This section has addressed the second objective of this chapter and discussed the 
characteristics of cross-national and multi-level research. The next section discusses the 
last objective, the data collection.   
 
4.3 Data 
This section focuses on the data collection process in light of the research objectives and 
research design of the thesis. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the data 
particulars as they related to each study will be discussed within the relevant chapter.  
 
Dependent variable: Sampling and Data Collection 
The guiding principle of the sampling strategy adopted for this research was the aim to 
represent the largest number of firms, industries and countries for which reliable data were 
available, following established practice in cross-national research (see for example Ram 
and Zhang, 2002; Ram, 2006; Fernandes et al., 2009). Empirically, very few studies of a 
cross-national nature have investigated women’s prevalence on corporate boards of 
directors. Terjesen and Singh (2008) investigated national institutional determinants of 
women’s ascent to the corporate board of directors using a sample of 43 countries; 
however, it is unclear whether the study is longitudinal or cross-sectional in nature and no 
sample size is given for the study. Furthermore, their study is not theoretically 
conceptualised and therefore has limited explanatory power beyond their statistical 
 102 
findings. As scholarship has largely omitted to systematically study the influences on 
women’s share of the corporate board directorships in a global perspective, widening the 
geographical scope of the sample population as far as possible whilst maintaining data 
reliability was considered important.  
 
Whilst the explicit aim of the sampling strategy adopted was to maximise the number of 
firms, industries and countries that were included in the empirical studies, the nature of the 
object of study, the corporate board, placed some practical limitations on the sampling 
universe. Following Louden (1982), Abdullah (2006) and McKoy (2006), the board was 
considered to be the group of executives who represented the firm’s highest decision-
making body, and to assess cross-national variation in the prevalence of women on the 
corporate board of directors, it was necessary that the country adopted the corporate form, 
and had a governance structure that relied on such a group of executives. Annual accounts, 
or equivalent documents, detailing the members of the firm’s highest decision-making 
body also had to be publicly available and published on an annual basis. Despite these 
restrictions, country-level data were collected for 50 countries, including Europe, the 
European Economic Area, the former Eastern Europe, North America, Australia, New 
Zealand, four countries from Latin America, two African nations, as well as a number of 
Asian countries including India, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and Malaysia. 
However, the Middle-East, most of Africa and parts of Asia were not included.  The table 
below lists the countries for which data were obtained detailing the percentage number of 
women on the corporate board or equivalent highest decision-making body.  
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Table 4-2 Overview of sample countries included 
Countries 
Argentina Japan 
Australia Latvia 
Austria Lichtenstein 
Belgium Luxembourg 
Brazil Malaysia 
Bulgaria Malta 
Canada Mexico 
Chile Netherlands 
China New Zealand 
Cyprus Norway 
Czech Republic Poland 
Denmark Portugal 
Egypt Romania 
Estonia Russia 
Finland Singapore 
France Slovakia 
Germany Slovenia 
Greece South Africa 
Hong Kong Spain 
Hungary Sweden 
Iceland Switzerland 
India Turkey 
Ireland Ukraine 
Israel United Kingdom 
Italy USA 
 
 
The starting point for identifying data on the prevalence of female corporate board 
directors was BoardEx. BoardEx is a commercially available database, provided by 
Management Diagnostics Limited which has been successfully used in academic research 
(Singh, 2007; Kuang 2008; Fracassi and Tate, 2008) and which is rapidly establishing 
itself as the premier source of board-related data (Fernandes, 2009).  BoardEx provides 
data concerning board and director characteristics for many of the companies listed on 
stock exchanges around the world. In total, BoardEx data cover in excess of 7,000 
companies from 2001. To increase country coverage beyond what was available in 
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BoardEx, further data were collected from corporate annual reports for companies in a 
number of countries. At the time of writing a number of major economies, were not 
represented in BoardEx, including Latin America and India. To remedy this, using Latin 
Trade’s list of Top 500 companies in Latin America by Net Sales, companies for 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the largest Latin American trading economies were 
identified. For India all companies listed on the SENSEX index which represents the 
largest 30 firms by market capitalisation listed on the Bombay stock exchange were 
identified. Annual reports or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings were 
consulted to identify directors for each company’s board and for every year available. 
Gender was identified by way of pictures, use of titles (Miss, Ms, Mrs, or native language 
equivalents) and names.  
 
To ensure data reliability, data triangulation was deemed important. At the country level 
data estimates from BoardEx were validated through exploration of estimates available in a 
range of secondary sources. For example, the European Commission tracks the gender 
composition of boards in Europe using a methodology that examines the character of the 
boards of the 50 largest listed companies in each member state. Where fewer than 50 listed 
companies exist, all available listed companies are incorporated in their analysis. Other 
specialist research exists for particular countries and regions such as Spencer Stuart Board 
Indices, Catalyst, European Commission reports, the Australian Equal Opportunities for 
Women in the Workplace Agency (EOWA), Business Women’s Association South Africa 
and Globe Women.  
 
BoardEx was used to identify percentage number of women both at the country and at the 
industry level. At the industry level firms were classified based on Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes to enable industry evaluation of the prevalence on women board 
directors.  
  
Independent variables: sampling and data collection 
This section highlights some of the key independent variables used in the studies contained 
herein. The particular details and decisions as pertaining to the particular empirical 
chapters presented in this thesis are described in more detail in each empirical chapter. 
However, a number of the key variables collected for the research are presented here, as 
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some of them are used in more than one study. It was therefore deemed useful to outline 
those key variables here, and also provide an illustration of how the various independent 
variables relate to the different levels that make up the multi-level setting of this research.  
 
 
Table 4-3 Core independent variables 
Level Variable 
National • Mean left-right political inclination 
• % Women in Parliament 
• Good Governance  
• Religion 
• Female tertiary education enrolment 
• Hofstede’s Cultural Values 
Industry • Labour union density 
• State share ownership 
• % Women employees 
• R&D intensity 
Firm • Nomination Committee prevalence 
• Average board director age 
 
The independent variables associated with each level will be discussed in turn, starting 
with the national level, before moving onto the industry and firm-level 
 
National level independent variables 
At the national level the following key variables were identified: mean left-right political 
positioning, percentage number of elected females to parliamentary assemblies, quality of 
national governance, religious prevalence, female education enrolment and Hofstede’s 
cultural values.  
 
The measure for national political sway was collected from the World Value Survey 
(WVS) website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). Data from the WVS have been 
extensively used in research and are an established source, informing cross-national studies 
in a range of disciplines including management research (Parboteeah and Cullen, 2003; 
Hui and Fock, 2004; Franke and Nadler, 2008). The WVS in collaboration with the 
European Value Study draws on a network of social scientists around the world who 
administer and analyse surveys for 97 countries. Between 1981 and 2007 five tranches of 
surveys have been administered and 257,000 responses have been collected in total 
 106 
(Ingelhart, 2008). To ascertain political alignment, the WVS asks respondents to self-
categorise their political allegiance on a left-right scale from 1-10, with 1 being left and 10 
being right. National scores are then aggregated to country level to give an indication of 
the relative conservative-liberal inclination of a given nation.  
 
The percentage number of parliamentary seats held by women was identified using the 
United Nations, Women's Indicators and Statistics database. The database covers over 200 
countries and surveys were conducted in 1980, 1987, 1991, 1993 and 1999, though data 
availability is not uniform across countries. National statistical information collected by the 
United Nations has been extensively used in scholarly research, in particular data from the 
Women's Indicators and Statistics database have informed the identification of trends in 
female employment patterns in the face of growing industrialisation (Mehra and Gammag, 
1999), progress and future challenges in women’s equality (Buvinic, 1999) and patterns of 
gender and work in developing economies (Mammen and Paxson, 2000). United Nations 
data have also informed corporate governance research such as Estrin and Wright’s (1999) 
review of corporate governance in the former Soviet Union and Khanna et al.’s, (2006) 
review of globalization trends in corporate governance. 
  
To measure the quality of national governance standard, the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators were used. These indicators comprise six measures; Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, and cover in excess of 200 
countries. The World Bank consults in excess of 30 sources to compile their measures, 
including local national research firms, major developmental agencies, NGOs and 
commercial risk-rating agencies (World Bank, 2008). The World Bank indicators have 
been successfully used in scholarly research in areas such as public management (Ear, 
2007), development economics (Faust, 2008) and corporate governance (Doidge et al., 
2007).  
 
The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) was consulted to identify percentage 
believers by religion by country. The ARDA covers 195 countries and collects information 
from the US State Department’s International Religious Freedom Reports and the World 
Christian Database. Corporate governance scholars have relied on data from ARDA 
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(Hilary and Hui, 2008; Kuhnen and Niessen, 2009) as have institutional researchers 
(Soares et al., 2007). 
 
To assess the level of female educational attainment, the measure percentage female 
tertiary school enrolment was extracted from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. UNESCO defines tertiary 
education as an education qualification that is obtained from an institution that requires 
secondary school qualifications to be considered for admission and where students must 
pass formal exams in order to graduate. Khanna and Palepu (2000) relied on the same 
source and measure in their institutional analysis of conducting business with Chilean 
business groups, as did Barosso (2005) in his analysis of institutional higher education 
preferences and economic development. The UNESCO data are based on questionnaire 
responses administered through UNESCO National Commissions and local partners in 
more than 200 countries. The questionnaires were completed by local educational experts 
and once returned to UNESCO cross checked for consistency and accuracy before 
aggregate measures were made available (UNESCO, 2009).  
 
Hofstede’s cultural values are based on extensive and repeated questionnaire survey data 
administered by Geert Hofstede in the late 1970s and early 1980s to IBM employees 
globally. Hofstede administered a survey to a substantial number of staff at IBM located in 
more than 70 different countries, and based on their answer developed a measure of 
national cultural idiosyncrasies along four dimensions: power-distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism and masculinity. Each country was allocated a score from 1-100 
for each dimension. Hofstede’s measure has a number of advantages that has made it a 
popular tool in cross-cultural management research (see for example Henwood and 
Seaman, 2007; Arnold et al., 2006; Littrell and Valentin, 2005; Mukherji and Hurtado, 
2001; Page and Wiseman, 1993; Williamson, 2002). The values are pre-defined, they are 
available for a large number of countries, they do not change and are simple to understand 
and apply. Whilst some scholars have viewed these as advantages of Hofstede’s 
framework, others have considered them distinct disadvantages and argued the framework 
is insufficiently nuanced, dynamic and too restrictive (McSweeney, 2002). For the purpose 
of this study Hofstede’s cultural framework was considered a suitable framework as it had 
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previously been applied to the domain of research on women in senior managerial roles 
(Caligiuri et al., 1999; Bernardi, 2006; Mueller, 2004).  
 
Industry level variables 
At the industry level, measures of union density, R&D intensity, state shareholdings, and 
percentage female employees were used. 
 
Union density data were collected from the OECD statistical database. As far as possible 
OECD make every attempt to base this measure on survey responses from individual trade 
union members in individual countries. Where such data are not available, data are 
obtained from major national union organisations, with numbers adjusted for non-active 
and self-employed individuals (Visser et al., 2008). OECD data have been successfully 
applied in corporate governance research (see for example Thomsen and Pedersen, 1997; 
Jackson, 2005) and by institutional theorists (Western, 1998; Cartilla, 2004).  
 
Data showing national governments’ stake in a given industry was obtained from the 
OECD. The OECD distributes a questionnaire to member states asking for information on 
the particular characteristics of states share holding interests in a given industry. The data 
are binary, taking a value of 1 if a given country held shares in a particular industry, and 0 
otherwise (Conway et al., 2005).  
 
Percentage number of female employees by industry was obtained from LABORSTA, the 
international statistics database compiled by the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
ILO was established in 1919 and its statistics arm LABORSTA sits within the UN research 
network as the central provider of labour-related statistics (ILO, 2009). The economically 
active population is defined as an individual between the age of 15-74 years “who furnish 
the supply of labour for the production of goods and services during a specified time-
reference period” (LABORSTA, 2009). Industry was defined according to International 
Standard Industry Codes (ISIC). ILO’s research has been used in corporate governance 
statistics, institutional analysis and the role of women in senior positions (Deakin and 
Ahlering, 2005; Van der Boon, 2003; Henrekson and Stenkula, 2009).  
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The last industry level variable is Research and Development intensity based on data from 
Thomson Datastream (Datastream). Datastream reports firm-level financial data for 
75,000 firms across 64 developed and emerging economies. Datastream either receives 
data direct from the stock exchange where the firm is listed or from local and international 
data providers’ published reports. As with the other databases, Datastream has been used 
in research relating to a multitude of managerial research fields, including corporate 
governance, institutional theory and women’s place on the board (Brammer et al., 2009, 
2007; Grosvold et al., 2007; Chizema and Buck, 2006; Cormier et al., 2005).  
 
Firm-level variables 
The prevalence of the use of nomination committees at the firm-level was obtained from 
BoardEx, as was the average age of the board’s. 
 
Table 4-4 Summary of independent variable sources 
Level Variable 
 
Source 
Mean left-rightness World Values Survey 
% Women in Parliament 
 
United Nations, Women's Indicators 
and Statistics database 
Good Governance  
 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
Religion 
 
The Association of Religion Data 
Archives 
Female education enrolment 
 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Institute for Statistics 
National 
Hofstede’s Cultural Values http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ 
Union density OECD statistical database 
State ownership OECD statistical database 
% women employees LABORSTA 
Industry 
R&D intensity DataStream 
Firm Nomination Committee  BoardEx 
 Average Age of the Board BoardEx 
 
Methodological limitations 
The research decision to maximise the number of countries included in the sample selected 
for this study was based on the desire to reflect the greatest variety in the percentage 
number of women observed at board level across the countries. As explained earlier in this 
section, the fact that this research is concerned with investigating a particular corporate 
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elite, meant that the sample was restricted to countries that had corporate boards or board 
equivalents, and crucially, who made information of this highest decision-making body 
publicly available. In reality, this means all the countries included are largely developed or 
rapidly developing countries and in effect that means the research presented in this thesis is 
concerned with the percentage number of women board directors in the largest firms for a 
given country or industry. Consequently, this research does not reflect the ‘average’ firm in 
a particular country, given that the vast majority of the world’s companies are not listed 
and differ in their corporate governance structure compared to that of publicly traded firms 
(Claessens and Tzioumis, 2006; Dehaene et al., 2001). In particular, it is likely that the 
sample included suppresses the real cross-country variation in the prevalence of women on 
the board as female directors tend to serve on the board of large, profitable companies. 
Whilst this is clearly a limitation of this study, the problems of obtaining reliable data for 
private firms are well documented (Burke and Mattis, 2000). Some countries included in 
this study may have more data available on the nature of firm leadership covering private 
firms, but the time, effort and cost associated with collating the data is well beyond the 
means of this research project.  
 
4.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter had three objectives: to justify the cross-national and multi-level research 
strategy adopted in this thesis, secondly to discuss the characteristics of cross-national, 
multi-level research and thirdly to outline the data collection strategy. In the context of the 
research objectives articulated for this thesis and the extant methodological choices 
reflected in the literature to date, there is a distinct need to carry out further research on 
women on the board, by conducting comparative analysis that covers a larger number of 
countries than those traditionally studied, and that accounts for the wider context within 
which women do or don’t acquire corporate board directorships. Multi-level, cross-national 
research offers exciting avenues for fruitful enquiry and the next four chapters begin to 
explore these avenues, starting with an extensive overview of the antecedence of the 
evolving pattern of women corporate board directors in an international perspective.  
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5. Women on the board: A view across countries, industries and firms 
This chapter provides the backdrop to the next three empirical chapters by analysing the 
patterns of women on corporate boards around the world. The aim is to provide a detailed 
descriptive insight into the prevalence of female corporate board directors across a range of 
countries and industries. This analysis explores the pattern of women on the corporate 
board of directors in countries that have traditionally not been subject to previous study as 
well as countries that have been more extensively analysed. In doing so, this chapter 
highlights the nuanced and varied pattern of female board participation across countries 
and industries and show that the dominant conclusions in academic research about the 
context and circumstances in which women acquire board seats may not necessarily apply 
in all institutional contexts. In drawing attention to different patterns and different drivers 
of gender diverse boards across countries, this chapter illustrates Mintzberg’s (1979) 
observation that descriptive studies can sometimes challenge the veracity of empirical 
findings and offer a complementary perspective to extant literature.  
 
Reflecting the theoretical discussion provided in chapter 3, this analysis drills down from 
the national to the firm level in its review of women’s share of corporate board 
directorships. To that end, this chapter has four objectives: firstly, to highlight the cross-
national variation in the prevalence of women on the board; secondly to show that the 
gender composition of the corporate board of directors also varies across industries; 
thirdly, to take a more detailed look at the pattern of female board directors across 
countries for a given industry to show that substantial variation also exists within 
countries; and finally to analyse the relationship between certain salient firm level 
characteristics and the proportion of female corporate board directors. The next section 
outlines the method employed before the subsequent sections report national level and 
industry level findings. A final section concludes.  
 
5.1 Method 
The research strategy pursued in this chapter focuses on broadening the scope of countries 
and industries included for analysis. At all points in the study, the emphasis is on 
maximising the observed variation across units of analysis to provide as wide an analytical 
perspective as possible. At each stage of the analysis the most comprehensive, consistent 
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and up-to-date data are used. However, as the over-riding concern is to expose variation 
across countries and industries, it means that the basis for sampling varies across stages of 
the analysis but breadth and comprehensiveness of the analysis is maximised. This 
sampling decision is further discussed in section 5.4.  
 
The cross-country analysis mainly used data from BoardEx and the European Commission. 
BoardEx is an online subscription-based service which has compiled a novel dataset 
covering over 7,000 companies. Firm level observations were aggregated to the country 
level, to provide the average percentage number of women on the board for a given 
year/country. The European Commission collects data for the 50 largest public firms in 
each of its member states, and where the stock exchange does not have 50 firms, the entire 
universe of listed companies is included. Data were available for some countries from both 
BoardEx and the European Commission. Where this was the case, the source which relied 
on the largest and most consistent sample over time was used, based on the premise that a 
larger sample provides more reliable results. In addition to using BoardEx data, further 
data collection was carried out for Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Brazil and India, as data 
covering these countries was at the time of writing not available on BoardEx. In order to 
compute these figures for particular countries/years the recognised method in the research 
was used. This approach relies on the examination of the annual corporate reports for the 
relevant companies, from which the total number of directors on each firm’s board and the 
number of these who are female can be extracted. Based on Latin Trade’s list of Top 500 
companies in Latin America by Net Sales, companies for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico, the largest Latin American trading economies were identified and a similar 
approach was used for India, where all the firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange SENSEX 
index were included. The SENSEX represents the largest 30 firms by market capitalisation. 
Annual reports or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings were used to 
identify the board of directors for each company. Gender was identified by way of pictures, 
use of titles Miss, Ms, Mrs or native language equivalents and names. The companies were 
picked with a view to having a minimum of ten observations for each country for every 
year available. As some countries (for example Mexico) have more companies with 
extensive annual report archives, this meant inclusion of the top 65 Mexican companies on 
the Latin Trade list, whilst for countries with a smaller population of listed companies (for 
example Argentina), all available companies are included. 
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The industry and firm level analysis in the variation in the prevalence of women on the 
board used data obtained from Datastream, a data source extensively used in board 
literature (Brammer et al., 2009; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007; 
Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Dahya and McConnell, 2005) and BoardEx.  Datastream 
provides Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for each firm roughly equivalent to 
the three-digit SIC, which allowed for aggregate industry level, and within-industry level, 
analysis to be conducted. This analysis is presented in table 5.4 and within industry 
analysis is shown in table 5.5. Datastream covers firm level information on more than 20 
countries, focusing on the largest listed firms in each country. Datastream was also used 
for the analysis of firms’ market capitalisation and the prevalence of women on the board. 
BoardEx was used to identify the percentage number of women on a firm level and then 
aggregated to industry level based on the SIC-classifications from Datastream.  
 
5.2 Findings 
This section reveals the findings of the analysis, starting with the country level.  
 
5.2.1 Cross-country variation in the prevalence of women corporate board directors 
As discussed in chapter 2, previous investigations of board gender diversity have typically 
explored corporate board diversity in single-country contexts and have tended to employ 
cross-sectional research designs. Such studies have collectively highlighted the variation 
across countries in board diversity, and mapped its evolving pattern (Burke 1999; Singh et 
al., 2001; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Sheridan 2001; Farrell and Hersch, 2005).  This 
chapter builds on this foundation and to that end, Table 5.1 provides a starting point for 
this cross-national analysis. The table shows the average percentage board seats occupied 
by women for 48 countries in 2006, the most recent year for which data was available for 
such a large sample of countries.  Table 5.1 clearly shows that there is a very substantial 
degree of variation in the prevalence of women board directors across countries. In 
Norway 32% of board seats were held by women, which is the largest share observed in 
any of the sample countries. Norway’s decision to pass affirmative action for this particular 
aspect of corporate governance greatly influenced the share of board seats held by women, 
as will be discussed later. Following Norway’s ‘lead’ were Bulgaria (21%), Latvia (21%) 
and Slovenia (21%), followed by Finland, where 19% of directors were women. At the 
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opposite end of the table, Argentina and Japan had no female board directors, whilst 
Luxembourg had 1%, India 3.86%, Russia 3.13% and Ireland just over 4% female board 
directors. On average, women held 9.5% of corporate board directorships across the 
sample. However, the mean percentage women on the board observed in the top half of the 
sample was nearly three times that of the bottom half. The average percentage women 
board directors for the highest ranked countries was 14.43%; by comparison the bottom 
ranked countries had 4.58%. Consistent with the theoretical discussion in chapter 3, this 
suggests that country level factors may play an important role in shaping board 
demography.  
 
Table 5-1 Average percentage board seats held by women 
% Women Board Directors 2006 
Argentina 0.00   Latvia 21.00 
Australia 10.90   Liechtenstein 8.33 
Austria 6.00   Lithuania 17.00 
Belgium 5.78   Luxembourg 1.00 
Bulgaria 21.00   Malaysia 4.00 
Canada 8.70   Malta  4.00 
China 12.50   Netherlands 4.88 
Cyprus 7.00   New Zealand 7.13 
Czech Republic 8.00   Norway 32.00 
Denmark 12.71   Poland 10.00 
Egypt 10.00   Portugal 7.00 
Estonia 15.00   Romania 13.00 
Finland 19.00   Russia 3.13 
France 6.98   Singapore 0.00 
Germany 6.46   Slovakia 10.00 
Greece 6.31   Slovenia 21.00 
Hong Kong 5.88   South Africa 11.50 
Hungary 14.00   Spain 4.38 
Iceland 6.00   Sweden 17.37 
India 3.86   Switzerland 6.37 
Ireland 4.04   Turkey 7.00 
Israel 13.36   UK 8.10 
Italy 2.63   Ukraine 16.67 
Japan 0.00   US 15.12 
 
Sources: BoardEx provided data for Australia, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK. Data from the European Commission were used for Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and 
Ukraine. Data for India were compiled by the author based on annual reports for the largest 30 firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
and data for the US were collected from Catalyst. Data on Argentina were similarly collected by the author based on the Latin Trade’s 
top 500 companies.  
 
It has been suggested that there has been a significant degree of harmonization of corporate 
governance practices across countries in recent years. This tending to ‘convergence’ in 
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corporate governance has been widely discussed in the literature (Denis and McConnell, 
2003; Aguilera, 2005; O’Sullivan, 2003; Fligstein and Freeland, 1995; Jacoby, 2005; 
Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997; Otten et al., 2006). Table 5.2 provides an insight into the 
extent to which convergence in corporate governance has been reflected in the pattern of 
women on the board.  Table 5.2 shows the evolving pattern of female board representation 
across a wide range of countries in Europe, North America, Asia and Africa, for a period 
of five years. In every country men make up over 68% of corporate boards in 2006, but 
some countries have more female representation than others.  
 
Table 5-2 Percentage cross-national variation in the prevalence of women on the 
board  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria 7.32 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 
Belgium 4.93 5.26 6.07 5.85 5.78 
Canada 11.40 12.00 12.60 12.30 8.70 
China 0.00 12.00 14.29 14.29 12.50 
Denmark 9.55 10.00 12.00 13.17 12.71 
Finland 7.42 11.00 15.00 19.00 19.00 
France 6.26 7.07 6.79 6.62 6.98 
Germany 5.86 6.60 6.52 6.91 6.46 
Greece 5.03 5.96 6.33 6.25 6.31 
India 4.12 4.01 4.73 3.91 3.86 
Ireland 2.90 3.00 3.95 4.16 4.04 
Israel 13.97 10.88 10.50 7.69 13.36 
Italy 2.22 2.42 2.75 2.67 2.63 
Netherlands 4.55 4.04 3.57 3.87 4.88 
Norway 10.30 13.70 15.70 21.36 32.00 
Poland 12.50 6.67 8.00 11.00 10.00 
Portugal 0.96 4.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 
Russia 4.17 2.86 3.13 4.35 3.13 
South Africa 9.00 10.20 10.50 10.70 11.50 
Spain 3.09 3.19 3.27 3.02 4.38 
Sweden 9.88 14.01 16.32 17.85 17.37 
Switzerland 4.51 4.43 4.83 5.57 6.37 
UK 5.13 5.89 6.31 7.39 8.10 
USA 12.40 13.60 13.80 14.70 15.12 
 
Sources: BoardEx provided data for Canada, China, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Data from the European Commission were used for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Portugal and Poland. Data for the US were collected from Catalyst. Data for India were compiled by the author based on 
annual reports for the largest 30 firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
 
Table 5.2 shows the development in the national average number of board seats occupied 
by women from 2002-2006. There are three intriguing observations that can be gleaned 
from the table. Firstly, there is large within-year variation in the prevalence of women 
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board directors, which is consistent with the pattern seen in table 5.1. Secondly, there is 
large variation in the prevalence of women board directors over time and there are distinct 
country-clusters showing remarkably similar patterns in prevalence of women on the 
board. Finally, there is no convergence observed between countries in the share of board 
seats held by women. Each of these trends warrants further analysis and will be discussed 
in turn.  
 
Table 5.2 clearly illustrates persistence in cross-national variation in the prevalence of 
women on the corporate board of directors. When considering 2006, the most recent year 
for which data were available, the largest proportion of female corporate board directors is 
found in Norway, where women hold 32% of the board seats, which is perhaps not 
surprising in light of the Norwegian government’s decision to pass affirmative action 
covering this particular aspect of board demography. In this sample Finland has the second 
highest concentration of female directors at 19%, and Sweden the third highest proportion 
of female board directors with 17.37%. At the bottom end of the table, Italy shows the 
lowest share of women directors. Women occupied only 2.63% of Italian board seats. 
Similarly, India, Ireland, Russia and Spain have fewer than five percent of the available 
board seats occupied by women.  
 
By comparison, a review of the board composition in 2002 reveals some interesting 
insights, in particular the observation that neither Norway, Sweden nor Finland, the ‘trail 
blazers’ of 2006, featured in the top three countries having the highest proportion of female 
board directors. Instead, Israel, Poland and the United States show the largest 
concentration of women in the boardroom. Israel had 13.97% women, whilst Poland had 
12.5% and the United States, 12.4%. At the bottom end of the scale the observed pattern 
was more consistent with the findings from 2006. Italy and Ireland still featured in the 
bottom three countries that did have women some female board directors, with 2.22% and 
2.90% respectively. Additionally, Portugal only had 0.96% women board directors, whilst 
China had none. The Scandinavian cluster of countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, all 
had approximately 10% women board directors in 2002, compared with Finland which had 
7.42%.  
 
 118 
The next sections addresses the second and third points of interest to emerge from these 
data; the variation in the prevalence of women board directors over time, and the 
emergence of distinct country clusters exhibiting similar patterns in female board 
participation.  
 
The countries with the largest proportion of female corporate board directors in 2006 are 
Norway, Sweden and Finland. Across all years, Norway and Sweden consistently feature 
in the top quartile of countries showing the largest proportion of female board directors, 
and by 2006 all the Nordic countries are represented in the top quartile. Norway had 10.3% 
female corporate board directors in 2002, a proportion that rose to 32% by 2006, a trebling 
in the share of board seats held by women. Finland’s share of female board directors rose 
from 7.42% in 2002 to 19% in 2006, a rise of not dissimilar magnitude to that observed in 
Norway. Sweden’s rise in female board directors from just under 10% in 2002 to 17.37% 
in 2006 fits the Nordic trend of dramatic rises in the prevalence of corporate board 
directors over the period under review. Denmark had 9.55% women board directors in 
2002, and showed a more modest rise in directorships held by women; however by 2006 
Denmark had a sufficiently large share of women board directors to it a place in the upper 
quartile of the 24 countries included in this analysis.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Ireland, Spain, Russia, India, Italy and Netherlands show 
a very low proportion of female board members in their directorial ranks. Ireland had 
fewer than 3% female corporate board directors in 2002 and just over 4% in 2006, a 
pattern similar to that of Spain, which saw a rise from 3.09% to 4.38% over the same 
period. Italy had the lowest proportion of female corporate board directors over the period, 
at just over 2%. Spain and Italy’s low proportion of women in the board room meant they 
were in the lowest quartile of countries across all the years included in the analysis. Russia 
and India both decreased the proportion of female corporate board directors over the 
period. In 2002 Russia’s boards boasted 4.17% female corporate board directors, but by 
2006 this proportion had fallen to 3.13%. A similar picture emerges in India where women 
held 4.12% of board seats in 2002 and 3.86% in 2006.  In between these polar extremes are 
a number of countries for which the proportion of corporate board directors has remained 
relatively stable such as France and Germany, or seen modest growth such as the US and 
the UK. The female proportion of corporate board directors in the UK rose from 5.13% to 
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8.10% over the period, whilst in the US the rise was from 12.4% in 2002 to 15.12% in 
2006.   
 
What this analysis of cross-national variation in the prevalence of women on the board 
reveals is that the picture painted by extant academic literature suggesting the proportion of 
female board directors is growing (Kesner, 1988; Daily et al., 1999; Bilimoria and 
Wheeler, 2000; Izrael, 2000), is insufficiently nuanced and reflects the narrow range of 
countries that have typically been addressed. This analysis shows not only that in a given 
year there are large differences in the share of directorships held by women between 
countries, but also that the rate of change over time differs markedly across country 
contexts. The picture painted here is less linear than the literature suggests, and hints that 
there may be a country, or country-cluster, effect that accounts for these large, persistent 
and idiosyncratic differences.  
 
The findings of this cross-national analysis question the degree to which there is 
convergence in corporate governance practices with respect to the prevalence of women 
board directors. If anything, this analysis shows that there is divergence, rather than 
convergence in the share of board seats women hold across countries. In 2002 the upper 
quartile of countries that had the highest proportion of women on the board had on average 
11.74% women, whilst the bottom quartile had on average 2.22% women, a difference of 
9.52% between the upper and the lower quartile. By 2006, the upper quartile had 18.26% 
women directors and the lower quartile had 3.82% a difference of 14.44% women. In other 
words, over the five-year period, the difference between the prevalence of women in the 
highest versus the lowest scoring countries increased by 4.91%, suggesting women’s 
ascent to the corporate boardroom is far from uniform across the countries surveyed.  
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Table 5-3 Divergence in women corporate board directors 
  
  
Average percentage 
number of women 
  2002 2006 
Upper Q average 11.74 18.26 
Lower Q average 2.22 3.82 
Difference 9.52 14.44 
 
This section described the national level findings to emerge from this analysis and the next 
section turns the attention to cross-industry differences.  
 
5.2.2 Cross-industry variation in the prevalence of women on the corporate board 
of directors 
The previous section highlighted the cross-national variation in the prevalence of women 
on the board. This section addresses the second objective of this chapter and evaluates the 
industry level variation in the prevalence of women on the board.  
 
As highlighted in the literature review, most academic research has focused on establishing 
patterns of gender diversity of the corporate board at the national level, with a focus on 
single country studies. Recent research has, however, recognised that industry 
characteristics may also shape the gender demography of corporate boards (Hillman et al., 
2007; Brammer et al., 2007). Consequently, it is increasingly important to analyse the 
evolving pattern of women board directors with reference to industry. Table 5.4 shows the 
average percentage number of female corporate board directors in a given industry in a 
given country in 2005. Differences in sector composition across countries meant not all 
countries have firms in each industry.  
 
Applying the same approach to analysis as that adopted in the national comparison, the 
industries in the analysis were divided into quartiles. The industries represented were 
ranked according to the weighted average share of board directors for a given industry 
starting with the industry that had the largest percentage women board directors. Looking 
within the upper quartile, Educational services had the highest proportion of female board 
directors with 28.57% women on the board. However, this is an artefact of the cross-
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national variation, as only Australia had firms in this sector. The two following sectors had 
a broader sample representation. Hobby & Leisure Manufacturing had a weighted average 
of 26.46% women board directors, whilst printing and publishing had 23.87% women on 
the board and banks and savings institutions had 22.71%; in fashion and accessories, 
women held 22.69% of the available board directorships. The emerging cross-national 
pattern in industry variation in the prevalence in women board directors is interesting when 
considered in the context of extant literature on which industries have the largest share of 
women board directors. Contrary to the observation in section 5.2.1 that the cross-national 
pattern of female corporate board directors does not conform with the dominant literature 
in the field, the observed industry variation does seem to conform to extant literature. 
Brammer et al. (2007) investigated gender diversity on the boards of UK companies and 
concluded that there was substantial sector variation in the prevalence of female board 
directors. They found that media, retail, banking and utilities had the largest proportion of 
female board directors. Grosvold et al. (2007) in their study of board diversity in Norway 
showed that consumer manufacturing and chemicals had large shares of women corporate 
board directors, whilst Smith et al. (2006) found that in Denmark women were 
predominantly represented on the boards of firms in the retail, hotel and restaurant sector. 
Harrigan (1981) investigated the prevalence of women on the board in the US and 
concluded that women directors were concentrated in labour-intensive service industries or 
industries producing and selling targeted at the female consumer market. A similar pattern 
was found in Australia by Burgess and Tharenou (2000) and Conroy (2000). The observed 
industry pattern seems to largely accord with existing research. Retail, chemicals, and 
technology-related firms, fashion & accessories, textiles, and banks and savings 
institutions had high proportions of women in their executive ranks, broadly echoing 
literature reflecting the industry prevalence of women corporate board directors (Brammer 
et al., 2008; Grosvold et el. 2007; Smith et al., 2006; Harrigan, 1981). 
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Table 5-4 Percentage women board directors by industry 2005 
Industry Australia Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden UK 
Weighted 
average  
  
Educational Services 28.57                   28.57 
Hobby & Leisure manufacturing 28.57     22.22         28.57   26.46 
Printing and Publishing 3.85 12.50 20.00 18.18 7.69 10.00 13.57 25.00 20.20 8.54 23.87 
Banks and savings institutions 15.14 11.84 21.35 7.74 9.94 2.64 10.43   35.20 11.33 22.71 
Fashion and accessorise   12.50         0.00   31.73 37.50 22.69 
Food retail 28.57 0.00 15.38 10.10     22.22     14.42 22.27 
Chemicals, ink and detergents 12.70 3.85 15.85 12.63 5.70 8.88 9.82   0.00 9.77 18.91 
Professional services 0.00 2.38 0.00 4.21 8.31 0.00 2.25 11.30 17.29 5.06 17.99 
Motion pictures   22.22               12.50 17.36 
Technology equipment 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.48 10.73 0.00 11.11   18.63 3.78 16.99 
Textiles   40.00   0.00   9.09         16.36 
Property management and development 4.17 0.00   8.08 0.00 0.00 3.77   17.21 5.35 15.97 
Wood, veneer and saw mills                 15.38   15.38 
Insurance 19.40   17.79 2.95 7.54 2.63 6.35     8.76 15.35 
Apparel 28.57       15.00   0.00   16.67   15.04 
U
p
p
e
r
 
Q
u
a
r
t
i
l
e
 
Food & beverage 12.54 16.67 17.07 4.55 3.57 0.00 2.08     12.62 14.97 
Communication equipment 10.58 17.16 10.21 4.54 5.77 4.21 3.33   10.00 8.25 12.78 
Travel and tour operators 7.14     11.76   0.00   20.83   20.00 12.53 
Building material       30.00 0.00         5.56 11.85 
Logistics       5.90 17.24   14.29     0.00 11.77 
Energy and power   4.86 8.01 5.19 4.13 7.69 6.25   10.83 5.79 11.74 
Retail       9.40           13.06 11.59 
Investment and broker services 28.98   10.00 0.00 3.70   0.00 33.33 13.39 10.55 11.53 
Restaurants   0.00   14.29   0.00       13.49 11.18 
Local transport                   11.11 11.11 
Industrial Equipment manufacture 0.00 0.00 4.17 10.00 3.03   2.08   19.36 0.00 10.09 
Insurance agents and brokers 19.84     13.33 10.00         7.91 9.75 
Commercial water transport 0.00 5.56   22.22     0.00 14.29 0.00 3.57 9.46 
Consumer goods non-durable 16.67 0.00   0.00 29.93 8.33     11.11 0.00 9.39 
Petroleum refining & petroleum based products 6.25   15.28     0.00       12.94 9.36 
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Industry Australia Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden UK 
Weighted 
average  
Professional services 0.00   0.00 9.82 7.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.02 8.10 8.79 
Metals 7.14 0.00 0.00 5.00 3.33 4.76 10.00   16.67 0.00 8.74 
Cigarettes and Tobacco products                   8.62 8.62 
Rail       16.67             8.33 
Health services   0.00 3.57   14.29   0.00   30.77   8.31 
Air Transport 15.56     5.56 4.17         7.32 8.25 
Paper and Packaging 12.50   7.69           8.82 3.13 7.84 
Furniture Manufacturing   0.00   0.00     7.14       7.14 
Rubber and plastic   0.00   10.00 5.00       15.38   7.08 
Building contractors 7.04 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 6.67 0.00   12.88 7.06 6.81 
Consumer durables 4.55 0.00               10.37 6.70 
Oil & Gas 11.46   9.33 5.59       0.00 5.56 3.86 6.46 
Footwear and handbags       5.88 12.50 0.00         6.13 
Food, drink and misc 7.02 5.56   2.94 4.35   0.00   34.47   5.89 
T
h
i
r
d
 
q
u
a
r
t
i
l
e
 
Technology equipment 0.00 0.00 25.00 13.43 8.10   0.00 18.75 6.70 0.83 5.41 
Commercial property services 4.11 8.88 0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 6.25 7.03 5.16 
Glass, cement and concrete 14.29 20.00   3.33 0.00 2.78   12.50   2.78 5.04 
Mining 6.71   4.16             3.89 4.94 
Auto and aero manufacture 0.00   7.69 6.62 3.29 0.00 0.00   9.02 2.71 4.92 
Leisure and sport 0.00     12.50 0.00       14.29 4.32 4.84 
Social and vocational services 0.00               12.50   4.17 
Infrastructure construction 0.00     3.51 4.76 0.00 0.00   26.67   3.81 
Motor vehicle dealers       0.00           5.56 3.70 
Hotels and lodgings       4.23           0.00 2.54 
Metal products 14.29   0.00 0.00 4.00   0.00   3.13 0.00 2.45 
Vehicle rental and repair 0.00       0.00         2.78 1.67 
Credit and mortgage institutions     0.00 0.00 3.85     0.00   1.67 1.61 
Sand, Stone & Clay 0.00     0.00 4.55           1.52 
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The pattern in the bottom quartile is also broadly consistent with literature. The lowest 
share of female board directors was found in the sand, stone & clay sector, followed by 
credit and mortgage institutions and vehicle rental and repair. These bottom three sectors 
all had less than 2% women on the board. The sand, stone and clay sector had 1.52% 
women board directors, whilst the mortgage and credit sector had 1.61% and the vehicle 
rental and repair had 1.67% of their board seats taken up by women. The composition of 
the lowest performing sectors in terms of share of board directorships held by women also 
broadly reflect findings in the literature. Brammer et al. (2008) noted the difference in 
proportion of female board directors between the consumer-facing high street banks and 
the investment segment of banking. Whilst the high street banking sector, which had a 
large proportion of female employees and was deemed to be closer to the customer, had a 
large proportion female board directors, the investment side had very few. Similarly, 
Harrigan (1981) found a low prevalence of women on the board in the extraction 
industries, and Grosvold et al. (2007) found a similar pattern in construction and certain 
utilities.    
 
Looking across the quartiles that make up the industry analysis in table 5.4, the variance in 
the share of board directorships held by women was roughly 10% between the high end of 
the second quartile and the low end of the third quartile. Food and beverage was the 
highest ranked industry in the second quartile with 14.97% women board directors. By 
comparison, food, drink and misc. was the lowest ranked industry in the third quartile, and 
this sector had 5.89% women board directors. The weighted average across all industries 
was 10.7% female board directors.  
 
Focusing within industries across countries, it is worth noting that although some 
industries appear in the upper quartile of firms, suggesting a larger proportion of women 
on the board, there is substantial variation across countries. Looking within the top quartile 
firms, the textiles industry has 40% female board directors in Belgium, and none in France. 
Similarly, firms in the apparel industry in Netherlands have no women board directors; 
however, by comparison, women are well represented on the boards of apparel companies 
in Australia, Germany and Sweden. Perhaps even more interesting is the observation that 
three of the industries in the bottom quartile have relative large proportions of female 
directors in a certain country. The technology and equipment industry has 18.75% women 
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board directors in Norway and none in Australia and Belgium. Similarly, the glass, cement 
and concrete sector has 20% women on the board in Belgium and none in Germany. The 
most extreme cross national variation for a given industry in the lowest quartile is the 
infrastructure construction industry, where Sweden leads the way with 26.67% women, 
whilst Australia, Italy and Netherlands have no female corporate board directors.  The 
industry with the most consistent high proportion of female board directors is the 
publishing and print industry, where four of the ten countries have more than 15% women, 
the lower bound of the upper quartile, whereas the most consistent ‘under-performer’ with 
regards to female directors was the metal products industry, where six out of seven 
countries had fewer than 5% women directors.  
 
In conclusion, just as the cross-national analysis revealed substantial variation in the 
prevalence of women on the board across the sampled countries, there are similarly large 
cross-industry variations in the prevalence of women on the board. However, whereas 
cross-national differences revealed a more nuanced and less linear relationship than extant 
literature would suggest, at the industry level findings largely echo that of the literature.  
Women board directors tended to be concentrated in consumer-facing industries such as 
retail, high street banking and female oriented sectors such as fashion, where women also 
tend to make up a substantial portion of the workforce (Brammer et al., 2009). By 
comparison, the share of female directors is low in the extraction industries, the investment 
arm of banking and in the automotive-related sectors, industries where women tend to be 
scarce not only in the board room but also amongst the employee base (Burgess and 
Tharenou, 2000; Conroy, 2000). However, whilst the weighted average highlighted 
particular industries as generally having a large or a small proportion of women board 
directors, the picture became less clear when within industry differences across countries 
were analysed. Some industries showed persistently high rates of female board 
participation, whilst other industries had a similarly low rate. There were however some 
industries that had substantial cross-national variation across an industry as observed in the 
textiles industry, where Belgian textile firms had 40% female directors, and France by 
comparison had none. This within-industry variation is the subject of the next section.  
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5.2.3 Within-industry variation in the prevalence of women corporate board 
directors 
Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 detailed the national and industry level differences in the 
prevalence of women on the corporate board of directors. This section addresses the third 
objective of this chapter and provides a detailed within-industry analysis to show that 
substantial variation exists within industries as well as across sectors and countries. In 
particular, the percentage of women board directors in the professional services sector in 
2005 will be analysed across ten countries. This sector showed the broadest data coverage 
and exhibited interesting patterns of variation in board composition, which illustrate some 
of the important elements of difference observed within as well as between countries. The 
results are shown in table 5.5 
 
The weighted average percentage number of female board directors for the professional 
services segment was 7.75% in 2005, the median was 0% and the range was 0%-50%.  
When ranked in descending order of which company has the highest to the lowest share of 
female directors, the lower bound of the upper quartile was 12.5%. For the purpose of this 
analysis, all firms which exhibited more than 12.5% women board directors were deemed 
to have a higher prevalence of female corporate board directors. The firms with the highest 
shares of female board directors were Groupe Crit of France and Proffice AB and Poolia 
AB of Sweden all reported 50% female corporate board directors. However, both France 
and Sweden, similarly had firms within the industry that showed no female corporate board 
directors. Of the 17 Swedish firms in the sample, eleven companies had more than 12.5% 
women directors, whilst of the 26 French firms, only four companies, Groupe Crit, Altran 
Technologies, ESI Group and Ilog SA had 12.5% or more female board directors. Both 
Norway and the UK had firms in their industry sample with a large proportion of female 
board directors; however the Norwegian sample is considerably smaller than that of the 
UK. The UK sample represents 19 firms whilst the Norwegian industry represented 
comprises seven firms. Of the Norwegian firms, three had 20% female board directors or 
more, with Prosafe ASA and Superoffice ASA reporting 25% female board directors and 
Norse Energy 20%.  In the UK, Reuters Group showed 18.18% female board directors, 
whilst Hays Group and Sthree had 14.29% and 16.67% respectively, and WPP Group 
reported 18.75%. Of further interest is the observation that three of the seven Norwegian 
firms included did not have any female corporate board directors in 2005, despite the threat 
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of legally mandated affirmative action initiatives. By comparison, nearly two-thirds of the 
firms included in the UK industry list had no female corporate board directors.  
 
The United States showed a more consistent pattern of female representation at board 
level. Of the firms included, ten firms had a high proportion of women directors; in 
particular Compuware Corporation had just over 27% female board directors, followed by 
IBM with 23.08% and Autodesk Inc. with 22.22%. Nine of the firms in the industry had no 
women in their directorial ranks. Affiliated Computer Services Inc, Citrix Systems Inc, 
Computer Sciences Corp, Comverse Technology Inc, Monster Worldwide Inc, Nvidia 
Corp, Parametric Technology Corp, Robert Half International Inc and Yahoo Inc had no 
female corporate board directors in 2005. Canada had no women listed as corporate 
directors for the firms classified as belonging to the professional services industry, nor had 
Australia. However, as Australia is only represented by one firm in this instance, no firm 
inferences can be drawn from the failure of Coates Hire Limited to have any women board 
directors in 2005.  
 
Belgium and Holland show similar patterns of gender composition at board level in the 
professional and personal services industry. Of the six companies included in the Belgian 
sample, one company had women represented, with 14.29% female directors. By 
comparison, the Dutch sample included ten firms and one company, USG People NV had a 
high proportion of female board directors, with 12.5% women.   
 
Considered in the context of the national and industry variation in the prevalence of 
women on the board as detailed in the previous sections, this firm level descriptive analysis 
highlights the variance in the gender homogeneity of corporate boards within an industry. 
Not only does the degree to which women are represented at board level differ on a 
country-by-country context, but pervasive differences also exist across and within 
industries. In light of the pattern of gender demography revealed by this analysis, it is clear 
that the observed difference across units of analysis needs careful attention in a broader, 
more contextualised manner, suggesting research into drivers at multiple levels will be an 
insightful addition to our understanding of why women succeed in acquiring corporate 
power on some boards, but fail to do so on others.  
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Table 5-5 Firm level percentage women corporate board directors for the professional services industry 2005 
Australia % Belgium % Canda % France % Germany %
Coates Hire Ltd 0.00 Arinso International NV 14.29 Cryptologic Inc 0.00 Altran Technologies 14.29 DIS Deuctscher Industrier AG 14.29
Dolmen Computer Applications NV 0.00 Hummingbird Ltd 0.00 Atos Origin 0.00 Intershop Communications AG 0.00
Iris Group SA 0.00 March Networks Corp. 0.00 Bull SA 0.00 Mobilcom AG 12.50
Real Software Group NV 0.00 Business Objects SA 0.00 Onvista AG 0.00
Systemat 0.00 Cegedim 0.00 SAP AG 13.04
Ubizen NV 0.00 Cegid SA 0.00 Software AG 8.33
Dassault Systems 0.00 SQS Software Quality Systems AG 0.00
ESI Group 12.50 Techem AG 10.00
Fimalac 6.67 TUI AG 16.67
GFI Informatique 0.00
GL Trade 0.00
Groupe Crit 50.00
Groupe Silicomp 0.00
Groupe Steria 0.00
Havas 5.88
Ilog SA 12.50
Infogrames Entertainment 0.00
Infovisra 0.00
JC Decaux SA 0.00
Neurones 0.00
Prosodie 0.00
Sopra Group 0.00
Sword Group SA 0.00
Sylis 0.00
Teleperformance 7.69
Ubisoft Entertainment 0.00
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Table 5 -5 Firm level percentage women corporate board directors for the professional services industry 2005 cont. 
Netherlands % Norway % Sweden % US % UK %
Brunel International NV 0.00 Apptix ASA 0.00 Context Vision 0.00 Adobe Systems Inc 18.18 Aegis Group 9.09
Getronics NV 0.00 Fast Search and Transfer ASA 0.00 IFS AB 28.57 Affiliated Computer Services Inc 0.00 Aggreko 0.00
ICT Automatisering NV 0.00 Kvaerner ASA 9.09 LBU International AB 14.29 Autodesk INC 22.22 Ashtead Group 0.00
Lycos Europe NV 0.00 Norse Energy Comp ASA 20.00 Ledstiernan AB 20.00 Automatic Data Processing Inc 8.33 Autonomy Corporation 0.00
Ordina NV 0.00 Prosafe ASA 25.00 Partnertech AB 9.09 BMC Software Inc 9.09 Computa Centre 0.00
Ranstad Holdings NV 0.00 Stepstsone ASA 0.00 Poolia AB 50.00 CA Inc 9.09 Group 4 Securior 0.00
TIE Holding NV 0.00 Superoffice ASA 25.00 Pricer AB 20.00 Citrix Systems Inc 0.00 Hays 14.29
Unit 4 Aggresso NV 0.00 Proffice AB 50.00 Computer Sciences Corp 0.00 Logica MC 10.00
USG People NV 12.50 Protect Data AB 14.29 Compuware Corp 27.27 Michael Page International 0.00
Vedior NV 10.00 Readsoft AB 20.00 Comverse Technology Inc 0.00 Misys 0.00
Securitas AB 16.67 Convergys Corp 9.09 Northgate Information Solutions 0.00
Skanditek industriforvaltning AB 14.29 Electronic Arts 11.11 Regus 0.00
Technology Nexus AB 16.67 Electronic Data Systems Corp 10.00 Rentokil Initial 0.00
Teleca AB 10.00 Equifax Inc 10.00 Reuters Group 18.18
Telelogic AB 10.00 First Data Corp 16.67 Sage Group 9.09
Teligent AB 0.00 Fiserv Inc 10.00 Speedy Hire 0.00
Tridep AB 0.00 IMS Health Inc 10.00 Spirent Communications 0.00
IBM Corp 23.08 Sthree PLC 16.67
Interpublic Group of Companies 11.11 WPP Group 18.75
Inuit Inc 11.11
Microsoft 20.00
Monster World Inc 0.00
Moodys Corp 12.50
Novell Inc 20.00
Nvidia Inc 0.00
Omnicom Group 18.18
Oracle 9.09
Parametric technology 0.00
Robert Half International 0.00
Symantec 12.50
Unisys 9.09
Yahoo 0.00  
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5.2.4 Firm characteristics and the prevalence of women on the corporate board of 
directors 
The fourth and final objective of this chapter is to detail the relationship between certain 
salient firm level characteristics and the proportion of female corporate board directors. In 
particular firm size, defined as market capitalisation, and board independence, defined as 
the proportion of executive to non-executive directors is analysed to see whether there are 
more women on the board of larger firms with more independent board as suggested by the 
literature (Burgess and Tharenou, 2000; Burke, 2000; Erhardt et al., 2003; Harrigan, 1981; 
Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Carter et al., 2003) 
 
Extant literature on female corporate board directors suggests that women are found on the 
boards of larger and more profitable companies, and that boards with a higher proportion 
of non-executive or outside directors tend to have more women on their boards (Carter et 
al., 2001; Erhardt et al., 2003). However, as pointed out in chapter 2, the majority of 
empirical research carried out on female corporate board directors has been conducted in 
the US, Canada and Australia, all countries that commonly fall within the Anglo-American 
corporate governance family, which may typically conceal the role played by institutional 
variation across countries (Weimar and Pape, 1999).  The narrow tranche of literature that 
has  analysed the percentage board directorships women hold outside the Anglo-American 
corporate governance context has highlighted the role played by the distinct nature of 
alternative institutional environments, such as family ties for women directors in Swiss 
firms (Ruigrok et al., 2007), the impact of affirmative action on the gender composition of 
boards  in Norway and Israel (Grosvold et al., 2007; Izraeli, 2000), and the role of gender 
politics and a female head of state in New Zealand (McGregor, 2000). These different 
contexts and findings, coupled with the analysis reported here suggest the prevalence of 
women corporate board directors is more multifaceted than literature has suggested to date.  
 
Strands of the comparative corporate governance literature have established that certain 
cross-national similarities in institutional characteristics mean that more or less distinct 
clusters of countries can be identified around specific corporate governance features such 
as ownership concentration and type, legal heritage and board system (Weimar and Pape, 
1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Reflecting the notion of clusters of 
countries, the 12 countries included for comparison here were selected in part with a view 
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to capturing particular constellations of countries that have been shown to exhibit distinct 
institutional characteristics with regard to elements of their corporate governance context. 
France, Belgium, Italy and Spain are all civil law countries (De Andres and Vallelado, 
2008; La Porta, 1996; Renneboog, 2000), and literature suggests these countries have 
similar board leaderships structures, with the CEO serving as the Chairman of the Board 
(Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Renneboog, 2000), and the state owns strategic stakes in 
businesses in France, Spain and Italy (Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997), and share ownership 
is more concentrated and family ownership more prominent than in the UK and the US 
(Berglöf, 1997; De Miguel et al., 2004; Becht, 1999).  Countries such as Australia, UK, US 
and Canada by comparison have dispersed share ownership (Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997; 
LaPorta et al., 1999; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998), more institutional investors 
(Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998), a common-law legislative heritage and, until the recent 
financial crisis, a strong emphasis on free rather than state directed market regulation 
(Weimar and Pape, 1999). Continuing the theme of understanding different evolving 
patterns of female corporate board participation in different national contexts, this section 
analyses the pattern of the prevalence of women on the board for a sample of 12 countries 
in relation to market capitalisation and board independence.  
 
Turning first to the relationship between board gender demography and company size as 
measured by market capitalisation, this analysis was arrived at by ranking each country’s 
firms in descending order according to market capitalisation and based on this ranking 
associated average percentage female board directors were calculated for each quartile.  
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Table 5-6 Percentage women board directors by market capitalisation 2005 
Country 
Upper 
Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Lower 
Quartile 
Australia 11.96 12.68 6.61 5.23 
Belgium 5.04 8.31 8.38 0.78 
Canada 13.63 9.97 7.21 3.72 
France 6.76 5.34 7.50 8.66 
Germany 7.16 5.87 8.81 4.95 
Holland 6.77 3.28 3.25 0.48 
Italy 3.36 1.01 2.64 5.06 
Norway 14.88 14.58 6.55 6.93 
Spain 3.94 3.32 0.83 7.42 
Sweden 19.18 15.40 15.51 15.54 
United States 14.85 14.90 13.71 13.51 
United Kingdom 10.57 7.09 5.11 5.13 
Average percentage 9.84 8.48 7.18 6.45 
 
Far from being a simple linear relationship between market capitalisation and proportion of 
female corporate board directors, the above table reveals a more complex picture. Belgium, 
France, Italy and Spain all have the highest proportion of female corporate board directors 
in the smaller firms by market capitalisation. Belgian firms show the highest prevalence of 
female corporate board directors in the second and third quartile, with over 8% women; 
whilst Belgium’s largest firms had merely 5.04% female board directors. Women were 
virtually absent from the board of smaller firms, with less than one percent of board 
positions held by women. Whilst the largest French firms have 6.76% women on their 
boards on average, this declines to 5.34% for the second quartile firms, and increases to 
8.66% for the smallest firms. Italy and Spain exhibit a similar trend, but with a lower 
proportion of directorships held by women compared with France. Women have 3.36% 
board directorships in Italy’s largest firms, but the proportion rises sharply to 5.06% in the 
smallest firms. Similarly, the largest companies in Spain had just fewer than 4% of women 
serving as corporate board directors, whilst in the smallest had 7.42% women board 
directors.   
 
Below is a graphic illustration of the relationship between firms’ market capitalisation and 
the degree to which they have female corporate board directors for Belgium, France, Italy 
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and Spain. When viewing these four countries in isolation the linear trend shows an 
increase in the proportion of women on the board for the smaller firms in the sample.  
 
Figure 5.1 Percentage female board directors in Spain, Belgium, France and Italy 
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By contrast, Australia, UK, US, Canada, Norway, Germany, Holland and Sweden show a 
more linear relationship in the expected direction. In general there is a larger concentration 
of female corporate board directors in the larger firms. The largest firms in Norway and 
Australia had nearly twice the proportion of female board directors compared with the 
smallest. Australia had 11.96% and 12.68% female corporate board directors in their 
largest firms, compared with 6.61% in the third and 5.23% in the lowest quartile. Norway 
showed a similar trend, larger companies had more women, with 14.88% and 14.58% for 
the upper and second quartile respectively, whilst the third quartile has 6.55% female 
directors and the lowest quartile 6.93%. Canada, Holland and the UK all had a 
progressively lower prevalence of women on their boards. Canada had the largest absolute 
difference in prevalence between the largest and smallest firms, with 13.63% of board 
seats taken by women in its largest firms, and only 3.72% of board seats in its smallest 
firms were occupied by women. By comparison the smallest companies in Holland had 
less than one percent female board directors, whilst the largest had 6.77% female directors. 
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The UK’s largest firms had on average 10.57% female board directors, whilst the smaller 
firms had just over 5% female board directors.  Sweden and the US had the highest and 
most consistent pattern of female board directors. Sweden’s biggest firms boasted 19.18% 
female board directors, whilst the largest corporations in the US had 14.85%. The below 
graph illustrates the downward-pointing trend line, confirming that previous research 
conducted into the firm size and profitability and the prevalence of women on the board 
does hold true in certain national institutional settings.  
 
Figure 5.2 Percentage female board directors in Sweden, USA, Norway, Australia, 
UK, Germany and Holland  
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The second part of this analysis into firm level characteristics and the prevalence of women 
on the board concerns board independence. Research suggests that more independent 
boards have more female directors (Zahra et al., 1993; Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) and that the women who serve as corporate board directors 
overwhelmingly do so as non-executive directors (Daily et al., 1999). As with the research 
that established this truism for the relationship between firm size and profitability and the 
proportion of women serving on a given board, scholarly enquiry has largely been confined 
to North America, Australia and Canada (Zahra et al., 1993; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; 
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Hillman et al., 2007; Sheridan 2001).  Thus, continuing from the review of the relationship 
between market capitalisation and the prevalence of women on the board, below is an 
analysis of the relationship between the dominance of non-executive board directors and 
the proportion of board seats held by women. As with the above analysis, this analysis 
divided the firms for a given country into quartiles depending on the share of outside 
directors the firm had and calculated the mean percentage number of women on the board 
for each quartile on a country-by-country basis.  
 
 
Table 5-7 Percentage women corporate board directors by board independence 
Country 
Upper 
Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Lower 
Quartile 
Australia 11.74 11.29 7.83 5.62 
Belgium 5.13 4.37 5.10 8.50 
Canada 15.42 8.27 7.51 3.79 
France 6.26 7.42 6.76 7.90 
Germany 8.22 6.08 8.83 3.42 
Holland 3.48 4.81 2.86 2.48 
Italy 3.18 2.00 3.45 3.43 
Norway 11.93 10.71 9.58 10.71 
Spain 1.33 4.45 3.69 5.89 
Sweden 19.68 15.45 17.26 13.23 
United States 15.05 15.13 13.15 13.61 
United Kingdom 7.92 8.13 7.50 4.33 
Average percentage 9.11 8.18 7.79 6.91 
*Board independence is defined as the proportion of non-executive to executive directors. Calculations for average board 
independence was aggregated to the national level, and countries were sorted in descending order from the highest ratio of non-
executive directors to executive directors, to the lowest 
 
The share of board seats held by women when analysed in relation to board independence 
shows a varied pattern that is similar to that observed for company size. In other words, the 
academically established pattern suggesting boards with a larger share of non-executive 
directors have more women shows variation across countries.  Belgium, France, Italy and 
Spain again showed an inverse of the expected relationship between women on the board 
and board independence. All four countries had higher percentage women board directors 
where there were fewer non-executive directors. The relationship is particularly prominent 
for Spain, where the most independent boards only had just over 1% female corporate 
board directors, whilst the firms with the lowest number of non-executive directors had 
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nearly 6% women on their boards. In Belgium, firms with the highest number of outside 
board directors had 5.13% women, in France the proportion was 6.26% and in Italy 3.18%.  
Belgium and France both had a quite stable proportion of women on the boards of firms in 
the second and third quartile, whilst Italy had approximately 1.5% more women in the third 
quartile compared with the second. France, Belgium and Spain had the highest proportion 
of women on the board in the lowest quartile, Belgium with 8.5%, France with 7.90% and 
Spain, as stated above, 5.89%.  
 
The remaining countries continued to show patterns of board composition broadly in line 
with extant scholarly research.  Australia and Canada had more women on the board in 
firms that had a higher proportion of non-executive directors, and gradually fewer women 
until the least independent boards were associated with the least gender heterogeneity. 
Germany, Holland, Norway, Sweden, the United States and United Kingdom broadly 
showed a decline in the number of women on the board in line with diminishing board 
independence. Sweden and the US continued to show the highest and most consistent 
pattern of female corporate board directorships, Sweden exceeding 19% women on the 
board of firms in the upper quartile, whilst the US had just over 15%. The lowest quartile 
shows a similar level of female corporate directors, 13.23% in Sweden and 13.61% in the 
US. The UK and Holland both show the second largest proportion of women on the boards 
where boards are most independent; UK had 7.92% women and Holland had 3.48% on the 
firms in upper quartile. Similarly both countries had the largest proportion of female 
directors on the boards of firms belonging to the second quartile, followed by a steady 
decline for firms categorised as belonging to the third and bottom quartile. The most 
independent boards in Norway had 11.93% female corporate board directors, a proportion 
that fell to 10.71% for the boards with the lowest number of female board directors. The 
graph below highlights the complex nature of the relationship between board independence 
and female corporate board directors.  
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Figure 5.3 Percentage female board directors by board independence 
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Regarding the evolving trends in proportion of corporate board directorships held by 
women, it is clear from this analysis that the development in gender demography has not 
been linear. Large, consistent and in some instances, growing differences were found at the 
national, industry and within-industry level. The next section discusses these findings with 
reference to the literature and a final section concludes.  
 
5.3 Discussion and conclusion 
This analysis has highlighted substantial country and industry variation in the prevalence 
of women on the board, and illustrated the importance of broadening the sample of 
countries and industries included in any analysis of board’s gender demography and the 
value in looking beyond country averages for understanding the pattern of female 
corporate board directors. 
 
Some salient national level observations emerged that warrant discussion. The relatively 
consistent high level of female board participation across the Nordic region is noteworthy. 
The Nordic countries have a long history of promoting a gender equitable society (Baxter 
and Kane, 1995), and they all score relatively highly on feminine values in Hofstede’s 
framework of cultural country characteristics (Hofstede, 1983). However, Norway’s 
decision to introduce affirmative action may be a particularly pertinent factor in accounting 
for the high proportion of female corporate board directors, not only in Norway but across 
the Nordic region. Norway’s decision to legislate the gender proportion of the corporate 
board came in 2003, when the Norwegian Parliament passed a law requiring all Publicly 
Restricted Companies (Similar to PLC) boards to have at least 40% male and 40% female 
corporate board directors by 2007 (Det Kongelige Barne og Familie Departement Ot.prp 
nr. 97 2002-2003). Following this move, Sweden decided to address their gender 
imbalance at the board level and announced their intention to legislate in a similar fashion 
to Norway, but rather than set the proportion at 40% like Norway had done, Sweden aimed 
to increase the proportion of female corporate board directors to 25% by the end of 2004. 
Swedish firms responded by increasing their proportion of female board directors 
substantially before the law was passed, prompting the government to scrap their plans for 
legislation but to continue to monitor the gender diversity of Swedish boards (Thomson et 
al., 2005). At the time Denmark decided not to legislate for higher proportion of female 
corporate board directors, but the Danish state urged firms to appoint more women to their 
corporate boards (Thomson et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2006). Similarly, Finland has not 
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introduced legislation to cover the relative gender composition of corporate board of 
directors, except where the state has representatives on a corporate board, in which case the 
state’s representatives should reflect gender parity (Kuusipalo, 2000). Norway’s early 
decision to make use of legislation to address the gender disparity in the boardroom may 
have influenced the gender composition of the corporate boards in other Nordic countries. 
 
A further interesting finding to emerge from the national level analysis was the 
comparatively slow evolution in the share of board seats held by women across the US and 
the UK when compared with Norway and the broader Nordic region.  The modest growth 
observed across these two countries is particularly interesting. The period reflected in the 
analysis coincides with influential developments in the corporate governance framework of 
both countries. Following high profile, and high impact, corporate scandals such as 
WorldCom and Enron, both the UK and the US paid renewed attention to the way in which 
corporate governance, including board structure and composition, influenced firm 
behaviour (Valenti, 2008).  In particular, the Higgs Report commissioned by the UK 
government in 2003 to review the salient characteristics of the corporate boards of public 
limited liability companies, made clear recommendations for increasing the proportion of 
female corporate board directors, and the British government further emphasised the desire 
for more gender heterogeneity in the boardroom by also commissioning the Tyson Report 
(2003), which explicitly highlighted the benefits associated with diverse boards, but 
stopped short of recommending quotas like those introduced in Norway (Aldrick, 2003).  
The United States similarly made far-reaching changes to their corporate governance 
practices and the Senate passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Whilst SOX did 
not explicitly mention women, the Act clearly articulated the need for greater director 
independence and accountability, as corporate failings had made obvious the inherent 
problems of poor decision-making and groupthink where boards become demographically 
too homogeneous (Ramirez, 2003). Faced with prominent state-backed corporate 
governance initiatives like the Higgs Review and SOX, and intense media and scholarly 
scrutiny around the issue of board homogeneity (Brickey, 2008; Bartunek, 2002), the 
modest increase in the proportion of female corporate directors is interesting, and is 
perhaps indicative of the challenges faced by women wishing to acquire board 
directorships, when there is no legally mandated requirement for increased corporate board 
diversity.  
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In addition to the emerging pattern of women board directors across the Nordic region and 
the US and the UK, a less distinct, but none-the-less note worthy Southern European 
cluster also seems to emerge. Portugal, Italy, France, Greece and Spain consistently ranked 
amongst the countries with the lowest share of female corporate board directors in table 
5.2. Whereas the Nordic trend in female board room participation may be in part 
attributable to Norway’s decision to introduce affirmative action, the Nordic countries are 
also similar in cultural characteristics. Hofstede (1983) found a similar clustering of 
Southern European countries, where masculine values were more prominent than the 
feminine and power distances were higher, which may contribute to the explanation for 
why these countries showed such persistently low rates of female board participation. The 
next chapter begins to address some of these national characteristics in accounting for the 
share of corporate board directorships women hold across countries. Understanding the 
broader national institutional context within which firms operate can contribute to further 
our understanding of what engenders an increase in the percentage share of board seats 
held by women.   
 
Idiosyncrasies in the male to female director ratio were also observed at industry level with 
some industries having consistently larger shares of female board directors. Within 
industry differences were further observed, suggesting that the influences on the 
prevalence of women on the board are multi-faceted and multi-level in nature. The firm 
level analysis presented in table 5-5 revealed that firms in the same industry differed 
markedly in the extent to which they had female board directors. Some firms such as 
Groupe Crit of France had 50% women board directors, whilst other firms in the same 
industry had none. 
 
This analysis suffered from a notable limitation: The lack of consistent data. Despite 
extensive efforts to obtain as large and consistent sample as possible covering the broadest 
range of countries and industries, at the time of writing it was not possible to indentify a 
single data source that simultaneously offered national, industry and firm level data 
coupled with the prevalence of female corporate board directors. Substantial time and 
effort went into building the national level database in particular, which required extensive 
and thorough examination of a large number of annual reports, web sites and databases to 
complement the data obtained from BoardEx. With regards to firm and industry level 
observations, time and financial restrictions meant this research had to substantially use 
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BoardEx, which is an established and trusted academic resource as discussed in chapter 4. 
However, gaps in the data persisted and this impacted on the analysis presented here. The 
slight variation in the sample across the different levels of analysis means consistent 
reporting across levels is not possible and that better analysis is available for some parts of 
the analysis than others. Afforded the time and the financial resources, subsequent research 
should seek to build a bespoke dataset that is consistent over time tracking the evolving 
role of female board directors and match such data with firm level financials to provide the 
clarity and coherence of data that is needed. Despite this limitation, this research throws 
light on a number of important issues in research on women board directors and highlights 
the need to explore wider avenues of research in establishing precisely why there is 
variation across countries and industries.   
 
5.4 Chapter summary 
Notwithstanding the data limitations, this chapter achieved the objectives it set out to fulfil, 
namely to highlight the cross-national variation in the prevalence of women on the board, 
secondly to show that the gender composition of the corporate board of directors varies 
across industries, thirdly to provide a detailed within-industry analysis to show that 
substantial variation exists within industries as well as across sectors and countries, and 
finally to detail the relationship between certain salient firm level characteristics and the 
proportion of female corporate board directors. To begin to understand this cross-national 
variation, the next chapter will assess national, level influences on the prevalence of 
women on the corporate board of directors for a cross-national sample drawn from a 
database of 50 countries.  
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6.  Women corporate board directors and national institutional context  
The previous chapter systematically mapped the percentage number of women board 
directors across a set of countries, industries and companies and highlighted salient facts 
regarding the share of board directorships women held in particular country clusters and 
industries. This chapter seeks to explore whether the varying pattern of female board 
participation can be explained with reference to country institutional factors. This chapter 
has three particular objectives: firstly, to draw on the conceptual framework developed in 
chapter 3 to develop testable hypotheses informed by Scott’s (1995) three pillars about the 
role played by national institutions in shaping the prevalence of women on the board; 
secondly, to test empirically these hypotheses using a novel cross-national dataset; and 
thirdly, to draw conclusions from the findings as they relate to theory and practice. 
Through this analysis, two significant contributions are made. First, this research extends 
and complements earlier analyses of the factors associated with greater prevalence of 
women on corporate boards of directors to encompass macro-level influences and 
processes. Given significant debate concerning the mix of policies and practices necessary 
to promote women’s participation on corporate boards, this analysis is able to highlight the 
relevance of country level institutional levers to this debate. Also, this helps companies to 
understand better the constraints and influences upon their capacity to recruit women and 
raises awareness of how national institutions shape board demography. Secondly, this 
research extends the analysis of the influences of country institutional environments to 
encompass the domain of board demography. In so doing, this research responds to calls 
for research that explores the relationship between boards of directors and the wider 
institutional contexts within which firms operate (Boyd, 1990; Pearce and Zahra, 1992), 
and contributes to the development of the emerging literature that addresses a comparative 
analysis of country institutions. Through this, further evidence is added to the ongoing 
evaluation of the range of phenomena to which a comparative institutional analysis can 
usefully contribute. 
 
The next section addresses the literature review and hypothesis development. Then, the 
empirical methods are described, and then the findings are reported. The importance of 
these results for both the literatures on board demography and for managerial practice is 
then discussed. A final section concludes.  
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6.1 Literature review and hypotheses development 
As discussed in chapter 3, institutional theory emphasises the significance of long-lasting, 
embedded and persistent aspects of a social environment for the behaviour of actors and 
agents within that environment (Scott, 1987, 1995; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Selznick, 
1957). Central to many discussions of institutional pressures is the tendency for businesses 
to select relatively homogeneous, or isomorphic, responses to them in the form of similar 
organisational structures, processes and behaviours (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Therefore, while companies are, in principle, able to select a number of possible responses 
to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1997), firms tend, in many contexts, to conform to 
institutional forces. In light of this tendency to isomorphic conformity to institutional 
pressures, a growing body of research has analysed the distinctive institutional attributes of 
countries and demonstrated the significance of these for a range of economic, political, and 
business phenomena (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Whitley, 1999; 
Crossland and Hambrick, 2007).  
 
Research on national institutions focuses on the identification and classification of aspects 
of country institutional environments and the study of their importance for a wide range of 
phenomena (Whitley, 1999; La Porta et al., 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hofstede, 1980, 
1983, 1985). For example, empirical research concerning national institutions has focused 
on explaining cross-country variation in innovation (Patel and Pavitt, 1994; Lundvall et al., 
2002), human resource management activities (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998), 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Busenitz et al., 2000), and corporate governance practices 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003). In this chapter, it is argued that cross-national variation in 
institutional factors plays an important role in shaping corporate boards, particularly with 
respect to the board’s gender composition, and in light of the conceptual framework 
proposed in chapter 3, this research analyses the role played by regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive pillars in explaining cross-national variation in the share of board seats 
held by women.  
 
The regulative pillar is concerned with legitimacy, anchored in judicially sanctioned, 
enforceable laws and complied with on the basis of expediency, whilst the normative pillar 
centres on morally governed expectations concerned with appropriate behaviour and has its 
basis of compliance in social obligation (Scott, 1995). In the normative view of 
institutions, social obligations and morally governed behaviour are central components. 
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The third and final pillar identified by Scott (1995) is the cultural-cognitive pillar which 
focuses on the shared yet often implicit understanding of common beliefs and logics, 
which at its core has the “shared conceptions that define the nature of social reality” (Scott, 
1994, p 408). The board of directors is one such group of people who establish a common 
understanding of the etiquette and taken for granted behavioural patterns that reflect the 
culture and wider institutional context within which the board, and by extension the firm, 
operates and make decisions (Westphal and Khanna, 2003). 
 
Regulatory influences on the prevalence of women on the board 
Regulatory institutions encompass such factors as rule of law, consent, judicial expediency, 
the structure of the state and the political climate (Scott, 1995; Whitley, 1999).  A 
country’s political and governance-related institutions constitute an important facet of the 
firm’s environmental context, as Hitt et al. (1997) argue: “managerial practices are as 
much a function of environmental forces as they are of cultural attributes…executives’ 
strategic orientation will be affected by their…national policies and institutions” (p 160). 
Governance provides the societal parameters within which institutions exist and develop: 
“Institutions constrain and regularize behaviour” (Scott, 1995, p 51). Firms, the central 
actors of institutional theory (Hall and Soskice, 2001), exist alongside and are dependent 
on these institutions and consequently the form, extent and nature of the institutions will 
shape board-level decision-making and processes. Political environments are frequently 
characterised in terms of left (Liberal) or right (Conservative)-wing inclinations. The right-
wing or Conservative political views emphasise stability, preservation of tradition, and 
order, whilst vindicating continued societal inequality (Thorisdottir et al., 2007; Evans et 
al., 1996). With the right-wing governments’ traditional stress on stability and resistance to 
major change in the corporate realm, one would expect there to be fewer women on the 
board where there are Conservative political regimes, as the overriding desire for order and 
stability is paramount (Thorisdottir et al., 2007), and introducing women on the corporate 
board in the face of a largely Caucasian, all-male group would represent a departure from 
the established norm: conversely, the expectation is that there would be more women on 
the board in countries on the left-hand side of the political spectrum; because left-wing or 
socialist inclined political parties have historically been associated with gender equality, 
extensive welfare provisions especially for women, state intervention and inclusiveness 
(Arian and Shamir; 1983; Mandel & Semyonov 2006; Lin 2005).   
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From a regulative perspective, where women are afforded the opportunity to more directly 
be involved with the national legislative process this can have beneficial outcomes for 
female board directors. Women who acquire positions of national political power are able 
to more directly engage with the legislative process of a given country and more 
effectively work to ensure gender parity is reflected in national laws and regulations 
(Reynolds, 1999). Research suggests where more women hold political office, there are 
more women-friendly policies such as child-care and welfare provisions, which in turn 
help women, pursue professional careers outside the home (Lijphart, 1991). The power 
conferred by positions of regulative influence may engender a related benefit for the 
women who hold political office. Shilton et al. (1996) found that women in positions of 
influence and senior political power were coveted for board positions, and Hillman (2005) 
suggests that legislation and government regulations exert important pressures on business, 
which business in turn seek to address by recruiting board directors who have political 
clout. Women who inhabit roles of regulatory influence may themselves therefore be 
offered corporate board directorships.  
 
Discrimination has been identified as a possible reason for the low representation of 
women on the board (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994). Effective, impartial and fair national 
governance is essential to the safeguarding of equal rights for men and women. Most 
western economies have legislation protecting against discrimination on the basis of 
gender. Women and men, in principle, have the same rights to work and educational 
opportunities in the developed world (Masselot, 2007). Whilst legislation and societal 
support may underpin this in principle, gender equality only becomes a reality with the 
help of an effective and impartial judiciary, and law enforcement agencies that can ensure 
that workplaces, educational establishments and other organisations follow the laws and 
can deal effectively with cases of gender discrimination as and when they arise. Countries 
with strong institutional governance practices are thus more likely to benefit from fair 
access to education and gender equitable career opportunities essential for demographically 
diverse corporate boards. These arguments suggest: 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the degree to which a country is on the left-hand side of the political 
continuum. 
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Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament 
 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the quality of national governance.  
 
Normative influences on the prevalence of women on the board 
The normative pillar of Scott’s framework centres on shared norms, beliefs and values. 
These are reinforced and developed through continued interactions between individuals, 
groups of people, and organisations. Normative determinants are manifested through 
appropriateness - what constitutes accepted social interaction in a given setting. Whilst 
rules, laws and sanctions were the overt manifestations of the regulatory pillar, Scott 
(2005) lists certification and accreditation as indicative of normative constructs, in addition 
to the value-based norms he argues develop over time. Hoffman (1999) and Mark (2007) 
argue that education and religion are indicators of aspects of a country’s normative 
institutions.  
 
The educational opportunities afforded women in a given country is indicative of the 
perceived societal beliefs of women’s role in society. Countries that encourage women to 
invest in their human capital implicitly encourage them to pursue professional careers 
outside the home, allowing women to build up the requisite work experience needed for 
board directorships. Research evaluating female board directors’ credentials found that 
women directors hold a larger proportion of academic qualifications and have equal if not 
better skills and competencies than their male counterparts (Burgess and Tharenou, 1996; 
Sheridan, 2001; Hillman and Cannella, 2002). An increase in the number of women 
pursuing higher education and professional qualifications has coincided with a substantial 
increase in the number of women in the workforce, and in particular in senior roles (Levin 
and Mattis, 2006). This suggests that access to adequate education is essential to women 
who wish to pursue board directorships. Secondly, a country’s educational system is an 
important normative carrier. The curriculum taught by an educational system reflects the 
values and beliefs inherent in that system, and these normative values are passed on to 
consecutive cohorts of students (Trevino et al., 2008; Turner, 1997). Educated women will 
therefore embody the beliefs and values of the educational system they studied in.  
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Religious beliefs are still a pervasive force in shaping perceptions of gender and often 
define what is perceived to be right, wrong and acceptable behaviour for a given society 
(Parboteeah et al., 2008). The manifestation of national religious faith has many facets and 
implications for social life. In this research the concern is with the degree to which religion 
may influence women’s commercial and professional role in society as seen from a 
spiritual perspective. In light of the normative pillar, the impact of Christianity, Islam, and 
Chinese Folk Religion as encompassing Buddhism, Hinduism and Taoism are explored for 
the proportion of women on the board. Chinese Folk Religion is mixture of beliefs 
originating in Asian philosophy and related religious belief systems such as that of 
Buddhism, and is based on the belief that a direct bond exists between “the terrestrial and 
spiritual world, and between and among human beings, gods, and spirits” (Gaw, 1993, p 
247). Noticeable overlaps exist between Buddhism, Hinduism and Taoism as well as 
elements of Hinduism (Bouma and Singleton, 2004).  The notion of religion and religious 
beliefs has been subjected to numerous definitions (Graafland et al., 2007; Iannaccone, 
1998; Chusmir and Koberg, 1988). Common for them all is the focus on the individual’s 
belief in a supernatural power, usually focused on one God, but some religions have more 
than one God such as Chinese Folk Religion (Harrell, 1977). The belief system embedded 
in the particular religion an individual worshipper follows forms an integral part of the 
normative and ethical behavioural make-up of that individual (Chusmir and Koberg, 1988). 
Personal religious beliefs have been associated with a number of business-related 
outcomes such as attitudes to corporate social responsibility (Graafland et al., 2006, 
Brammer et al., 2007; van Burren III, 2007; Agle and van Burren III, 1999), attitude to 
work (Chusmir and Koberg, 1988; Sadler-Smith et al., 2003), stakeholder management 
(Schwartz, 2006) and business ethics (Pava, 1998, Clarke et al., 1996).  
 
Despite the inherent differences in values, beliefs and methods of worship found across 
religions, there are commonalities in the way Islam, Christianity and Chinese Folk 
Religion encourage commercial ventures, economic activity, self-sufficiency and charity 
through the sharing of any earnings and profit (Gordon, 1994; Calkins, 2000; Sadler-Smith 
et al., 2003; Alexandrin, 1993). All the religions considered in this analysis allow and 
encourage worshippers to improve their material standing and pursue prosperity. However, 
the intrinsic motivation for pursuing financial and material gains and how the wealth is 
created and shared differ. Christianity and Islam focus on the importance of hard work, 
dedication and the need to part with some of one’s wealth and share it with those less well 
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off and less fortunate, whilst Buddhism and Hinduism, both elements of Chinese Folk 
Religion, place greater emphasis on intrinsic well-being, cooperation, compassion and 
humility (Alexandrin, 1993; Chow, 2007).  Where the religions do differ is in relation to 
the role of women in business. Christianity emphasises the rights of women to equal 
wages, respect and treatment in commercial life to those of men (MacLean, 1946), and 
Islam’s view of women is that they have an equally important role to play in society to that 
of men, albeit a different one. Women’s societal role is predominantly played out in the 
familial, social and welfare-related sphere, and where professional women pursue careers 
they are often expected to stop working once they marry or have children. Moreover, their 
continued participation in professional roles is somewhat dependent on their husband’s 
approval (Metcalfe, 2007). Women’s role in Hinduism is largely framed in terms of being 
good wives and mothers and being subservient to their male family members (Tomalin, 
2006). Some notable exceptions to the subservient Hindu woman exists, such as Ms Nooyi 
of Pepsi Co who successfully ascended the highest echelons of business; however, she 
benefitted from extensive university education, including business studies in the US, which 
is not common for all women in India, suggesting these are opportunities afforded the few 
rather than the many. Despite the philosophical nature of Buddhism and the opportunity for 
more individual interpretations of the basic edicts associated with the faith, it appears to 
offer less by way of opportunities for women. Women can be seen to be of lower re-birth, 
higher re-birth being important for furthering one’s own life, career and well-being. 
Certain Buddhist countries such as Thailand marginalise women from the public arena 
(Peach, 2002), and Norsworthy (2004) suggests Buddhist beliefs as interpreted by certain 
men legitimise violence and degrading treatment of women. Buddhism says little about the 
scope for having women in positions of leadership. As Buddhism and Hinduism figure 
prominently within the Chinese Folk Religion (Bouma and Singleton, 2004), the Eastern 
Religious principles of Folk Religion, Hinduism and Buddhism will be treated as one 
Eastern Religion. Reflecting the discussion of the normative pillar it is therefore 
hypothesised: 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the percentage of women who enter higher education.  
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the degree to which Christian beliefs prevail. 
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Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the degree to which Islamic beliefs prevail. 
 
Hypothesis 7: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the degree to which Chinese Folk Religious beliefs prevail. 
 
Cultural-Cognitive influences on the prevalence of women on the board 
National culture is a multifaceted and frequently defined phenomenon (Arnold et al., 2007; 
Craig and Douglas, 2006; Orchard, 2002). Culture is often characterised in terms of 
behavioural patterns and actions within a common frame of reference (Huczynski and 
Buchanen, 1991; Scott, 1995), the adhesive that bind communities together through shared 
values, norms, rites and other implied and explicit patterns of behaviour (Tsui et al., 2007). 
In operationalising Scott’s (1995) cultural-cognitive pillar, this chapter uses Hofstede’s 
cultural framework. Hofstede defines culture as “the collective mental programming of the 
people in an environment…the collective mental programming that these people have in 
common…the programming that is different from other groups” (1980, p 43). Hofstede’s 
framework is well established and extensively used in management research (See for 
example Johns et al., 2007; Arnold et al., 2006; Littrell and Valentin, 2005; Mukherji and 
Hurtado, 2001). His research identified four key aspects which, together, provide a 
summary of the character of a nation’s culture: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Individuality and Masculinity.  
 
The concept of Power Distance captures the degree to which a society accepts and 
recognises that power is unequally distributed in society. Countries that exhibit high levels 
of power distance see powerful people as being entitled to privileges, see ‘subordinates’ 
and authority possessors as different kinds of people and subordinates see their superiors as 
essentially inaccessible. Where low power distance prevails, subordinates and superiors 
treat and see one another as equals, everybody has equal rights and superiors are readily 
contactable and accessible to their subordinates (Hofstede, 1983). Countries that exhibit 
large power distance include India (Kedia and Bhagat, 1988), whilst Scandinavian 
countries display low power distance (Sundqvist et al., 2005). Uncertainty Avoidance 
refers to the degree to which a nation is comfortable with uncertain and ambiguous 
situations and how adequately the country copes with change and unpredictability. 
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Hofstede (1980) found that countries with high uncertainty avoidance often displayed more 
aggressive behaviour and anxiety. Portugal and Brazil are examples of countries with high 
uncertainty avoidance whilst Ireland and the UK display low uncertainty avoidance. 
Individualism-Collectivism captures a people’s propensity primarily to look out for 
themselves and their immediate family (individualistic) rather than their wider family, the 
community or clan (collectivist). Collectivist countries are characterised by tight social 
networks and a high degree of loyalty to the community in return for care and protection. 
Collectivist countries include Thailand and Chile whilst individualist countries include the 
USA and Australia. Lastly, the masculine-feminine continuum measures the degree to 
which a society is driven by masculine as opposed to feminine values. Feminine values are 
deemed to be quality of life and care for others, whilst masculine values are said to focus 
on wealth and material accumulation and status. Furthermore, feminine societies were 
found to exhibit greater flexibility in sex-roles and displayed a greater degree of gender 
equity (Huczynski and Buchanen, 1991).  
 
Given this, countries with high power distance are less likely to challenge the status quo on 
gender diversity at board level as these countries innately see authority figures as different 
from those not in powerful positions, and therefore deserving of special privileges. 
Regarding uncertainty avoidance, Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) found that companies were 
occasionally reluctant to take on women directors as there was some perceived risk 
attached to hiring them, hence countries that score high on uncertainty avoidance are 
expected to have fewer female board directors. With respect to individualism versus 
collectivism, Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) highlight that to gain board directorships 
women must assimilate male career-planning, networking and politicking tactics, 
essentially aimed at promoting the self, rather than the collective company. Bolino and 
Turnley (2003) found that men were much more aggressive than women in employing self-
promoting, career-enhancing tactics, whilst women do not easily engage with more covert 
political organisational manoeuvres; “women are no good at the politics side of things” 
(Simpson, 1997, p 127). In sum, this suggests there is a likelihood of more women 
directors on boards in more individualist cultures because women within these cultures are 
accustomed to and more familiar with the attributes more commonly associated with board 
membership. Concerning masculinity/femininity, masculine countries are known to exhibit 
a focus on the accumulation of material possessions and prestige, and a large degree of 
male-female role differentiation (Huczyski and Buchanen, 1991). More traditional patterns 
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of gender roles are characterised by men in the breadwinner role and women as 
homemakers (Corrigall and Konrad, 2006). According to Hofstede higher degrees of 
masculinity were also associated with a perception that men should be the dominant force 
in society, which suggests that more masculine countries would have fewer female board 
directors. Reflecting these arguments:  
 
Hypothesis 8:  Countries that display high levels of power distance will have a lower 
percentage of female board directors than countries that display low power distance. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Countries that display high levels of uncertainty avoidance will have a lower 
percentage of female board directors than countries that display low uncertainty avoidance. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Countries classified as individualist will have a higher percentage of female 
board directors than countries classified as collectivist. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Countries classified as feminine will have a higher percentage of female 
board directors than countries classified as masculine.  
 
6.2 Methods 
Sample 
This analysis focuses on evaluating the degree to which Scott’s (1995) three pillars of 
institutional theory explain the prevalence of women on the corporate board of directors in 
a cross-national perspective. As outlined in chapter 4, this placed certain restrictions on the 
countries that could usefully be included in the analysis to those countries which a) have 
corporations, i.e. companies that adopt the corporate form, b) employ corporate boards or a 
comparable highest decision-making body, c) have a requirement, or convention, that 
information about these boards is made public, and d) had a sufficient number of listed 
companies for the national aggregate numbers to be viewed as being reasonably 
representative of the general pattern of board demography found among large companies in 
a given country. Notwithstanding these limitations, the gathered data have global reach 
encompassing all the major continents including Europe (Western Europe, many countries 
of the former Eastern Bloc, Southern Europe including Greece and Turkey), Australasia, 
Africa (including both South Africa and Egypt), Asia (including key economies such as 
Japan, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, India and Malaysia), Latin America (including 
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile), in addition to the US and Canada. Drawing upon a 
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wide range of sources discussed in more detail below, it was possible to identify robust 
estimates of the prevalence of women on corporate boards for 50 countries, and typically 
for several years per country. However, the constraints outlined did limit the number of 
countries included from Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is defined as the percentage of board seats in a country occupied 
by female directors in a given year. For the vast majority of countries, BoardEx was used 
to obtain data concerning the composition of corporate boards. BoardEx is a commercially 
available database, which is establishing itself as the premier data source for board related 
data, as discussed in chapter 4. BoardEx data were then aggregated to country level annual 
averages for the purpose of this research. In addition to using BoardEx data, further data 
collection for Latin American countries and India was carried out as these countries were 
at the time of writing not available on BoardEx. In order to compute these figures for 
particular country/years the recognised method in the research was used. This approach 
relies on the examination of the annual corporate reports for the relevant companies, from 
which the total number of directors on each firm’s board and the number of these that are 
female can be extracted. Based on Latin Trade’s list of Top 500 companies in Latin 
America by Net Sales, companies for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the largest 
Latin American trading economies, were identified, and a similar approach was used for 
India, where all the firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange SENSEX index were included. 
The SENSEX represents the largest 30 firms by market capitalisation. Annual reports or 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings were used to identify the board of 
directors for each company. Female gender was identified by way of pictures, use of titles 
Miss, Ms, Mrs or native language equivalents and names. The companies were picked with 
a view to having a minimum of ten observations for each country for every year available. 
As some countries (for example Mexico) have more companies with extensive annual 
report archives, this meant inclusion of the top 65 Mexican companies on the Latin Trade 
list, whilst for countries with a smaller population of listed companies (for example 
Argentina), all available companies are included. 
 
Having collated data from company reports and BoardEx, it was deemed important both to 
validate the self-generated estimates of the prevalence of women on corporate boards and 
to broaden the coverage of the database through a thorough exploration of estimates 
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available in a range of secondary sources. For example, the European Commission tracks 
the gender composition of boards in Europe using a methodology that examines the 
prevalence of women on boards of the 50 largest listed companies in each member state. 
Where fewer than 50 listed companies exist, all available listed companies are incorporated 
in their analysis. Other specialist research exists for particular countries and regions. For 
example, data were collected from the following bodies: Spencer Stuart Board Indices, 
Catalyst, European Commission reports, the Australian Equal Opportunities for Women in 
the Workplace Agency (EOWA), Business Women’s Association South Africa, and Globe 
Women. Where this process generated multiple estimates of the prevalence of women on 
boards within a particular country, the approach was to use the estimate that was generated 
using the largest sample of firm observations since this was considered as providing the 
most robust and reliable estimate. 
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables were collated from publicly available data sources and, 
reflecting the conceptual development, relate to the regulatory, normative and cultural 
institutions in the sample countries.  
 
Regulatory variables 
Data relating to the regulatory pillar were captured through country political and regulatory 
institutions using the World Bank’s indicators of national governance. The World Bank 
produces data concerning the following six aspects of national regulatory institutions: 
Voice & Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption Control. Together, these provide a useful insight into 
the character of a country’s regulatory institutions. An exploratory analysis of these facets 
of country political environments showed that they were very highly correlated with each 
other. So as to reduce the chances of statistical issues commonly associated with high 
degrees of multicollinearity an exploratory factor analysis was carried out to find out 
whether the six indicators could be reduced to a smaller number of common factors. Factor 
analysis was conducted using principal component analysis with the varimax rotation (Hair 
et al., 1998). This process identified a single factor with an eigenvalue greater than one 
which explained over 85% of the variance within the six original variables. This factor was 
labelled “GoodGov” and retained for use in the regression analysis. The second indicator 
of country political institutions included was the percentage number of parliamentary seats 
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(or national equivalent) occupied by women. These data were extracted from the United 
Nations, Women’s Indicators and Statistics Database. Finally, following Brady (2007), to 
reflect the orientation of political institutions in a country, the World Values Survey 
measure of mean left-rightness was used to capture the extent to which a country was 
politically more socialist or conservatively inclined.  
 
The normative pillar 
The national normative environment was reflected by the inclusion of tertiary education 
enrolment of women obtained from UNESCO. Tertiary education is associated with 
successful completion of secondary education before stepping up to this more advanced 
level of learning. Higher level of tertiary education enrolment for women was seen as a 
desire by society to have an actively working female population and reflecting the 
normative beliefs of the country through the inclusion of women in education. Educational 
establishments were also seen as a mechanism for instilling national beliefs and values in 
the next generation. The second variable used to measure the normative pillar was religion. 
By using on the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), it was possible to obtain 
a breakdown of the dominant national religions as a percentage of the total population. The 
National Religion Archives international database of religious beliefs relies in the main on 
the 2003 US State Department’s International Religious Freedom Reports, but is also 
augmented by further data from such institutions as the United Nations to create a more 
complete and reliable dataset. ARDA provides detailed breakdown of nearly 20 religions. 
The number of worshippers for some of these religious traditions constituted less than 1 
percent of total number of followers world wide. Data were extracted for the five largest 
religions, measured as having the largest number of followers. These were Christianity, 
Islam, Chinese Folk Religion, Hinduism and Buddhism. As Chinese Folk Religion has 
overlap and spiritual similarities with both Buddhism and Hinduism, followers of these 
three religions were aggregated to one variable entitled Eastern Religion (Zhao, 1989; 
Stark, 2001; Paper, 1995; Manchao, 1995; Gates and Well, 1987).  
 
The cultural-cognitive pillar 
The measures relating to national cultures are attributable to Geert Hofstede. Estimates of 
Hofstede’s cultural variables, Power Distance, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Individualism were extracted for each available country from www.geert-hofstede.com. 
Reflecting Scott’s (1995) view of cultural-cognitive institutions as enduring over time, it 
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was assumed that Hofstede’s variables were constant over the period of study (2000-
2006/7).  
 
Control variables 
In order to capture the possibility that the composition of boards of directors has changed 
over time, independent of the nature of the national business environment, a set of dummy 
variables was created, one for each year encompassed by the dataset, which take a value of 
one if a given observation is attributable to that year, and zero otherwise. The analysis also 
controlled for the level of national wealth and included GDP per capita, obtained from the 
World Bank Development database for each country and each year.  
 
6.3 Findings 
This section reveals the findings of the regression analysis. Table 6.1 presents descriptive 
statistics and correlation coefficients. The sizes of correlation coefficients and Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) conform broadly to permitted norms in the literature and therefore 
no serious problems with multicollinearity were expected to emerge from the results (Hair 
et al., 1998). VIFs are not reported.  This suggests that the exploratory diagnosis and 
subsequent factor analyses discussed above are likely to have successfully solved issues 
associated with high degrees of bivariate correlation observed in some of the independent 
variables.  
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Table 6-1 Correlation coefficients 
 
 
Mean
Standard 
Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Composite % Women 7.7203 5.5504
2 YEAR2001 0.0943 0.2927 1.4898
3 YEAR2002 0.0997 0.3000 1.4968 -0.1440
4 YEAR2003 0.1240 0.3300 1.7192 0.0093 -0.1214
5 YEAR2004 0.1321 0.3390 1.8596 0.0225 -0.1259 -0.1298
6 YEAR2005 0.1375 0.3448 1.9337 0.0805 -0.1288 -0.1329 -0.1502
7 YEAR2006 0.1348 0.3419 1.9090 0.1438 -0.1274 -0.1314 -0.1485 -0.1540
8 YEAR2007 0.1348 0.3419 1.7206 0.2101 -0.1274 -0.1314 -0.1485 -0.1540 -0.1576
9 GDP 17786.1868 12689.5452 4.1607 -0.0374 0.0598 0.0411 -0.0271 -0.0317 -0.0382 -0.0362
10 Mean L-R 5.4367 0.5570 1.1742 0.0472 0.0129 0.0248 0.0279 -0.0269 -0.1024 -0.0195 -0.0122
11 Women in Parliament % 20.3362 10.3636 2.1905 0.2005 -0.0095 -0.0037 -0.0098 -0.0111 0.0067 0.0304 0.0452 0.3514
12 Good Gov 0.0000 1.0000 5.0821 -0.0131 0.0627 0.0141 -0.0057 -0.0104 -0.0625 -0.0223 -0.0153 0.7818 0.0580
13 Women in tertiary education % 58.0407 26.3417 2.5805 0.4041 -0.0516 -0.0485 -0.0116 0.0220 0.0543 0.0511 0.0485 0.2792 -0.0947 0.3749
14 Christianity 0.6972 0.3201 5.3476 0.1740 -0.0074 -0.0420 -0.0046 0.0056 -0.0055 0.0108 0.0096 0.0667 0.1137 0.2479 0.1419
15 Islam 0.0589 0.1616 3.2646 -0.1661 -0.0049 0.0211 0.0014 -0.0072 0.0292 0.0322 0.0316 -0.2337 -0.2055 -0.3228 -0.2530 -0.2283
16 Eastern Religion 0.0653 0.1670 3.8459 -0.2662 -0.0090 0.0452 0.0123 0.0027 -0.0035 -0.0267 -0.0182 0.0160 0.1142 -0.2631 -0.3011 -0.3612 -0.6807
17 Power Distance 51.7704 22.3264 3.5019 -0.2098 -0.0436 -0.0084 0.0286 0.0318 0.0318 0.0312 0.0255 -0.5918 -0.2282 -0.5025 -0.7252 -0.4606 -0.1694 0.2154
18 Individuality 57.0332 21.2387 4.1839 0.2686 0.0076 -0.0112 -0.0296 -0.0277 -0.0277 -0.0233 -0.0143 0.4931 0.0226 0.3666 0.6338 0.5321 0.3223 -0.2499 -0.3940
19 Masculinity 52.3807 20.9830 2.4197 -0.1899 -0.0306 -0.0292 -0.0046 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0191 -0.0026 -0.0633 0.1732 -0.4120 -0.2593 -0.3240 -0.1511 -0.0959 0.2308 0.1439
20 Uncertainty Avoidance 64.2991 24.6683 2.7585 -0.1337 -0.0073 -0.0281 -0.0008 0.0143 0.0143 0.0042 0.0274 -0.2869 -0.1238 -0.3518 -0.4383 -0.0468 0.2209 0.0246 -0.3281 0.2555 -0.2643
Variable definitions: Year 1-7 is a constant dummy variable to account for the passing of time.GDP is measured per capita and indicates degree of wealth. Mean L-R is a scale measuring degree of left or right wing 
ideological inclination.Women in Parliament measures the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber occupied by women.GoodGov is a factor of six World Bank indicators including Voice & 
accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of Law and Corruption control. Tertiary education enrolment is percentage number of women entered for higher education.Christianity, 
Islam and Eastern Religion is the percentage followers of each of these religions. Power Distance, Individuality, Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance are all constructs of Hofstede's framework
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Table 6.2 begins to explore the relationship between institutional factors and the 
prevalence of women on corporate boards. In the initial step of the analysis the sample 
includes all countries/years for which the country estimate of the prevalence of women on 
corporate boards is based upon 10 or more companies. The variation in the sample size 
across models in table 6.2 arises because of the lack of availability of all independent 
variables. These sampling decisions are discussed later in the analysis. The base model, 
model 1, explores the degree to which there has been change over time in the proportion of 
directorships filled by women within the sample, and the effect that national level 
economic wealth as measured by GDP per capita has on the prevalence of women on the 
board.  The coefficients on the annual dummy variables are all positive and become larger 
and statistically significant in more recent years, particularly between 2003 and 2007, 
suggesting that there has been substantial growth in the proportion of directorships 
occupied by female directors in recent years. Quantitatively, the analysis suggests that 
across the sample this trend accounts for growth of between 3% and 6% over the period of 
study. There is also a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between level of 
economic wealth and the number of female corporate board directors. Together, the 
evolution of board diversity over time and level of wealth account for about 13% of the 
variance in the cross-national variation in the prevalence of women on corporate boards. 
Models 2-5 build upon the base model to explore the contribution that national institutional 
factors make in shaping board gender diversity relative to the time trend explored in model 
1.  Model 2 explores the regulatory pillar of Scott’s (1995) framework as reflected in the 
quality of national governance, the dominance of women in parliament and national 
political inclinations. Hypotheses 1-3 suggested that what Scott (1995) referred to as the 
regulatory pillar influences the proportion of women on the board by providing the 
governance mechanisms necessary to minimise discriminatory behaviour, and opening up 
positions of political and regulatory influence to women, and a political climate conducive 
to promoting women into roles of power and responsibility. The coefficient for the 
proposition that countries on the left-hand side of the political spectrum will have a higher 
proportion of women on the board displays the expected results, but the finding is 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient for whether women in parliament influence the 
degree to which women acquire corporate directorships is positive and statistically 
significant to the 5% level. Surprisingly, there is evidence of a negative, but statistically 
insignificant coefficient for the proposed relationship between good national governance 
practices and the proportion of female board directors. Cumulatively the regulatory pillars 
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add 8% to the explanatory power of this analysis compared with the base model. Model 3 
examines the importance of the normative pillar of Scott’s framework. This pillar is 
concerned with the values and beliefs held by societies and how these may influence the 
gender composition of corporate boards of directors. As measured by education and 
religion, model 3 shows a statistically significant positive relationship between the 
percentage of women in tertiary education and female board representation, suggesting that 
access to higher education is an important factor in determining whether women are able to 
break into the upper echelons of corporate power. The coefficient for Christianity was 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting devout Christian 
countries have fewer women board directors. The remaining religious coefficients are all 
negative, but statistically insignificant. Model 3 therefore suggests religion is not an 
important influence upon whether women attain board directorships. Overall, model 3 adds 
24% to the explanatory power of the base model. Model 4 tests the importance of the 
cultural-cognitive pillar in shaping the prevalence of women on corporate boards. 
Consistent with the view that culture is important, the analysis shows that three of 
Hofstede’s cultural constructs in particular influence the percentage of women on the 
board. Specifically, countries with a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance, emphasis on 
individuality and more masculine cultural traits have lower proportions of women on their 
boards. Collectively, cultural institutions account for an additional 15% of the variance 
across countries in the presence of women on corporate boards. Finally, model 5 examines 
the influence of three pillars concurrently. Looking within model 5, the result shows that 
the influence of time remains consistently important at the 1% level with more women 
being added to the board of directors at an accelerated rate in recent years, adding ca 3%-
5% to the model. Next, the measures of the regulatory pillar shows national political sway 
to be important for whether women are appointed to the corporate board, with more liberal 
political climates adding more women. The surprising finding of a negative relationship 
between good national governance and the proportion of women on the boards remains and 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Within the normative pillar there remains a 
strong relationship between women’s education and role of women on the board; however, 
any statistically significant effect of religious beliefs on women’s prevalence on the board 
is absent. 
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Table 6-2 Regression results. Standard Error reported in () 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Independent variables
CONSTANT 5.2822 0.0207 4.4051 8.7262 -4.2116
(1.0160) (3.7297) (2.4467) (2.4579) (5.7389)
YEAR1 0.4945 0.6731 0.5717 0.3456 0.8081
(1.4206) (1.4070) (1.2611) (1.2303) (1.1306)
YEAR2 1.3683 1.3292 1.1974 1.2584 1.0698
(1.3794) (1.4084) (1.2236) (1.1945) (1.1332)
YEAR3 3.5139 3.9547 3.0415 3.1693 2.8743
(1.2152)*** (1.2468)*** (1.0729)*** (1.0881)*** (1.0413)***
YEAR4 3.2481 3.7960 2.4294 3.4591 3.0708
(1.1711)*** (1.2048)*** (1.0365)** (1.0491)*** (1.0222)***
YEAR5 4.1104 4.6674 3.2822 4.0338 3.4922
(1.1852)*** (1.2253)*** (1.0574)*** (1.0648)*** (1.0566)***
YEAR6 5.1331 5.7013 4.0612 4.8379 4.1214
(1.1906)*** (1.2356)*** (1.0646)*** (1.0693)*** (1.0806)***
YEAR7 5.8807 6.5975 4.3257 5.5673 4.6614
(1.2763)*** (1.3152)*** (1.1436)*** (1.1659)*** (1.1619)***
GDP Per Capita 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)*** (0.0000) (0.0000)
Mean L-R 0.5367 1.2018
-(0.6293) (0.5341)**
Women in Parliament % 0.0979 0.0507
(0.0383)** (0.0377)
GoodGov -0.6338 -2.3110
(0.0000) (0.6137)***
% Women enrolled tertiary education 0.1077 0.1129
(0.0132)*** (0.0188)***
% Christian -4.0139 0.6197
(2.3890)* (4.2872)
% Muslim -2.3210 0.1550
(4.1473) (5.0319)
% Eastern Religion -5.7018 2.5696
(3.5122) (9.6191)
Power Distance 0.0119 0.0551
(0.0210) (0.0252)**
Individuality 0.0497 0.0150
(0.0234)** (0.0274)
Masculinity -0.0727 -0.0475
(0.0143)*** (0.0181)***
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.0407 -0.0945
(0.0172)** (0.0192)***
R-Squared 0.1311 0.2118 0.3739 0.2813 0.4906
R-Squared Adjusted 0.1032 0.1725 0.3422 0.2423 0.4385
△in R-Squared relative to model (1) 0.08 0.24 0.15 0.36
No. of Observations 257 232 249 233 205
Dependent Variable = Average % women on a country's boards
Notes: Significance levels:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Variable definitions: Year 1-7 is a constant dummy variable to account for the 
passing of time. Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and Individualism are dimensions of Hofstede's cultural framework. 
GDP is measured per capita and indicates degree of wealth and tertiary education enrolment for women. GoodGov is a factor of six World 
Bank indicators including Voice & accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law and 
Corruption control. Mean L-R is a scale measuring degree of left or right wing ideological inclination. Women in Parliament measures the 
percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber occupied by women. % Christian, Muslim and Eastern Religions are 
indicators of percentage individuals in each country adhering to each religion.
 
 
The cultural-cognitive pillar remains important. In model 5 there is a positive and 
statistically significant result between power distance and women on the board, whilst 
countries with a more masculine culture and preponderance for uncertainty avoidance have 
fewer women on their board. Model 5 shows an R² of 49% suggesting Scott’s institutional 
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pillars and the control variables included account for nearly 50% of the cross-national 
variance found in the percentage women on the board at national level.  
 
Table 6-3 presents the first of two consistency checks. Because of the unavailability of 
variables for all observations, the number of observations included varies across models 1-
5 of table 6-2. This raises the possibility that the variation in the pattern of statistical 
significance and explanatory power across models is simply a result of the variation in sub-
sampling. To explore this possibility the regression analysis was repeated using a fixed 
sample comprising the 205 observations for which all models could be estimated. The 
pattern of statistical significance on individual variables and the character of the additional 
explanatory power offered by models 6-10 show a very similar pattern to that observed in 
models 1-5, suggesting that the observations made with respect to models 1-5 are not 
attributable to variation in the sample being analysed.  
 
Table 6-4 presents a final consistency check. As discussed, the sample analysed in models 
1-5 was restricted to those country/years for which 10 firms are available upon which to 
base the estimate of a country’s proportion of women directors. Since this is a somewhat 
arbitrary cut-off, some ancillary regressions were carried out to check for robustness. 
Models 11-15 explore the full model while employing various threshold levels of numbers 
of companies as a rule for inclusion. Model 11 includes all country/years for which data 
are available independent of the number of companies upon which the data are based. 
Gradually, going from left to right, higher thresholds are applied, beginning with 5 and 
moving ultimately to 20 or greater companies. In broad terms, the findings discussed above 
are robust to adapting the cut-off at which observations are included. For example, the 
importance of culture as reflected in uncertainty avoidance, power distance and 
masculinity, left-right political inclination and education are all confirmed across all 
models. Other findings show slightly less robustness however to the sampling rule adopted. 
For example, the general quality of government and regulation is only found to be 
important in model 13-15, but not 11 and 12. In general, the direction of the relationship 
observed across the models was consistent. An exception was the relationship between 
Good Gov and the proportion of female board directors.  In Model 11 the relationship was 
slightly positive but not statistically significant; however, this changed in subsequent 
models to become negative, and statistically significant in models 13, 14 and 15.  
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Table 6-3 Regression results robustness test. Standard error reported in () 
Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10)
Independent variables
CONSTANT 3.9623 -2.4286 3.5837 8.3535 -4.2116
(1.0224) (3.5505) (3.7464) (2.4999) (5.7389)
YEAR1 0.7661 0.5920 0.6062 0.6179 0.8081
(1.3789) (1.3419) (1.3070) (1.2418) (1.1306)
YEAR2 1.3941 1.2482 0.9797 1.2481 1.0698
(1.3793) (1.3433) (1.3088) (1.2430) (1.1332)
YEAR3 3.6102 3.3048 2.7597 3.6867 2.8743
(1.2464)*** (1.2148)*** (1.1911)** (1.1234)*** (1.0413)***
YEAR4 3.8157 3.5071 2.8546 4.1867 3.0708
(1.2026)*** (1.1768)*** (1.1536)** (1.0848)*** (1.0222)***
YEAR5 4.6922 4.2135 3.5550 4.8534 3.4922
(1.2134)*** (1.1993)*** (1.1766)*** (1.0959)*** (1.0566)***
YEAR6 5.5946 4.9440 4.2789 5.8102 4.1214
(1.2337)*** (1.2126)*** (1.2029)*** (1.1118)*** (1.0806)***
YEAR7 6.4415 5.7391 4.8313 6.6371 4.6614
(1.3374)*** (1.3144)*** (1.2990)*** (1.2072)*** (1.1619)***
GDP Per Capita 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Mean L-R 0.5921 1.2018
(0.5961) (0.5341)**
Women in Parliament % 0.1386 0.0507
(0.0368)*** (0.0377)
GoodGov -1.1025 -2.3110
(0.5771)* (0.6137)***
% Women enrolled tertiary education 0.0842 0.0507
(0.0186)*** (0.0377)***
% Christian -2.6251 0.6197
(3.9216) (4.2872)
% Muslim -1.8137 0.1550
(4.9509) (5.0319)
% Eastern Religion -10.4425 2.5696
(8.7883) (9.6191)
Power Distance 0.0624 0.0551
(0.0237)*** (0.0252)**
Individuality 0.0389 0.0150
(0.0240) (0.0274)
Masculinity -0.0719 -0.0475
(0.0143)*** (0.0181)***
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.0752 -0.0945
(0.0194)*** (0.0192)***
R-Squared 0.1837 0.2433 0.2878 0.3545 0.4906
R-Squared Adjusted 0.1032 0.2004 0.2435 0.3144 0.4385
△in R-Squared relative to model (6) 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.31
No. of Observations 205 205 205 205 205
Dependent Variable = Average % women on a country's boards
Notes: Significance levels:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Variable definitions: Year 1-7 is a constant dummy variable to account 
for the passing of time. Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and Individualism are dimensions of Hofstede's 
cultural framework. GDP is measured per capita and indicates degree of wealth and tertiary education enrolment for women. 
GoodGov is a factor of six World Bank indicators including Voice & accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, 
Regulatory quality, Rule of law and Corruption control. Mean L-R is a scale measuring degree of left or right wing ideological 
inclination. Women in Parliament measures the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber occupied by women. 
% Christian, Muslim and Eastern Religions are indicators of percentage individuals in each country adhering to each religion.
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Table 6-4 Regression results robustness test. Standard error reported in () 
Model (11) Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) Model (15)
Independent variables ALL N=>5 N=>10 N=>15 N=>20
CONSTANT -7.7378 -1.8590 -4.2116 -3.7012 -6.6705
(5.7435) (6.0922) (5.7389) (6.0574) (6.8150)
YEAR1 0.3128 0.6780 0.8081 0.4731 0.2530
(1.1162) (1.1471) (1.1306) (1.2584) (1.4338)
YEAR2 0.9997 0.8952 1.0698 0.8014 0.6231
(1.1336) (1.1501)** (1.1332) (1.2426) (1.4097)
YEAR3 2.3322 2.7516 2.8743 2.4202 2.1907
(1.0772)** (1.0746)*** (1.0413)*** (1.1639)** (1.2948)
YEAR4 2.9989 3.0972 3.0708 2.8298 2.4199
(1.0733)*** (1.0548)*** (1.0222)*** (1.1440)** (1.2549)
YEAR5 3.8862 3.6967 3.4922 3.3680 3.0096
(1.1190)*** (1.0905)*** (1.0566)*** (1.1828)*** (1.3017)*
YEAR6 4.4246 4.7263 4.1214 3.7841 3.7368
(1.1190)*** (1.1154)*** (1.0806)*** (1.1905)*** (1.3152)**
YEAR7 6.0793 5.9310 4.6614 4.0132 3.9752
(1.1828)*** (1.1909)*** (1.1619)*** (1.2862)*** (1.4442)**
GDP Per Capita -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000)** (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Mean L-R 1.1927 1.0284 1.2018 1.2112 1.1390
(0.5939)** (0.5662)* (0.5341)** (0.5527)*** (0.5918)**
Women in Parliament % 0.0048 0.0019 0.0507 0.0585 0.0790
(0.0388) (0.0379) (0.0377) (0.0402) (0.0456)
GoodGov 0.9445 -0.6586 -2.3110 -2.9495 -3.0784
(0.5965) (0.6695) (0.6137)*** (0.7970)*** (0.8846)***
% Women enrolled tertiary education 0.0690 0.0907 0.0507 0.1128 0.1105
(0.0186)*** (0.0190)*** (0.0377)*** (0.0202)*** (0.0229)***
% Christian 8.8581 1.3073 0.6197 0.5600 3.9408
(4.0247)** (4.5481) (4.2872) (4.4609) (5.1404)
% Muslim 6.4456 1.8957 0.1550 0.1378 3.6339
(4.4099) (5.3209) (5.0319) (5.2149) (5.9488)
% Eastern Religion 13.5735 3.9097 2.5696 1.8978 6.9119
(8.8825) (10.2002) (9.6191) (9.9648) (11.0285)
Power Distance 0.0852 0.1067 0.0551 0.0513 0.0568
(0.0246)*** (0.0247)*** (0.0252)** (0.0263)* (0.0286)
Individuality 0.0175 0.0116 0.0150 0.0156 0.0145
(0.0278) (0.0287) (0.0274) (0.0291) (0.0327)
Masculinity -0.0373 -0.0488 -0.0475 -0.0455 -0.0435
(0.0184)** (0.0186)*** (0.0181)*** (0.0192)** (0.0213)**
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.104300329 -0.1177 -0.0945 -0.0949 -0.1000
(0.0201)*** (0.0196)*** (0.0192)*** (0.0204)*** (0.0225)***
R-Squared 0.3981 0.4512 0.4906 0.4703 0.4465
R-Squared Adjusted 0.3463 0.3982 0.4385 0.4114 0.3760
No. of Observations 240 216 205 190 168
Dependent Variable = Average % women on a country's boards
Notes: Significance levels:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Variable definitions: Year 1-7 is a constant dummy variable to account 
for the passing of time. Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and Individualism are dimensions of Hofstede's cultural 
framework. GDP is measured per capita and indicates degree of wealth and tertiary education enrolment for women. GoodGov is a 
factor of six World Bank indicators including Voice & accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory 
quality, Rule of law and Corruption control. Mean L-R is a scale measuring degree of left or right wing ideological inclination. 
Women in Parliament measures the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber occupied by women. % Christian, 
Muslim and Eastern Religions are indicators of percentage individuals in each country adhering to each religion.
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Having carried out these consistency checks, the time has come to evaluate the hypotheses 
by reference to these findings. The mean left-right inclination of the national government 
showed consistent statistically significant results in explaining the prevalence of women on 
the board across all models, confirming the acceptance of hypothesis 1. The broad absence 
of statistically significant results for a contemporaneous relationship between female 
parliamentarians and the dominance of women on the board, suggest hypothesis 2 should 
be rejected. The inverse relationship between the proportion of directorial board seats held 
by women and the role of good governance persisted across all tests. Hypothesis 3 is thus 
rejected, as the coefficients are statistically significant in the opposite direction to what was 
expected. The educational variable of the normative pillar shows consistent support for 
hypothesis 4; suggesting countries where women have access to education have more 
women on the board. Religion does not show any statistically significant influence on the 
dominance of women on the board, indicating that hypotheses 5, 6 and 7, which are 
associated with religion, should be rejected. 
 
The original model and subsequent consistency checks show continued support for the 
importance of the cultural-cognitive pillar in determining the prevalence of women on the 
board; in particular less masculine countries, countries with lower power distance and 
countries less influenced by uncertainty, which had lower power distance also had more 
women on the board, supporting hypotheses 8, 9  and 11.  Hypothesis 10 is rejected.  
 
6.4  Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter analysed the role played by Scott’s (1995) three pillars of national institutions 
in influencing the number of women on the board in an international context. The results 
support the argument that Scott’s (1995) pillars of national institutions influence the 
percentage number of board seats occupied by women. Indeed, collectively they explain 
nearly 50% of the cross-national variance for female board representation in the sample. 
Some institutional pillars were found to be more important than others. In particular, extant 
analysis suggests the most influential pillar is the cultural-cognitive pillar. Countries that 
exhibited more feminine traits, lower power distance and less sign of uncertainty 
avoidance had a larger proportion of female board directors. Elements of the regulatory 
pillar proved influential, and countries that were politically liberal had more women on 
their boards than did countries that had more conservative governments. Thus, the results 
show that women tend to acquire board directorships in countries that have a more 
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feminine culture, where uncertainty avoidance is low, and the national political climate is 
liberal. Certain facets of the regulatory analysis resulted in unexpected findings. A 
statistically significant, negative relationship was identified between percentage board 
seats held by women and the national governance environment. This was a surprising 
finding. However, in reviewing the data it became clear that a number of the countries with 
the highest proportion of female board directors are emerging economies where regulatory 
institutions continue to develop and embed, and alternative mechanisms for board control 
and recruitment may play a role. Explanations for such a mechanism may perhaps be found 
in factors such as family connections. Nepotism might play a significant role in women’s 
acquisition of board directorships in certain economies. This mirrors findings by Sheridan 
and Milgate (2005) and Branson (2007) who found that family connections were deemed 
important for women’s access to the board, but less so for men. Research suggests where 
firms are predominantly family-owned, nepotism is more legitimised, and therefore these 
findings may indicate that where family-run firms are the prevalent company norm, 
women are represented in greater numbers (Johannison and Huse, 2000).  In analysing the 
normative pillar the importance of further educational attainment for women wishing to 
pursue corporate board directorships became clear; however, there was no evidence that 
national religious beliefs was a determining factor in the process.  
 
In applying institutional theory to the pervasiveness of women board directors, this chapter 
has pushed the boundaries of research and added to the extant body of literature assessing 
women’s place on the board, and extended and complemented earlier analysis. It applies 
institutional analysis as defined by Scott (1995) to board demography and adds to the range 
of phenomena where institutional theory can offer relevant insights. Previous studies on 
the occurrence of female board directors have focused on the firm (Hillman et al., 2007; 
Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Carter et al., 2003, Erhardt et al., 2003) and individual level 
(Sheridan 2002, 2001; Burgess and Tharenou, 2002), but no research has systematically 
evaluated the national institutional context over time in an institutional theory perspective. 
However, earlier studies have shown that institutional determinants matter for other facets 
of corporate executive outcomes, including national macro-environment on the role of the 
CEO (Hambrick and Crossland, 2007), how national institutional patterns influence 
strategy (Murtha and Lenway, 1994) and how country-specific patterns of culture and 
national policies influence decision-making behaviour (Hitt et al., 1997), supporting the 
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contention that the study of the broader national institution is important to further scholarly 
research.  
 
In contrast to existing research on board demography, this chapter set out to explore the 
potential for country institutional environments to play a significant role in shaping the 
demographic composition of corporate boards. That cross-country differences in the 
prevalence of women on corporate boards are substantial, enduring, and to a great extent 
explicable by reference to the attributes of national institutions suggests that the failure to 
address macro-level influences and processes in board demography research is a serious 
omission. Taken together with existing research, the evidence suggests that there is a need 
to explore further the role of institutional pressures in shaping boards and, in particular, to 
recognize that the processes shaping boards inherently arise at a variety of levels in 
society. These multi-level processes, and the relationships between them, are particularly 
important future lines of enquiry that will be addressed in chapter 7.  
 
Managerial implications  
This analysis suggests that the prevalence of women on corporate boards has increased 
substantially over time. This may be the result of a ‘snowballing’ effect, where increased 
attention and focus paid to the issue of women on the board in the international business 
press, academic literature, women networks and increased awareness and appreciation of 
the benefits brought by diversity has begun an organic evolution of more gender equitable 
boards. Major global corporate investors are also becoming more attuned to diversity and 
have implemented diversity screens as part of their investment criteria (Schepers and Sethi, 
2003). Such pressures may give countries that rely on investment from these businesses 
further impetus to assess and develop the composition of their corporate boards. If the 
current trend seen in this research continues the number of women on the board of 
directors will increase and women will grow as a force in corporate governance. As such, 
they will act as role models and mentors for younger women, contributing to a sustained 
pipeline of female executive talent. 
 
Scott’s institutional pillars matter for the recruitment of women to the board, and 
consequently for board composition, the decisions the board takes and the strategy it 
endorses. The corporate board of directors is the dominant strategic decision making body, 
designed to safeguard shareholder interests. Its composition is a lever connecting the firm 
   167 
with its wider environment and reduces uncertainty. Board directors bring with them 
different skills, competencies, insights and expertise designed to assist the firm in 
performing better and securing a higher return for shareholders. Women can play a 
powerful and unique strategic role on the board. Women board directors are associated 
with a number of positive results for the firm, including improved financial performance, 
better product and market positioning and acting as role models for aspiring female 
corporate board directors (Thomson et al., 2005). This research has highlighted the role 
played by national institutions, as defined by Scott (1995), in shaping the gender 
composition of corporate boards in a multinational setting over time. 
 
These results suggest that companies wishing to utilise the broadened talent pool made 
available by including women in the total market for directorial talent and consequently 
reaping the many benefits they offer, should consider the national institutional environment 
within which they operate when composing their board. In particular, companies operating 
in countries found to have an institutional environment less conducive to female board 
participation should be mindful of the additional hurdles encountered by women 
harbouring board ambitions in these countries. Where the national institutional 
environment works against women, companies can engage search and selection firms with 
a particular diversity focus in searching for qualified female board candidates, employ 
internal training programmes within their own companies to foster and grow internal senior 
female executive talent, and offer educational opportunities to senior female employees 
showing aptitude and ambition for directorships. Organisations are both constrained and 
enabled by their environment. This analysis has shown that national level institutional 
determinants might be more of an indirect constraint on corporate strategy than an enabling 
factor in certain country contexts. However, whilst this symbiosis between firm and 
institutional environment undoubtedly exists, “Organizations…are also capable of 
responding to these influence attempts creatively and strategically….Organizations are 
creatures of their institutional environment, but most modern organizations are constituted 
as active players, not passive pawns” (Scott, 1995, p 132). 
 
Theoretical contributions 
This research extends the boundaries of research relating to the role that national 
institutional environments play for a wide variety of business phenomena. By developing 
this stream of research to encompass the influences upon the presence of women on the 
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corporate board in a cross-national context, this chapter demonstrates that future research 
that continues this broad theme is likely to be fruitful. That the classifications of national 
institutions analysed here were not designed to inform issues associated with board 
demography underlines the power of a relatively general set of institutional factors for this 
phenomenon. More broadly, this further suggests there is value in extending the theoretical 
perspective applied to studies on women corporate board directors beyond the board level 
theories commonly adopted in research women executives to date.   
 
Limitations 
This research has a number of limitations that could provide the basis for future research. 
First, the scope and sampling of the analysis is inherently limited to those countries and 
years for which reasonable samples of publicly listed corporations as they would be 
understood in the western world, exist. This necessarily restricts the sampling to a 
particular, and not necessarily fully representative, set of countries. Furthermore, as shown, 
at least some of the findings are sensitive to the sample analysed. Therefore, there is a need 
for future work to explore the composition of elites within samples drawn from other 
countries where other organisational forms are more common. This would both add 
robustness to the analysis and provide a view of the diversity of managerial elites in these 
alternative organisational forms that is itself of great interest. Second, the absence of 
consistently reported data for some variables limited the ability to provide as nuanced and 
detailed an examination of the importance of some country factors as was desirable. In 
particular, the absence of data on numerous aspects of country welfare systems and on the 
pattern of corporate ownership limits this work. Finally, this study only evaluated the role 
played by national institutions. Whilst research has shown that characteristics associated 
with particular industries also influence the share of board seats women occupy (Hillman 
et al., 2007; Brammer et al., 2007; Fryxell and Lerner, 1989).  
 
Future directions 
The limitations of this study offer some interesting future research avenues. Firstly, the 
disparity in the number of females on the board is not limited to cross-country variation; 
women are not uniformly present on boards within a country, thus industry level analysis 
of the prevalence of women board directors may explain further variance in female 
corporate board presence within a country. Further research could seek to refine the 
particular set of institutional antecedent that are most applicable to the context of board 
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demography as well as examining the relationship between the multiple levels of influence 
on board phenomena. Secondly, future work, possibly of a more qualitative character, 
could help to shed more light on the importance of national welfare provisions, as data 
were limited on such welfare provisions as the availability of state-funded child care.  
 
Conclusion 
Research concerned with board demography in general, and the prevalence of women on 
corporate boards in particular, has proliferated in recent years. In spite of the recognition 
that there are large and persistent cross-country differences in the prevalence of women on 
company boards, these have not as yet been subject to systematic study. This chapter 
examined the influences on proportion of women on a country’s corporate boards through 
the lens of Scott’s (1995) conceptualisation of institutional theory and tested the extent to 
which his three pillars - regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive institutions - explain 
cross-country variation in the gender composition of corporate elites. Using a unique 
database drawn from 50 countries, this empirical analysis show that collectively such 
institutions explain approximately 50% of the variance between countries in the percentage 
of women on their corporate boards, and that institutions play a particularly important role 
in shaping the gender balance of boards in comparison to the regulatory and normative 
pillar.  
 
6.5  Chapter Summary 
This chapter had three objectives and set out to make two research contributions. The three 
objectives were: firstly, to draw on the conceptual framework developed in chapter 3 to 
develop testable hypotheses informed by Scott’s (1995) three pillars about the role played 
by national institutions in shaping the prevalence of women on the board; secondly, to test 
empirically these hypotheses using a novel cross-national dataset; and thirdly, to draw 
conclusions from the findings as they related to theory and practice. These objectives were 
met, and from this empirical research emerged the two unique contributions this chapter set 
out to make. First, this research added to existing analysis of factors associated with 
increased prevalence of women on the board by identifying national institutional context as 
an important consideration. Concerning the debate on the mix of policies and practices 
necessary to promote women’s participation on corporate boards, this analysis was able to 
show the relevance of country-level institutional levers for this ongoing debate. Also, this 
chapter can help companies to understand better the constraints and influences upon their 
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capacity to recruit women and raises awareness of how national institutions shape board 
demography. Secondly, this chapter responded to calls for research that explores the 
relationship between boards of directors and the wider institutional contexts within which 
firms operate (Boyd, 1990; Pearce and Zahra, 1992), and added to scholarship on 
comparative institutional analysis. The next chapter builds on the limitations of this 
research and the suggested future directions to consider a multi-level model of national, 
industry and firm level institutional influences on women’s place on the board.  
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7.  Multi-level institutional influences on the prevalence of women corporate board 
directors 
The previous chapter established that the country institutional environment is an important 
influence on whether women are able to acquire corporate board directorships in a given 
country. In doing so, the chapter made a notable contribution to the literature on women on 
the board, which has until now largely failed to evaluate systematically the importance of 
national firm context for the gender composition of the corporate board. However, as 
chapter 5 illustrated, women’s share of corporate board seats does not only vary on a 
country-by-country basis, but also on an industry-by-industry basis. Substantial differences 
in female board participation are also observable within both countries and industries, so 
the national level institutional environment, whilst important, is not the only factor to 
shape the gender demography of corporate boards. This chapter extends the analysis 
presented in the previous chapters and analyses the prevalence of women on the board 
through a multi-level approach with reference to national, industry and firm level 
institutional characteristics.  
 
The chapter centres on four core objectives: First, to shed further light on the complex 
nature of gender and board composition, this chapter briefly reviews the growing literature 
relating to multi-level studies (Parboteeah et al., 2008, 2009; Martin et al., 2008) - to the 
importance of country (Scott, 1995, 2001; Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001; La Porta 
et al., 1999), industry (Hillman et al., 2007; Hambrick et al., 2004; Blum et al., 1994) and 
firm level (Dickson and Weaver, 2008.; Lubatkin et al., 2007; Tan and Xia, 2007) 
institutional environments for a variety of business behaviours and outcomes. In particular, 
as the national level literature was covered in chapters 2 and 6, here the focus is more 
specifically on the industry and firm level literature.  Second, drawing on the conceptual 
framework presented in chapter 3, and continuing the application of the theoretical lens 
from chapter 6, this chapter develops a set of hypotheses informed by Scott’s (1995) 
pillars. Thirdly, the chapter tests the proposed hypotheses using a fixed factor multiple 
regressions approach which makes use of a unique database relating to the incidence of 
women on corporate boards in 21 countries. Finally, the chapter concludes and draws out 
theoretical and managerial implications of the analysis.  
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This study makes two substantial contributions to the scholarly literature. Firstly, this is the 
first systematic multi-level study to assess the relative importance of firm, industry and 
country level institutional factors for explaining the prevalence of women on the board. 
Secondly, this is the first multi-national study of women on the board to test Scott’s (1995) 
three pillars of institutional theory in a multi-level setting. This continues the evaluative 
process of the concepts and themes to which Scott’s (1995) framework may be applied.  
 
The next section briefly reviews the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses that 
will be tested. The subsequent section sets out the method used, before the results are 
revealed and a discussion of the results is provided. A final section concludes.  
 
7.1. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The logic of multi-level research stems from the observation that social phenomena are 
influenced by factors that originate at different levels of analysis (Roberts et al., 1978). As 
discussed in chapter 4, there is a growing body of literature that emanates from this insight 
and reflects the “importance of taking into account…different levels of analysis” (Aguilera 
et al., 2007, p 855).  
 
Empirically motivated multi-level studies on women in leadership positions on the board 
are in their infancy. Terjesen and Singh (2008) conducted a study into national institutional 
characteristics and the prevalence of women on the board for 43 countries and concluded 
that gender pay gap and a shorter history of female parliamentarian representation played a 
role in whether women were found in the country’s board rooms or not. Although not 
explicitly multi-level in nature, the study was one of the first to consider national level 
institutional influences on the prevalence of women on the board. Adopting Scott’s pillars, 
Parboteeah et al. (2008) established that national culture influenced managerial perceptions 
of women, and that more egalitarian cultures perceived women managers in a more 
positive light than did more traditional cultures. Other empirical multi-level studies that 
have adopted institutional theory as their conceptual model have uncovered evidence 
suggesting that national social institutions influence firms’ propensity to bribe (Martin et 
al., 2008) and national attitudes to work (Parboteeah et al., 2009). Thus, in viewing 
institutional context across analytical levels, multi-level research has established that 
country-specific institutional constellations matter for corporate governance, and there has 
been a call for incorporating national institutions into comparative research in the field of 
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corporate governance, “in order to understand how corporate governance models are 
changing around the world, and what practices get translated into different settings, we 
need to take into account path-dependence legacies and national institutional settings” 
(Aguilera, 2005, p 41). Literature heeding Aguilera’s (2005) encouragement to delve 
further into the role played by national level institutions in corporate governance matters 
has uncovered that country-specific institutional arrangements are associated with a 
number of corporate governance-related phenomena. For example, national institutions 
have been found to play a role in executive remuneration (Bruce et al., 2005; Bender, 
2003, 2004), corporate board composition (Li and Harrison, 2008) and the strategic 
decision making of multi national companies (Pauly and Reich, 1997). 
 
Scholars have only comparatively recently begun to investigate the role of industry 
characteristics on the incidence of women on the board, despite research establishing that 
industry mattered for female board participation some time ago (Elgart, 1983, Harrigan, 
1981). Enquiry suggests where women constitute a larger share of the employee base for a 
given industry, there are also more female corporate board directors (Hillman et al., 2007), 
and where the industry produces goods for the female consumer market, or operate in 
sectors that are closer to the final consumer there tends to be more women on the board 
(Fryxell and Lerner, 1989, Brammer et al., 2007). In particular Fryxell and Lerner (1989) 
suggested that the higher share of female board directors found in industries serving the 
female consumer market was a reflection of an increased concern with reflecting key 
customer stakeholders on the board. Hillman et al. (2007) evaluated organisational 
predictors of women board participation using a sample of 1,000 publicly traded American 
companies and found that as the share of female employees rose in a given industry, so too 
did the share of female board directors. Hence, the research that has focused on the role 
played by industry in accounting for women’s prevalence on the corporate board to date 
has made important strides in ascertaining that industry level characteristics are facets of 
the institutional landscape worth exploring in piecing together the jigsaw on why women 
prevail in positions of power in some circumstances and not in others.   
 
A growing body of literature has illustrated the impact of entrenched institutionalised 
sociological processes for the prevalence of women on the board. Westphal and Stern 
(2007) uncovered evidence of the pervasive use of ingratiation tactics by board directors 
towards colleagues who were in a position to generate further board directorships for board 
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colleagues. Ingratiation tactics, or ‘flattery’ as it was termed by the authors, rely on 
establishing positive affect with other board members, through for example supporting 
comments and adulation. The authors further found that the effects of ingratiation 
behaviour were not as positive for women as they were for men, suggesting men responded 
more positively to other men who sought to establish mutual affect. Westphal and Stern 
(2007) further tested whether directors who engaged in monitoring and control behaviour 
rather than providing counsel to fellow board directors were more or less likely to gain 
further directorships. They found that women who engaged in monitoring and control 
behaviour were less likely to gain further directorships. Other sociological processes such 
as homosocial reproduction, where men appoint other board directors similar to themselves 
was also shown to play a defining role in shaping the face of board demography (Kanter, 
1977; Westphal and Stern, 2006). Associated with these interpersonal relationships and 
well established board practices are clearly defined, though ill articulated, normative roles 
board directors are expected to conform to. Westphal and Khanna (2003) found that where 
board directors did not conform to expected, albeit unwritten, norms of behaviour in the 
board room, such as voting against initiatives that were likely to diminish the incumbent 
CEO’s power base, the directors were subject to punishment through social distancing. 
This led the authors to conclude that “directors exercise social control over other directors 
not because it serves their own personal interests, but because those directors violated 
normative expectations of behaviour for members of the corporate elite” (p 395).  
 
Literature concerned with understanding the context, nature and circumstances surrounding 
women’s successful ascent to the corporate board have sought explanations with reference 
to a variety of analytical levels, covering national context (Terjesen and Singh, 2008; 
Grosvold et al., 2007), sector level (Hillman et al., 2007; Brammer et al., 2007; Fryxell and 
Lerner, 1989) and the firm level (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Westphal and Milton, 2000; 
Westphal and Stern, 2006, 2007). However, these facets of the board’s broader institutional 
environment have so far not been collectively explored in an integrated manner.  
 
Building on the descriptive findings presented in chapter 5, this study looks across 
‘jurisdictions’ as defined by Scott  (1995) and extends the analysis of the regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars to take account of institutional influences that 
occur at different analytical levels. In particular, the study reflects national, industry and 
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firm level institutional influences. As chapters 3 and 6 outlined a detailed review of Scott’s 
(1995) institutional pillars, only a brief synopsis is included here as an aide-mémoire.  
 
The regulative pillar is concerned with the impact of laws, rules and governance systems 
and engenders a view of institutions that is based on compliance and expediency; “this 
view of rationality emphasizes that individuals are instrumentally motivated to make their 
choices according to a utilitarian, cost-benefit logic” (ibid, p 37). The normative pillar is 
derived from the sociological heritage of institutional theory and is concerned with norms, 
values and roles. From a normative perspective, values constitute the impression of the 
ideal state and delineate a standard against which prevailing behavioural patterns and 
standards can be measured. Norms, on the other hand, outline how the ideal state should be 
achieved. The idea of normative roles is in recognition that certain actions and behaviours 
only apply to a limited pool of individuals, often in a given situation. Scott (1995) 
emphasises that these are not merely expectations of how a given individual should 
respond in a defined situation, rather, roles are prescriptions of expected behaviour. The 
cultural-cognitive pillar is the last pillar and is concerned with the elements of society that 
are taken for granted and culturally supported and accepted. Emphasising the cognitive 
dimension of human behaviour and culturally determined meaning, this pillar reflects “the 
rules that constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made” 
(Scott, 1995, p 40). The normative pillar stresses the importance of roles and scripted 
behaviour, whilst the cultural-cognitive pillar emphasises the individual’s perceived 
understanding and interpretation of events and associated response to these events. Scott’s 
synthesis of institutional theory is applicable across societal levels, and the following 
hypotheses set out to test the relevance of Scott’s framework across these levels for the 
prevalence of women on boards. Hypotheses pertaining to the national level will be 
outlined first, followed by those pertaining to industry and firm-level influences 
respectively.  
 
National level institutions – Regulative Pillar 
National regulatory considerations have been shown to affect corporate board structure, the 
role of the board and managerial perceptions of gender (Judge et al., 1992; Li and 
Harrison, 2007; Parboteeah et al., 2008) suggesting that national regulatory structures may 
influence the degree to which women acquire board seats in a given country. A potentially 
influential factor is whether a country’s population hold more liberal, rather than 
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conservative, political views. Right-wing or Conservative political attitudes are generally 
associated with emphasis on preserving values and traditions (Thorisdottir et al., 2007; 
Evans et al., 1996), whilst liberal or left-wing political attitudes are generally considered 
more accepting of change and concerned with the emancipation of women and gender 
equality (Arian and Shamir; 1983; Mandel & Semyonov 2006; Lin 2005), which suggests 
countries where more liberal political views prevail are likely to have more female 
corporate board directors.  
 
 A second influential regulatory aspect to the national institutional environment is the 
degree to which women are appointed to, and serve in, the national parliament. Permitting 
women access into the upper most echelons of national power ensures women are afforded 
the opportunity to influence the legislative process designed to safeguard their own 
professional interests, and provides women at large with powerful leadership role models 
(Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007; Lijphart, 1991). Parliamentary positions offer further 
benefits in the form of the potential to forge powerful relationships and networks with 
serving board directors or other influential corporate executives. Such networks may 
further offer women a route into the corporate board room, where political credentials are 
often observed amongst female board directorships (Shilton et al., 1996).   
 
Most developed, or rapidly developing, economies have gender egalitarianism reflected in 
their national laws, in principle offering the same access for men and women to education 
and employment and an equal wage for equal work (Jamoutte, 2003). However, the 
effectiveness of such legislation is dependent on the efficient enforcement of the law, and 
adequate political stability and individual freedom to pursue executive careers. Educational 
credentials and extensive relevant professional experience have been found to serve as 
prerequisites for attaining board directorships, suggesting only if gender equitable 
legislation is enforced can women be expected to accumulate sufficient education and 
professional experience to ascend the ladder to the corporate board room (Burke, 1997; 
Sheridan, 2002; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). Taken together these arguments suggest: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the degree to which a country is on the left-hand side of the political 
continuum. 
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Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the quality of national governance.  
 
National level institutions –  Normative Pillar 
The normative pillar relates to societal values, norms and notions of roles for its basis. 
Considering country level institutions that reflect these normative constructs of values and 
norms leads to two morally centred tenets of a country’s institutional make-up: religion 
and education (Weber, 1983; Collins, 1980); “Work and religion remain the very 
foundation of society” (Parboteeah et al., 2009, p 121). Education as an indicator of the 
normative pillar is reflected in the argument that national educational curriculum reflect the 
values and beliefs inherent in the country’s educational system (Trevino et al., 2008; 
Turner, 1997), and successive cohorts of students come to embody these values. Secondly, 
women’s access to higher education is indicative of a country’s normative view of 
women’s roles beyond the home. Where women are afforded the opportunity to pursue 
further education they are implicitly encouraged to embark on professional careers which 
may lead to board directorships where academic qualifications are an important 
prerequisite for directorships (Burgess and Tharenou, 1996; Sheridan, 2001; Hillman and 
Cannella, 2002).  
 
 The role of religion and spirituality is becoming increasingly important in management 
research, as evidenced by the decision of some journals to dedicate special issues to the 
topic and influential scholarly organizations to recognise the study of management and 
religion as a distinct emergent field (See for example The Leadership Quarterly special 
issue: Toward a paradigm of spiritual leadership, 2005; Journal of Organizational Change 
Management, special issue: The leading edge in research on spirituality and organizations, 
2003; Academy of Management’s Management, Spirituality and Religion Interest Group). 
In the context of this study, the interest lies in the degree to which religion influences 
women’s role in business. Religion details how individuals should relate to one another 
and provides the values which inform this behaviour (Parboteeah et al., 2009, 2007; 
Innaccone, 1997). Normative and value-laden stipulations permeate all the dominant world 
religions and define appropriate actions in a wide range of settings, including that of work, 
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economic enterprise and gender relations (Brammer et al., 2007; Parboteeah et al., 2009; 
Moaddel, 2002), suggesting national religion may be an important influence on whether 
women acquire board directorships in a given country. All the major world religions define 
the role of women in society and delineate the parameters of work and economic activity 
(Parboteeah et al., 2009). Despite the provision within the major world religions for 
women to take up paid employment outside the realm of the home, research suggests that 
countries where a larger proportion of the population classifies themselves as religious 
have a lower proportion of women in their workforce and in leadership positions (Lehrer, 
1995), as the norms associated with women’s role in the home are more established 
(Chadwick & Garrett, 1995; Clark et al., 1991, Youssef, 1972). Reflecting these 
arguments: 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the percentage of women who enter higher education.  
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of female board 
directors and the degree to which a country’s population is classified as religious. 
 
National level institutions –  Cultural-Cognitive Pillar 
National culture has been shown to play a major role in managerial perceptions of gender 
(Parboteeah et al., 2008), executive remuneration (Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004), national 
corporate governance systems (Buck et al., 2005; Buck, 2003) and board structure (Li and 
Harrison, 2008). It is therefore suggested that national culture may be an important factor 
influencing the degree to which women prevail on the corporate board of directors in a 
given culture. In continuing the analysis from chapter 6, Hofstede’s cultural framework is 
adopted, as reflected in the four variables: masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance and individualist-collectivist. Hofstede’s framework is based on extensive 
survey data carried out on IBM employees in a cross-national setting (Hofstede, 1983). His 
cultural work has been a mainstay of cultural research in management literature for some 
time, and despite some criticisms it remains a much used empirical tool (See for example 
Henwood and Seaman., 2007; Arnold et al., 2006; Littrell and Valentin, 2005; Mukherji 
and Hurtado, 2001). Furthermore, the substantial body of literature that has successfully 
applied Hofstede’s framework provides a basis for comparative research, enabling scholars 
to compare research done across topics but using the same conceptual framework.  
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Power distance is a reflection of societal hierarchy and the degree to which individuals are 
seen as equal (Hofstede, 1983). Societies with a high power distance see people in 
positions of authority as deserving of special privileges and more power, whilst countries 
that have a lower power distance are more egalitarian and tend to de-emphasise differences 
between individuals, instead focusing on points of commonality and mutual interest. 
Women typically have more prominent positions of influence in countries where power 
distances are lower (Cagliuri and Tung, 1999).  
 
Uncertainty avoidance defines national attitude to change, imbalance and ambiguity, with 
some countries more at ease with uncertainty. Societies more open to uncertainty are likely 
to be more laissez-faire in their attitude, and more open to differing points of view and 
diversity. Conversely, societies ill at ease with ambiguity are likely to be more aggressive, 
more risk-averse (Hofstede, 1983). Countries exhibiting low levels of uncertainty 
avoidance have been found to have more women in leadership positions, indicating that 
such nations are more willing to consider women in jobs conferring influence and power 
(Caligiuri and Tung, 1999).  
 
The third element of Hofstede’s framework is the individuality-collective continuum, 
which assesses the concern with the self versus the larger society. Countries that are said to 
be individualistic offer greater freedom to the individual, and the people are encouraged to 
pursue entrepreneurial avenues and be responsible for their own self-interest. Collectivist 
countries on the other hand look out for one another and welfare depends on mutual 
concern for one another (Hofstede, 1983). Women often experience more affinity with 
collectivist values, whilst men associate more with individualist perspectives. The role 
played by the self in individualist countries encourages the pursuit of individual goal 
attainment and self-promotion, values which research shows have been linked to power, 
prestige and positions of authority (Claes, 1999).  
 
The masculine-feminine construct of Hofstede’s framework is indicative of the degree to 
which a society appreciates more masculine virtues over feminine ones. Masculine virtues 
are associated with overt signs of wealth, an emphasis on high achievement and “‘big is 
beautiful’ “ (Hofstede, 1983, p 85) whilst traits of a more feminine character are typically 
associated with concern for welfare and interpersonal relations before money, an 
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emphasise on quality of life and harmony. Societies that have more masculine values will 
see positions of power and dominance as rightfully belonging to men rather than women.  
 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Countries that display high levels of power distance will have a lower 
percentage of female board directors than countries that display low power distance. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Countries that display high levels of uncertainty avoidance will have a lower 
percentage of female board directors than countries that display low uncertainty avoidance. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Countries classified as individualist will have a higher percentage of female 
board directors than countries classified as collectivist. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Countries classified as feminine will have a higher percentage of female 
board directors than countries classified as masculine.  
 
Industry characteristics and contexts are increasingly recognised as drivers of female board 
participation (Hillman et al., 2007; Brammer et al., 2007; Fryxell and Lerner, 1989). In 
light of this observation, and continuing the application of Scott’s synthesis of institutional 
theory at the industry level, this study investigates regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive elements of the industry to ascertain its relevance in explaining cross-national 
variation in the prevalence of women on the board.  
 
Industry level institutions – Regulative  Pillar 
National governments may hold shares in particular industries and where the state is a 
shareholder, firms can find themselves under increased pressure to conform to industry 
codes of conduct, corporate governance frameworks and broader regulatory frameworks 
that encompass a given industry (Thynne, 1998; Scott, 1995; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). 
Industry regulations heighten concerns of legitimacy and accountability and from an 
institutional perspective Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that “Regulation as a social 
process, should require organizations to be more concerned about their relationship with 
the external environment” (p 168).  This concern with regulative compliance is likely to be 
further reinforced where the national government is a shareholder. National governments 
are said to face duality of objectives in taking stakes in listed companies. On the one hand, 
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national governments look for a financial return on their investment but they may also be 
motivated by having more direct influence on the firms’ corporate governance practices 
(Knudsen and Pettersen, 2006; Byrkjeland and Langeland, 2000; Halvorsen, 2005; Wright 
et al., 2003). Given that national governments frequently are involved with the 
development and implementation of corporate governance codes and industry regulations, 
and that many corporate governance codes and frameworks now stipulate board diversity 
as a desired state (Higgs, 2003; Tyson, 2003; Dalborg, 2008; Ramirez, 2003), 
governments’ involvement with firms as corporate shareholders maybe motivated by a 
desire to ensure such regulations and governance frameworks are enforced. In line with 
national governments’ involvement in drawing attention to the gender homogeneous nature 
of most corporate boards, and the role of the state in informing national corporate 
governance codes, on balance where the state holds influential stakes in firms  they are 
likely to emphasise the adherence to best practice governance guidelines over short term 
financial gains.  
 
Hypothesis 10: Industries where the state is a shareholder will have a larger proportion of 
female board directors 
 
Industry level institutions – Normative Pillar 
Research suggests that at the industry level, normative considerations related to trade 
unions may influence corporate governance practice (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Bridges 
and Villemez, 1991) through such measures as employee representation rights on corporate 
boards. Labour unions are traditionally held to have the best interest of their members at 
heart and work to provide good working conditions, fair wage, equal opportunities for 
professional and skills development and generally support its members in negotiations with 
employers. Trade unions help define the normative parameters of what constitute good 
working conditions and practices for its members, and act as an arbiter between employees 
and employers in situations of maltreatment or conflict (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  The 
growing participation of women in the work force has created additional challenges for 
unions, which are now increasingly responding to the need for protection of workers who 
are part-time, the vast majority of whom are women. This renewed emphasis on particular 
aspects women’s working conditions, would suggest that trade unions are a positive force 
in women’s career development and enable female professional emancipation (Kirton, 
1999; Somavia, 2007). An alternative literature takes a very different view of the role of 
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unions for women employees. From a normative gendered perspective, labour unions are 
masculine in character, reflecting male values and interests. In particular, trade unions have 
been influential in restricting women’s access to particular industries with some scholars 
suggesting labour unions have been instrumental in suppressing the rise of women in 
certain areas of employment (Caraway, 2006; Booth, 1986). Despite a general trend in the 
rise of female employees, labour unions are not meeting the growing demand for union 
membership amongst women, in part because of prevailing sexist attitudes and partly 
because unions target male dominated environments when they recruit (Yates, 2006). 
Consequently, women are unable to join unions as readily as men, and may suffer the 
consequences in the form of lower wages, fewer professional development opportunities 
and lower job security. The perceived masculine nature of labour unions has also meant 
women are reluctant to join, failing to see that the union is a relevant institution for their 
interest (Kirton, 2005). Literature has established the requirement for extensive 
professional experience and career development opportunities for acquiring corporate 
board directors, so if women are denied the safeguards of fair working conditions, 
development opportunities, wages and job security that come with union membership, they 
may not be able to gain the requisite skills and experiences for board directorships.  
 
Whereas some suggest strongly unionised industries are associated with a masculine 
workforce and fewer opportunities for women, industries that rely more heavily on female 
labour have been found to have more female corporate board directors (Brammer et al., 
2007; Hillman et al., 2007). Increased industry diversity has also been associated with 
normative changes at the industry level (Kondra and Hinings, 1998). An increased pool of 
female employees in a given industry offers the potential for a wider choice of women who 
have attained the requisite skills and experiences to join the corporate board ranks in a 
given industry (Thomson et al., 2005). And secondly, more female dominated industries 
offer women a chance to forge relationships and establish networks with other women of 
influence and power, helping them ascend the corporate ladder more easily than in 
industries that are male dominated (Holton, 1995; Burris, 2005).  
 
Hypothesis 11:  There is a smaller proportion of women board directors in firms in heavily 
unionised industries 
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Hypothesis 12: There is a larger proportion of women board directors on the boards of 
firms that have a larger share of female employees 
 
Industry level institutions – Cultural-Cognitive Pillar 
Over time industries develop distinct cultural and cognitive characteristics which may 
influence a number of firm behaviours; for example particular forms of strategic 
behaviours may be encouraged, or managerial responses to particular industry uncertainties 
become isomorphic (Zahra et al., 2007; Christensen and Gordon, 1999; Philips, 1994). 
Literature suggests that over time, firms that inhabit the same industrial space develop a 
common culture. A number of sustained institutional influences help shape this culture, 
such as type of industry, innovation, gender distribution and industry history (Hofstede et 
al., 1990; Chatman and Jehn, 1994; Christensen and Gordon, 1999). In their study of 
culture, firm behaviour and industry, Chatman and Jehn (1994) investigated the degree to 
which there is a link between firm level culture and industry characteristics. Analysing 15 
firms across four service sector industries, the authors found that industry characteristics 
were a stronger influence on culture than firm characteristics. Chatman and Jehn attributed 
these industry differences to growth rate and technology. Christensen and Gordon (1999) 
however suggested wider institutional characteristics may also influence industry culture. 
Gordon (1985) analysed differences in industry culture between firms in dynamic 
industries such as technology industries and firms in more stable sectors such as utilities. A 
culture of innovation, risk taking and action characterised the firms in the R&D intensive 
technology industry, whilst firms in the utility sector exhibited a culture that was 
hierarchical, less flexible and more concerned with preserving existing company values. In 
light of Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) finding that firms perceived a risk associated with 
hiring female board directors, it is suggested that:  
 
Hypothesis 13: There is a larger proportion of female board directors in more dynamic 
industries 
 
Firm characteristics have been proved in previous studies to impact on the share of board 
seats occupied by women. A line of enquiry has suggested women prevail on the board of 
larger firms, with more independent boards that are more profitable (Burgess and 
Tharenou, 2000; Burke, 2000; Erhardt et al., 2003; Harrigan, 1981; Farrell and Hersch, 
2005; Carter et al., 2003), however chapter 5 established that such a relationship between 
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firm characteristics and women board directors may be more complex. Comparatively little 
empirical consideration has been given to the role of institutional theory in the prevalence 
of women on the board. An exception is Hillman et al. (2007) who argue that elements of 
institutional theory may explain why certain firms have more women on their boards, as 
firms that seek legitimacy may appoint women to their boards, as a signal of connection 
with a larger constituency of stakeholders.  There is scope at the firm level to build on the 
empirical findings in the literature which show that elements of the firm’s structure 
account for its share of women board directors, and marry firm characteristics with 
elements of Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars.  
 
At the firm level a conceptual obstacle of a very particular logical nature emerges. The 
regulative pillar as considered in terms of national and industry institutions suggests that 
regulative frameworks whether they are legislated for, or are of a ‘soft-law’ nature apply 
either to all firms operating in a given country, or to all firms within a particular industry. 
No law or corporate governance requirement seems to apply only to one firm. Although 
shareholder democracy (Brammer and Grosvold, under review) is on the rise in the US 
where shareholder resolutions encompassing board and gender demography have been 
raised, there is no evidence that these resolutions make a difference. Additionally, 
shareholder resolutions remain a more dominant form of regulative control in the US than 
the rest of the world and information on shareholder resolutions are hard to obtain. To that 
end, the regulative pillar will not be evaluated in the context of firm level influences on the 
prevalence of women on the board; instead the emphasis will be on the normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements.  
 
Firm level institutions – Normative & Cultural-Cognitive Pillar 
Despite Scott’s (1995) efforts at clearly defining the three institutional pillars as distinct, 
Scott in recent writings acknowledged more broadly that he recognise that elements of his 
pillars may coincide in certain circumstance as mentioned in chapter 3. One such instance 
is professionals operating in small groups (Scott, 2008). In such a setting, Scott (2008) 
suggests that a group of professionals “create and warrant knowledge” (p 224), and exert 
“collegiate control” (p 225) that are informed by group culture. This creates a distinct 
working culture amongst group members based on a common understanding within the 
group of what their normative role is and how it should be executed. Scott (2008) 
recognises that professional groups are subjected to normative standards and principles 
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outlining what constitute the appropriate behaviour and best-practice in a given situation.  
Individuals who make up professional working groups are therefore subjected to normative 
and cultural-cognitive pressures concurrently, which suggest that any observed behavioural 
outcome is a result of both normative and cultural-cognitive influences. Reflecting this 
observation, Scott et al. (2000) and Scott (2004, 2005) considered elements of the 
normative and the cultural cognitive pillar as coinciding.  This approach will similarly be 
adopted here; one hypothesis reflecting the normative and the cultural-cognitive element of 
Scott’s pillars will therefore be developed.  
 
The notion of time as an important consideration for corporate board behaviour and 
outcomes is well established in the literature. Scholars have discussed and analysed the 
role of time through a number of analytical lenses. Time has been considered in terms of 
director tenure and the particular timing of board appointments (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1980; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Johnson et al., 1993; Westphal and Zajec, 1995), 
contemporaneous or lagged effect on performance arising from board restructuring 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985), or temporal association between negative firm events and 
changes to the corporate board composition (Arthaud-day et al., 2006). Here, the focus will 
be on the board’s average age, and the role the age of the board’s directors play in enabling 
or preventing women from acquiring corporate board directorships. Corporate boards with 
high average directorial age have been associated with homosocial reproduction, where 
men recruit other men similar to them rather than search for talent amongst alternative 
qualified groups of potential candidates, such as women (Murphy and McIntyre, 2007; 
Kanter, 1977), which reinforces the gender homogeneous nature of the board. Age may 
confer membership in networks of corporate board directors, be it through ‘old-boys’ 
connections, interlocking directorships or shared organisational experiences such as 
attending the same university (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Wagner et al., 1984), which 
binds the, predominantly male, directors together around a common set of shared values 
and norms, which they transpose to their individual boards (Koenig and Gogel, 1981). 
These board norms are often rooted in long-standing practices, and Salancik (1977) found 
long tenure to be associated with increased conformity to organizational values. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 14: There is a larger proportion of female board directors on boards where 
directors are younger. 
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In addition to establishing the degree to which macro, meso and micro institutional factors 
influence the prevalence of women on the board, this chapter will go one step further in 
attempting to explain some of the idiosyncrasies observed in the pattern of female board 
participation. Within the literature on women on the board, a body of research has 
established that women board directors are more numerous in large firms with more 
independent boards (Burgess and Tharenou, 2000; Burke, 2000; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Harrigan, 1981; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Carter et al., 2003). Whilst chapter 5 presented 
an overview that suggested this was not necessarily a truism in all national or industry 
contexts there is nevertheless a question as to whether particular institutional 
characteristics at the firm level may influence the degree to which women are found on the 
board or not and whether particular types of firms are more influenced by institutional 
context than others.  
 
Within international management research, some scholars argue that multinational 
companies (MNCs) constitute a particular class of firm that exhibit a sufficiently distinct 
set of characteristics to warrant particular attention (Kostova et al., 2008). MNCs are 
distinct in that they establish a physical presence in at least one other country (Carter et al., 
2001), and often across more than one country. As MNCs operate in a plurality of national 
contexts, Kostova and Roth (2002) argued that these companies face a dichotomous 
pressure. On the one hand, MNCs must conform to local institutions to fit in and gain 
corporate legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation. On the other hand, Kostova and Roth 
(2002) argue a vital source of competitive advantage to the MNCs is the roll-out of home-
country practices across their operations. Such an approach would therefore enforce 
country-of-origin specific practices on the host nations. Cross-national institutional 
differences make MNC operations more difficult, highlighting the tension between the 
need for legitimacy in the host nation on the one hand, and operational efficiency on the 
other. Previous literature on the role of institutional practices has been divided. One body 
of research has emphasised the MNCs’ need and willingness to adapt, or conform, to local 
institutional settings and practices to fit in and gain legitimacy (Ferner et al., 2001; Philips 
and Tracey, 2009; Ferner et al., 2005). Another body of research has suggested that MNCs’ 
practices are path dependent, and whilst minor host country modifications may be enacted, 
the firms’ operations in host countries will largely adopt the practices of their country-of-
origin (Ferner et al., 2001; Geppert et al., 2003), as, MNCs belong to their own class of 
firms, which are exempt from local isomorphic pressures to fit in (Kostova et al., 2008). 
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Recent debates on the relevance of institutional context for MNCs have taken a very 
interesting turn, suggesting that MNCs make up a meta-institutional field (Kostova et al., 
2008) which transgresses industry and country borders. Instead, MNCs “are becoming, it is 
argued, increasingly disconnected from national institutional systems” (Kostova et al., 
2008, p 998). If this assertion is correct, it would suggest that MNCs’ corporate 
governance practices were substantially unaffected by their country-of-origin’s national 
institutional environment. In other words, the national institutional context of the MNCs’ 
country-of-origin would be a less significant factor in shaping the gender-profile of MNCs’ 
corporate boards. Conversely, those firms that are not multinational and do not own 
foreign assets in a different culture would be more inclined to adapt their corporate 
governance practices in line with their home country institutional environment, thus: 
 
Hypothesis 15:  National institutional environments have less influence on the prevalence 
of women on the boards of multinational companies than for non-multinational companies.    
 
7.2. Methods 
Data 
The data on female corporate board directors used in this study came from BoardEx as 
discussed in chapters 4 and 6.  As one of the main objectives of this research was to sample 
as broadly as possible beyond the list of companies usually subjected to empirical 
investigation, it was important that data were available for as large a range of countries as 
possible. Therefore, following Fernandes et al. (2008), all firms included in BoardEx for 
which data were available for 2005, the most recent years’ observations, were included. 
This yielded 1,673 firm level observations for 21 countries. A number of other scholarly 
studies seeking to conduct large-scale international comparisons or emphasise cross-
national variation have adopted the same sampling approach, where all countries in a given 
database are include in the analysis (see for example Aggarwal et al., 2006; Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2007; Schneper and Guillen, 2004).  
 
Measures 
This section details the operationalisation of the measures used 
 
Female board representation. The dependent variable in this study was the percentage 
women on the corporate board for a given firm as extracted from BoardEx. To date only a 
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relatively small number of studies has used the proportion of board seats held by women as 
the dependent variable (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Terjesen and Singh, 2008; 
Francoeur et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2006), thus this study adds to this small, but growing 
body of research. Prior studies that have relied on the prevalence of women board directors 
as the dependent variable have either used absolute numbers (Fryxell and Lerner, 1989) or 
a binary 0/1 notation to indicate whether a woman was present on the board or not 
(Brammer et al., 2009; Hillman et al., 2007).   
 
The independent variables were collated from BoardEx, Datastream and publicly available 
data sources and, reflecting the conceptual development, relate to the regulatory, normative 
and cultural environment of the sample. 
 
Regulative Variables  
Data relating to the regulatory pillar at the national level were captured through country 
political and governmental institutions using the World Bank’s indicators of national 
governance. The World Bank produces data concerning the following six aspects of 
national political institutions: Voice & Accountability, Political Stability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption Control. Together, these 
provide a useful insight into the character of a country’s political institutions. As in chapter 
6, an exploratory analysis of these facets of country political environments showed that 
they were very highly correlated with each other. Following the same procedure adopted in 
chapter 6, exploratory factor analysis using principal component analysis with the varimax 
rotation was carried out (Hair et al., 1998). This process identified a single factor with an 
eigenvalue greater than one which explained over 85% of the variance within the six 
original variables. This factor was labelled “GoodGov” and retained for use in the 
regression analysis. The second indicator of country political institutions included was the 
percentage number of parliamentary seats (or national equivalent) occupied by women. 
These data were extracted from the United Nations, Women’s Indicators and Statistics 
Database. Finally, following Brady (2007), to reflect the orientation of political institutions 
in a country, the World Values Survey measure of mean left-rightness was adopted to 
capture the extent to which a country was politically more socialist or conservatively 
inclined.  
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Industry SIC codes were extracted from Datastream and matched with BoardEx firm level 
data, this allowed for the classification of firms into distinct industries. Data showing 
national governments’ stake in a given industry was obtained from the OECD. The data 
was binary, taking a value of one if a given country held shares in a particular industry and 
zero otherwise.  
 
Normative Variables.  
The national normative environment was reflected by the inclusion of tertiary education 
enrolment of women obtained from the UNESCO database. Tertiary education is 
associated with successful completion of secondary education before stepping up to this 
more advanced level of learning. Higher levels of tertiary education enrolment for women 
were seen as a desire by society to have an actively working female population and 
reflecting the normative beliefs of the country through the inclusion of women in 
education. Educational establishments were also seen as a mechanism for instilling 
national beliefs and values in the next generation. The second variable used to measure the 
normative pillar was religion. By relying on the Association of Religion Data Archives 
(ARDA), it was possible to obtain the percentage number of the population who 
characterised themselves as religious in a given country. The ARDA database of religious 
beliefs draws on the main on the 2003 US State Department’s International Religious 
Freedom Reports, but is also augmented by further data from such institutions as the 
United Nations to create a more complete and reliable dataset.  
 
At the industry level, the normative pillar was reflected in the degree to which an industry 
was unionised and the share of female workers employed by the industry. Data on union 
density were obtained from the OECD (Conway et al., 2005), which reports the percentage 
proportion of employed individuals who are affiliated with a trade union for a given 
industry. The OECD distributes questionnaires to trade unions in member states and 
augments the data with central administrative data from member states and the Centre for 
Advanced Labour Studies at the University of Amsterdam. The share of female workers 
for a given sector was extracted from the International Labour Organisation’s database 
LABORSTA, which tracks the share of men and women employed by industry 
internationally.   
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Cultural-Cognitive Variables 
The cultural-cognitive pillar at the country level used Hofstede’s cultural values, where 
each country is given a numeric score for each of the four cultural constructs that make up 
his framework. These scores were collected from www.geert-hostdede.com. Industry 
dynamism was reflected in R&D intensity. R&D spend and annual revenue was collected 
from Datastream and R&D intensity was calculated as the total spent on R&D divided by 
annual revenue. Based on SIC codes used to divide firms up to industries, figures for R&D 
intensity were aggregated to the industry level. The firm level normative/cultural-cognitive 
variable; average age of board directors, was obtained from BoardEx and was reported as 
the average age of the board overall.   
 
Control variables.  
Following Hillman et al. (2007), Parboteeah et al. (2008) and Carter et al. (2001) a number 
of control variables were used to account for salient firm characteristics. In particular, 
board size (number of directors) was included to provide a scale of the share of board seats 
held by women. In light of the finding that larger companies with more independent boards 
have more women board directors (Carter et al., 2001), control variables were include for 
firm size (measured as market capitalisation) and board composition (measured as the ratio 
of outside directors to board size).  Organisational age was included to account for the 
potential that inertia helped explain the absence of female board directors. Some market 
and accounting based control measures were also included, to control for risk and firm 
performance. The following performance measures were included: Beta was included as a 
measure of systematic risk, Tobin's Q measured as total market value of the firm divided 
by total asset, Return on Shareholder Equity (the fiscal year return to $1 invested in a 
firm’s stock on the first day of the fiscal year, expressed %), and Return on Assets (net 
income/total assets expressed in percentage terms). 
 
The model adopted in this study follows a study by Doidge et al. (2007), which effectively 
assessed multiple levels of factors in accounting for the role corporate governance played 
for a given firm through a series of fixed effect multiple regression models. In aggregate 
the models account for firm, industry and country level factors in explaining the prevalence 
of women on the board. Formally the approach is to estimate seven empirical models as 
follows: 
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Model (1) = iii εναγ ++=  
Model (2) = imiesCountryDumi εαγ ++=  
Model (3) = icii εαγ ++=  
Model (4) = immiesIndustryDui εαγ ++=  
Model (5) = iii εχαγ ++=  
Model (6) = iiciii ενχαγ ++++=  
Model (7) = imiesCountryDummmiesIndustryDuii εχαγ ++++=  
 
where iγ  is the percentage board seats held by women, iν is a set of country level variables 
for country i, ci is a set of industry level variables for industry i, and iχ is a set of firm 
level variables for firm i. Industry and country dummy variables were binary, taking the 
value of 1 for a given industry or country and 0 otherwise.  
 
The fixed factor multiple regression analysis starts with an estimate of the regression for 
percentage number of women on the board and national level institutional characteristics. 
In doing so, the analysis provides an analytical continuation of chapter 6, where the final 
model reflected the totality of the national institutional environment thus operationalised. 
Model 2 establishes a statistical upper bound for the importance of country characteristics, 
and this is achieved by including country dummy variables. Model 3 estimates the 
regression coefficients for the percentage number of women on the board and industry 
institutions. The fourth model applies a similar approach to the country-dummy analysis in 
model 2, a set of binary industry dummy variables were included to create the same 
statistical upper bound for the role of industry characteristics. The fifth regression 
evaluates firm level characteristics for the prevalence of women on the board. Once the 
effects of these separate regressions are known, the coefficients for the cumulative 
institutional model are estimated in model 6, and a final model, model 7, estimates 
regression coefficients for firm characteristics, industry dummies and country dummies to 
evaluate the upper statistical limit of the explanatory power of national, industry and firm 
level factors for the prevalence of women on the board.  
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This analytical approach offers three distinct advantages. First, by establishing the upper 
limit for the role of country, industry and firm institutions this analysis affords a view of 
how well the variables included fit the proposed model, and how much remains 
unexplained.  Second, by adopting a similar statistical approach to that presented in the 
previous chapter, this analysis can more easily be compared with the results from chapter 
6. Third, given the number of country and industry dummy variables (21 and 66 
respectively), this approach is statistically more manageable than the obvious alternative, 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM). Nevertheless, versions of models 1, 3, 5 and 6 were 
estimated using an HLM approach to confirm the substantial similarity of the results. No 
significant differences emerged in this process; therefore, the approach described above 
was retained.   
 
7.3. Findings 
In this section, the findings of the empirical analysis are discussed. Before reporting the 
regression results, descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the data are 
presented in table 7.1. Multicollinearity diagnostics revealed higher than generally 
accepted Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) between Power Distance and Uncertainty 
Avoidance at 13.4 and 16.4 respectively, suggesting multicollinearity may be impacting 
these results. This will be discussed further later on in this section. This multicollinearity 
was unexpected and unusual, as Hofstede’s constructs, albeit both related to culture, should 
measure distinct cultural traits rather than overlapping elements.  All other VIF measures 
were comfortably within the generally accepted limit of 10 (Hair et al., 1998).  
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Table 7-1 Correlation coefficients 
Mean
Standard 
deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1 PERCENTWOMEN 9.2201 9.5006
2 Firm size 8.8133 2.0802 0.230
3 Board composition 75.6257 14.9522 0.262 0.273
4 Board size 10.9743 4.2687 0.060 0.450 0.206
5 Average director age 57.1046 4.6171 0.081 0.371 0.373 0.212
6 Return on shareholder's equity 26.6769 185.9685 0.028 0.025 -0.016 -0.006 -0.022
7 Tobin's Q 2.9125 3.0055 0.025 -0.080 -0.015 -0.118 -0.046 0.129
8 Return on assets 0.0811 0.0980 0.094 0.073 -0.016 -0.092 0.022 0.140 0.391
9 Beta 1.0737 0.6335 -0.095 -0.022 -0.022 -0.098 0.006 0.026 0.068 -0.013
10 Company age 34.0178 40.3559 -0.014 0.193 -0.003 0.208 0.096 -0.029 -0.086 -0.055 -0.061
11 Union density 0.2623 0.1759 0.002 -0.360 -0.043 -0.141 -0.403 -0.012 0.047 -0.034 -0.071 -0.101
12 Women in industry % 33.0841 14.3364 0.116 0.010 0.004 0.076 -0.073 -0.022 -0.023 -0.140 -0.120 -0.028 -0.007
13 State shareholding 0.3951 0.4890 0.038 0.096 0.091 0.228 0.077 0.027 -0.120 -0.095 -0.131 0.036 -0.043 0.191
14 R&D Intensity 4.0103 53.3501 -0.037 -0.095 0.010 -0.027 0.004 -0.030 0.103 -0.226 -0.003 -0.022 0.007 0.030 -0.046
15 Mean L-R 5.4204 0.3053 0.266 0.061 0.283 -0.113 0.191 0.007 0.067 0.065 0.010 -0.131 0.036 0.038 0.030 -0.011
16 Good Gov 0.5247 0.3164 -0.010 -0.250 -0.127 -0.161 -0.263 -0.011 0.085 -0.044 -0.061 -0.013 0.475 0.000 -0.034 -0.043 0.174
17 Women in Parliament % 22.2187 9.5293 -0.039 -0.250 0.008 0.017 -0.297 -0.028 0.065 -0.038 -0.128 -0.021 0.705 -0.017 -0.023 -0.019 -0.120 0.607
18 Power Distance 41.1394 11.3887 -0.110 0.075 0.063 0.067 0.098 -0.023 -0.079 -0.013 -0.015 0.093 -0.298 0.003 -0.048 0.010 -0.516 -0.556 -0.255
19 Individuality 80.6924 11.7029 0.213 0.160 0.077 -0.239 0.234 0.046 0.025 0.099 0.123 -0.094 -0.276 0.034 -0.021 -0.009 0.428 -0.008 -0.417 -0.304
20 Masculinity 54.0226 18.3550 -0.044 0.202 -0.127 0.126 0.187 0.034 -0.054 0.050 0.074 0.065 -0.526 -0.013 0.064 0.010 0.179 -0.366 -0.661 -0.066 0.386
21 Uncertainty Avoidance 52.7547 18.9888 -0.196 0.038 0.035 0.206 0.034 -0.042 -0.085 -0.040 -0.096 0.155 -0.244 -0.022 0.000 0.020 -0.501 -0.464 -0.037 0.842 -0.602 -0.035
22 Women in tertiary education % 79.0841 15.9092 0.388 0.149 0.485 0.005 0.231 0.004 0.046 0.095 0.017 -0.181 0.052 0.060 0.018 -0.014 0.598 -0.164 0.004 -0.257 0.386 -0.088 -0.358
23 Religious 0.8016 0.2248 0.072 -0.040 0.050 -0.442 0.109 0.027 0.016 0.062 0.084 -0.144 -0.061 -0.005 -0.025 0.003 0.249 -0.162 -0.380 0.130 0.336 -0.025 -0.171 0.120
Variable definitions: Firm size market capitalisation (share price x no. outstanding shares), board composition is a percentage measure of the total number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors by the board, board size is the 
total number of non-executive and executive directors that make up the corporate board. Average director age is the total age of the board divided by the number of directors. Return on shareholders equity is calculated as net income divided by 
shareholder's equity. Tobin's Q is measured as the total market value of the firm divided by total assets, whilst return on assets takes net income and divide by total assets. Beta is a measure of systematic risk and is arrived at using regression modelling 
based on past performance. The company's age is calculated based on its date of incorporation. Union density is a measure of percentage number of employees in a given industry that belong to a labour union, whilst percentage number of women 
employed by industry reflects the proportion of female workers observed in a given industry. State shareholding is bivariate measure which is set at 1 if the state is a shareholder in the industry or 0 otherwise.
 R&D intensity is the total amount a firm spends on R&D divided by total revenue for a given year. GoodGov is a factor of six World Bank indicators including Voice & accountability, Political stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory quality, 
Rule of Law and Corruption control.  Mean L-R is a scale measuring degree of left or right wing ideological inclination. Women in Parliament measures the percentage of parliamentary seats occupied by women. % women in tertiary educationt is the 
percentage number of women in higher education. Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and Individualism are dimensions of Hofstede's cultural framework. Religious is a measure from the ARDA indicating the degree to which a 
country's population perceive themselves to be religious
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The analysis starts with regressing country characteristics on percentage women board 
directors as shown in Model 1. This model predicts that national institutional 
characteristics reflected in Scott’s regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars will 
explain some of the observed variance in the prevalence of women on the board. Of the 
nine national level characteristics predicted to influence the prevalence of women on the 
board, seven are statistically significant. The regulative pillar is statistically significant for 
all the included measures; however, not all are significant in the expected direction. 
Political liberalism is positively related to share of board seats held by women and is 
significant at the 10% level, as suggested by H1. In comparison, the coefficients for good 
governance are positive and significant at the 1% level as predicted by H3. Contrary to the 
predicted relationship in H2, which proposed that countries that had a larger share of 
parliamentary seats held by women would have more women on their corporate boards, the 
results suggest a statistically significant result in the opposite direction. Countries that have 
more women in parliament have fewer women on the board. The finding is significant at 
the 10% level.  The normative pillar is strongly supported.  Both the normative variables 
are significant at the 1% level in the expected direction. School enrolment is positively 
related to the prevalence of women on the board conforming to the proposed relationship 
in hypothesis H4. Conversely, religious dedication shows negative coefficients similarly 
predicted in H5. The cultural-cognitive pillar is supported in the variables Power Distance 
and Uncertainty Avoidance at the 1% and 5% level respectively, suggesting confirmation 
of the proposed relationships in H6 and H7, but no support for H8 and H9. Overall, the 
adjusted R² from model 1 is 16.8% suggesting that the country institutional environment 
plays an important role in accounting for the prevalence of women on the corporate board 
of directors. Model 2 complements model 1 by evaluating the importance of country 
effects through the inclusion of a set of national dummy variables and shows an adjusted 
R² = 17.75%, approximately 1% higher than model 1, suggesting the variables included in 
model 1 substantially capture the country characteristics that can potentially influence the 
prevalence of women on the board in a given country. 
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Table 7-2 Regression results. Standard Error reported in () 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
CONSTANT -16.5689 
(6.9406) 
14.1514 
(0.4017) 
6.6908 
(0.7052) 
11.7640 
(0.9050) 
2.2138 
(3.0562) 
-15.1878 
(7.8832) 
22.2133 
(4.0805) 
Firm size 
    1.0853 
(0.1385)*** 
0.8635 
(0.1427)*** 
0.9321 
(0.1700)*** 
Board composition 
    0.1689 
(0.0175)*** 
0.0493 
(0.0220)** 
0.0472 
(0.0221)** 
Board size 
    -0.1644 
(0.0623)*** 
0.1079 
(0.0862) 
-0.0084 
(0.0771) 
Average director age 
    -0.2143 
(0.0591)*** 
-0.3015 
(0.0659)*** 
-0.3129 
(0.0652)*** 
Return on shareholders 
equity 
    0.0007 
(0.0012) 
0.0007 
(0.0011) 
0.0010 
(0.0012) 
Tobin's Q 
    0.0741 
(0.0939) 
0.0334 
(0.1009) 
-0.0231 
(0.0901) 
Return on assets 
    4.8944 
(2.7279)* 
2.8240 
(2.8664) 
4.1418 
(2.6918) 
Beta 
    -1.2264 
(0.3754)*** 
-1.2894 
(0.3741)*** 
-0.9893 
(0.4019)** 
Company age 
    -0.0131 
(0.0059)** 
0.0073 
(0.0063) 
0.0024 
(0.0058) 
Union density 
  0.1230 
(1.3433) 
  -1.8656 
(2.3909) 
 
Women in industry % 
  0.0760 
(0.0169)*** 
  0.0483 
(0.0173)*** 
 
State shareholder 
  0.3428 
(0.4969) 
  -0.0004 
(0.5072) 
 
R&D intensity 
  -0.0071 
(0.0044) 
  -0.0030 
(0.0062) 
 
Mean L-R 
2.2531 
(1.3235)* 
    2.5782 
(1.4666)* 
 
GoodGov 
4.6845 
(1.4876)*** 
    4.2228 
(1.6193)*** 
 
Women in Parliament % 
-0.0805 
(0.0475)* 
    -0.0029 
(0.0623) 
 
Power Distance 
0.2263 
(0.0658)*** 
    0.2213 
(0.0732)*** 
 
Individuality 
-0.0204 
(0.0359) 
    0.0042 
(0.0433) 
 
Masculinity 
0.0230 
(0.0258) 
    0.0348 
(0.0281) 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
-0.1010 
(0.0402)** 
    -0.1155 
(0.0485)** 
 
Women in tertiary 
education % 
0.2498 
(0.0287)*** 
    0.2263 
(0.0347)*** 
 
Religiosity -12.2442 
(3.6435)*** 
    -12.1786 
(3.8874)*** 
 
2-digits SIC  
control variables included 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
Country control variable 
included 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
R-Squared 17.30% 18.76% 1.55% 10.19% 13.46% 27.32% 34.38% 
R-Squared Adjusted 16.80% 17.75% 1.30% 6.53% 5.09% 25.98% 29.61% 
△in R-Squared relative to 
model (1) 
 1.46% -15.75% -7.11% -3.84% 10.02% 17.08% 
 
No. of Observations 1516 1634 1587 1634 1342 1217 1342 
Notes: Significance levels:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Standard Error (). Variable definitions: Firm size is based on market capitalisation, board composition measures the total 
number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors, and board size is the total number of non-executive & executive directors on the board. Return on 
shareholder’s equity is calculated as net income divided by shareholder's equity. Tobin's Q is measured as the total market value of the firm divided by total assets. Return on assets takes 
net income and divide by total assets. Beta measures systematic risk and is arrived at using regression modelling based on past performance. Company age is calculated from date of 
incorporation. Union density measures percentage employees in a given industry who belong to a trade union, whilst % number of women employed by industry is the share of female 
workers in a given industry. State shareholder is bivariate measure which is set at 1 if the state is a shareholder in the industry or 0 otherwise. R&D intensity is the total firm spend on 
R&D divided by total revenue. GoodGov is a factor of 6 World Bank indicators including Voice & accountability, Political stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule 
of Law and Corruption control.  Mean L-R is a scale measuring degree of left or right wing political view. Women in Parliament measures % is the share of parliamentary seats held by 
women.  Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and Individuality are dimensions of Hofstede's framework. Religiosity measures percentage worshippers for a given 
country. Women in tertiary education % is the share of women enrolled in higher education. 
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In model 3, the role of industry characteristics is explored. Results show industry 
characteristics as measured here account for a very moderate proportion of the observed 
variance, with an adjusted R² of 1.3%. The only statistically significant finding in this 
model is the share of employees in a given industry who are female, which is positively 
related to the prevalence of women on the board at the 1% level. This finding is in line 
with Hillman et al. (2007) which found that as the share of female employees in an 
industry increased, so to did the incidences of women board directors. This provides partial 
support for the normative pillar at the industry level; the regulative and cultural-cognitive 
pillars by comparison find no support. By comparison, model 4, which includes dummy 
variables for the industry characteristics, has an R² of 6.53%, and whilst low compared 
with model 2, it is five times higher than the adjusted R² for the industry level variables in 
model 3. This indicates that the variables used in the industry model only capture some of 
the industry characteristics that can potentially explain the prevalence of women on the 
board. However, the result of model 4 suggests that industry characteristics are less 
important in explaining the share of women on the board in a given industry than country 
characteristics are.  
 
Model 5 regresses firm level characteristics on the prevalence of women on the board. The 
results of the hypothesised normative/cultural-cognitive relationship between share of 
women on the board and the average age of the directors proposed in H14 conforms to the 
expected relationship. The higher the average age of the board, the fewer women hold 
directorships on a given firm’s board. The finding is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Looking within the results of model 5, a number of the control variables are also 
statistically significant, specifically board size and board independence are both positive 
and statistically significant, in line with previous research (Carter et al., 2001). Similarly, 
market volatility as operationalised through Beta is negative and significant, suggesting 
firms operating in more volatile market conditions have fewer women on the board.  
Return on assets was positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting more 
operationally efficient companies have more women on their boards. Company age was 
similarly negative and significant at the 5% level. Older more established firms have fewer 
female corporate board directors. The firm level adjusted R² is 5.09%, just under a third of 
the R² found in model 1 which accounted for national institutions.  
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In model 6, regressions are estimated for country, industry and firm level characteristics 
combined. The overall explanatory power of the model shows adjusted R² is 25.98%, 
9.18% higher than the country level model. The combined model shows continued support 
for all three pillars at the national level. Only one of the pillars shows slightly diminished 
explanatory power at the national level in the combined model. Within the regulative pillar 
the negative relationship between share of parliamentary seats held by women and the 
prevalence of women corporate board directors is still observed, but it is not statistically 
significant. The normative and cultural-cognitive pillars were both supported. More 
education result in more women on the board, whilst religious fervour is associated with 
fewer women board directors. Cultures where power distance and uncertainty avoidance is 
high similarly have fewer female board directors. The finding that the share of employees 
in a given industry who are women influences the prevalence of women on the board 
shows continued support in the final model, as does the firm level normative/cultural-
cognitive hypothesis suggesting older boards have fewer women.  
 
Lastly, model 7 adds country and industry dummy variables to the firm level model. Model 
7 has the highest adjusted R², the model accounts for just less than 30% at 29.61% of the 
observed variance. As the firm level model accounted for 5.09%, a further 24.54% is 
accounted for by industry and country dummies. The improvement in the explanatory 
power of model 6 compared with model 7 is comparatively small, 3.63%, suggesting 
model 6 successfully captures important elements of the institutional context that defines 
the antecedence of female corporate board directors.  
 
To test that the uneven sample available for the various models in table 7.2 did not 
materially influence the results, a similar robustness check to that carried out in chapter 6 
was conducted. The sample used to arrive at model 6 was identified and the seven 
regressions displayed in table 7.2 were re-run using only the sample observations from 
model 6. The resulting coefficients were neither different in direction nor statistical 
reliability, consequently they are not reported here but were undertaken for the sake of 
completeness.  
  
With the completion of this robustness check, the time has come to evaluate the hypotheses 
by reference to these findings. At the national level, the consistent finding that good 
governance practices and political liberalism are associated with a higher share of board 
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seats occupied by women, means there is evidence of support for H1 and H3. However, in 
the final model no support is found for H2, positing a positive relationship between the 
proportion of parliamentary seats held by women in a given country and the prevalence of 
women on the board. There is strong support for H4 and H5 suggesting that increased 
female tertiary education enrolment and less national religious fervour enable more women 
to acquire board seats.  There is further partial support for the cultural-cognitive pillar, 
reflected in the Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance constructs. H6 and H7 are 
therefore supported, though in light of the high VIFs, some caution should be applied in 
interpreting these results. Multicollinearity may suggest the independent variables in this 
model are unstable (Curwin and Slater, 1996); however, the findings in chapter 6 which 
showed similarly statistically significant results for these same two cultural variables, and 
no problems with multicollinearity lends some comfort to the idea that the results in this 
model are not excessively unstable. No support was found for H8 and H9. Partial support 
is found for the normative pillar at the industry level, and the share of female employees in 
a given industry is positively related to the prevalence of women on the board at the 1% 
level; H12 is therefore supported. H10, H11 and H13 were unsupported.  At the firm level, 
H14 which posited a relationship between board director age and share of women board 
seats occupied by women is supported. A higher average age of board directors is 
associated with a lower share of female directors.  
 
Multinational analysis  
The result of the analysis evaluating the role of national institutions in shaping the gender 
composition of corporate boards on multinational companies is reported in table 7-3. Two 
regressions are estimated for the firms classified as being most multinational (Model 8 and 
9) and two for those classified as least multinational (Model 10 and 11). The starting 
premise is a base model which incorporates firm level determinants of women on the board 
and industry dummies (Model 8 and Model 10). Next, country institutional factors are 
added to the base models (Model 9 and Model 11). This allows for a view of what country 
institutional characteristics add to the base model’s explanatory power.  
 
The regression results are rather surprising. Contrary to the hypothesised (H15) 
relationship which suggested multinational companies were less influenced by their home 
country institutional environment, the findings show that multinational companies are 
affected to a significantly greater extent by their home country institutional setting than are 
firms that are less multinational in character. A further observation is the finding that the 
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models presented in table 7-3 have a substantially higher explanatory power than the 
models presented in table 7-2 which included the entire sample. The models presented in 
table 7-3 fit better across both sub-samples compared with the overall sample presented in 
table 7-2. This suggests the distinction made in this analysis between firms that are 
multinational in character, and firms that are not, is an important one. Whilst non-
multinationals might be expected to be heavily driven by the national institutional 
environment in which they operate, given that they are confined to a single national 
context, the extent to which multinational companies were influence by their country-of-
origin national institutional context was surprising.   
 
Turning to table 7-3 and starting with model 8 and moving across, the adjusted R² for 
model 8 shows that the influence of firm level characteristics and industry dummy 
variables is 25.96%. It shows that larger firms, with higher return on assets, with more 
independent and younger boards have more women board directors, but that firms 
operating in volatile markets have fewer women board directors. These findings are all 
statistically significant. Return on assets is also positively related to women corporate 
board directors at the 10% level. The findings in model 8 that larger firms with younger 
boards have more female board directors were also found to be true in model 10. In model 
10 the coefficient for a relationship between board independence and prevalence of female 
directors were similarly positive as in model 8, however, the finding was not statistically 
significant. Similarly, the negative relationship observed in model 8 between women on 
the board and market volatility was evident in model 10, but not statistically significant. 
Models 9 and 11 add country institutional variables to the base model. Model 9 shows the 
results for MNCs, and adding national institutional influences to the base model increases 
R² by over 13% compared to model 8. The adjusted R² is 38.53% for model 9. There are 
more women on the boards for MNCs whose home country is politically liberal, has lower 
power distance and higher rates of female higher education attainment. In other words, 
elements of all three institutional pillars are supported.  In contrast, model 11 shows the 
degree to which country institutional factors matter for the prevalence of women on the 
board of firms that are not multinational in character, and the increase in R² from model 10 
to model 11 is 8.29%, suggesting national institutions matter less for the gender 
characteristics of boards on these firms.  The adjusted R² for model 11 is 21.7%. The only 
national institutional pillar to be of statistical significant for the least multinational firms 
was the cultural-cognitive. In particular, lower power distance and less uncertainty 
avoidance were associated with increase share of board seats occupied by women.   
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Table 7-3 Regression results MNCs. Standard Error reported in () 
Dependent variable = Average % women on a country’s boards 
 MNC NON-MNC 
  Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) 
CONSTANT 6.2606 -64.8490 22.2651 2.3751 
  (7.5078) (19.9711) (9.5345) (22.9972) 
Firm size 0.8128 0.9362 1.8231 1.2796 
  (0.3251)** (0.3350)*** (0.4310)*** (0.4800) 
Board composition 0.1873 0.0674 0.0682 -0.0055 
  (0.0365)*** (0.0443) (0.0423) (0.0570) 
Board size -0.0204 0.2754 -0.2044 -0.0552 
  (0.1248) (0.1812) (0.1615) (0.2387) 
Average director age -0.2761 -0.2927 -0.4479 -0.5703 
  (0.1306)** (0.1483)** (0.1672)*** (0.1835) 
Return on Shareholders Equity 0.0010 0.0015 -0.0040 -0.0021 
  (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0057) (0.0058) 
Tobin's Q 0.1891 0.3012 0.0001 -0.0260 
  (0.1864) (0.2465) (0.2059) (0.2092) 
Return on Assets 11.1616 6.5841 -0.4479 -5.6389 
  (5.9024)* (5.9967) (0.1672) (7.0321) 
Beta -1.7404 -1.8502 -1.0980 -0.8143 
  (0.1108)** (0.80841)** (1.1461) (1.1938) 
Company age -0.0061 0.0058 -0.0015 0.0192 
  (0.0105) (0.0120) (0.0131) (0.0140) 
Mean L-R   8.3950   5.0690 
    (4.0699)**   (4.2673) 
GoodGov   4.8825   4.5647 
    (3.3962)   (4.7725) 
Women Parliament %   0.0271   -0.0817 
    (0.1171)   (0.1579) 
PowerDistance   0.3719   0.5579 
    (0.1419)***   (0.2345)** 
Individuality   0.1546   -0.1560 
    (0.1012)   (0.1265) 
Masculinity   -0.0047   0.0286 
    (0.0545)   (0.0843) 
Uncertainty Avoidance   -0.0818   -0.3545 
    (0.0870)   (0.1431)** 
Women in tertiary education %   0.1726   0.1584 
    (0.0738)**   (0.1007) 
Religiosity   -8.1536   -1.4330 
    (8.0229)   (10.8096) 
2-digits SIC  
control variables included YES YES YES YES 
Country control variable 
included NO NO NO NO 
R-Squared 41.56% 54.70% 32.69% 40.98% 
R-Squared Adjusted 25.96% 38.53% 15.34% 21.70% 
△in R-Squared relative to model 8 
(MNC) model 11 (Non-MNC)   13.13%   8.29% 
No. of Observations 280 251 283 268 
Notes: Significance levels:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Standard Error (). Variable definitions: Firm size is based on market capitalisation, board composition 
measures the total number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors, and board size is the total number of non-executive & executive directors on 
the board. Return on shareholder’s equity is calculated as net income divided by shareholder's equity. Tobin's Q is measured as the total market value of the firm divided by 
total assets. Return on assets takes net income and divide by total assets. Beta measures systematic risk and is arrived at using regression modelling based on past 
performance. Company age is calculated from date of incorporation. GoodGov is a factor of 6 World Bank indicators including Voice & accountability, Political stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of Law and Corruption control.  Mean L-R is a scale measuring degree of left or right wing political view. Women in 
Parliament measures % is the share of parliamentary seats held by women.  Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and Individuality are dimensions of 
Hofstede's framework. Women in tertiary education % is the share of women enrolled in higher education. Religiosity measures percentage worshippers for a given 
country 
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7.4.  Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter tested the relevance of Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars in accounting for the 
observed differences in the prevalence of women on the board with reference to national, 
industry and firm level institutional characteristics. Across the levels, the regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars were found to account for 27.32% (Adjusted R² 
25.98) of the observed variance. At the country level, persistent support for elements of the 
regulative pillar was found; in particular the regression analysis highlighted the importance 
of good national governance practices, and a liberal political climate. Similarly, there was 
support for the normative pillar, which was operationalised through national educational 
attainment by women and religion. Religion was considered in aggregate in this study, as 
the countries included in this chapter showed a lesser variety of religious beliefs, than did 
the sample in chapter 6, the focus was therefore on degree on religiosity, rather than the 
particulars of faith.  Countries with a more highly educated female population had more 
women on the board, whilst countries that were considered more religious consistently had 
fewer female corporate board directors. There was further support for the cultural-
cognitive pillar, with Hofstede’s power distance and uncertainty avoidance constructs 
being significant influences on women’s rate of board participation. At the industry level, 
there was partial support for the normative pillar, but no support for the regulative or 
cultural-cognitive pillar. Industries where women constituted a larger share of the total 
workforce had more female board directors. Lastly, the hypothesised combined 
normative/cultural-cognitive relationship suggesting boards comprising older board 
directors were less likely to have female members was confirmed.  
 
To further complement the findings of this study, some auxiliary analysis was carried out 
on multinational firms. Current scholarly debates (Kostova et al., 2008, 2009 and Philips 
and Tracey, 2009) suggest multinational corporations may not be subject to national 
institutional pressures; instead they adhere to supranational standards rather than those 
standards of any particular country. To test whether this was indeed true for the gender 
composition of corporate boards, regression analysis was conducted on two sets of sample 
firms. One set was multinational in character and the other set was non-multinational in 
character. Results showed that the multinational corporations were more, not less, 
influenced by their national institutional environment, whilst the non multinational firms 
were less influenced by country institutional characteristics.  
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In extending the application of institutional theory beyond the national level as was 
reported in chapter 6 also to incorporate the industry and firm level, the boundaries of 
institutional research have been pushed yet further, as Scott’s pillars have now also been 
tested in a multi-level setting. This study extended the research of chapter 6 and applied the 
concept of Scott’s (1995) pillars across analytical levels and assessed the influence of 
national, industry and firm institutional characteristics.  
 
Continuing the scholarly thread from chapter 6, this study revealed some interesting and 
unexpected findings. Although the study in the previous chapter relied on a larger number, 
and more diverse range, of countries for its sample, it is interesting to note that the role 
played by political liberalism, lower power distance and less uncertainty avoidance found 
in chapter 6 is mirrored in the findings presented here.  
 
Despite the points of similarity found across the two studies, some notable discrepancies 
were evident. Some of the results found in this analysis were surprising. In particular, the 
negative relationship between female political participation and the prevalence of women 
on the corporate board ran contrary to the hypothesised direction, and contrary to the 
findings in chapter 6, where the relationship between women corporate board directors and 
women in parliament was positive, though statistically insignificant. Terjesen and Singh 
(2008) investigated the antecedence of female political power as a potential explanatory 
variable in understanding why some countries showed a larger share of female corporate 
board directors. Their findings also ran contrary to the expected relationship, prompting the 
authors to suggest that countries that had a large share of female parliamentarians had 
become complacent about promoting gender equality in the private sphere as women were 
well represented in the national political arena. Alternatively, as women have enjoyed a 
larger share of parliamentarian seats for longer than they have in the corporate board room, 
ambitious career women may prefer a political career over a business career. Research 
suggests the continued masculine culture that pervades most boards is a ‘turn off’ for 
women (Marshall, 1995; Selby, 2000), who may instead choose to enter politics where the 
gender imbalance is less stark, enabling women in politics to build more powerful 
networks that enable them to climb the political ladder, rather than the commercial ladder. 
The negative relationships may thus be a result of women deciding to apply their talent to 
politics rather than business. An alternative explanation may be that some of the findings 
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are sensitive to sampling decisions and future research should focus on testing the 
relationship for a broader sample of countries and companies.  
 
Considering the importance of good governance for increasing the share of board 
directorships held by women, the results presented here differ markedly with those in 
chapter 6. In the previous chapter, a persistent, statistically significant negative relationship 
between the prevalence of women on the board and good governance was evident. This 
relationship was reversed in this chapter, where there was a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the proportion of board directorships held by women, and the quality 
of national governance provision. The inclusion of a large number of more recently 
democratised countries in the sample used in chapter 6, led to the suggestion that the 
negative relationship was an artefact of the particular relationship between family 
ownership and board demography that exists in some of these countries, which has been 
found to engender nepotism in board ranks (Milgate, 2001; Branson, Branson, 2007; 
Johannison and Huse, 2000). The sample countries included in this chapter, though fewer 
in absolute numbers, broadly represent well established democracies and major trading 
economies, with similarly well established regulative governance framework, which 
suggests that as with the discrepancy in findings relating to women and political influence, 
these results are somewhat dependent on the particulars of the final sample, suggesting as 
previously discussed, the importance of broadening the sample in subsequent research. 
Overall, however, both chapters attest to the importance of national institutions more 
broadly. 
 
The other unexpected finding revealed by this study was the degree to which national 
institutions influenced the gender composition of corporate boards on multinational 
companies. Contrary to the expected relationship, the normative and the cultural cognitive 
pillar proved particularly salient influences on the prevalence of women on the board of 
multinational corporations relative to those firms that were less multinational in nature. 
These statistically significant findings attest to the importance of the institutional character 
of the home nation, and suggest that rather than be ‘boundary-less’ organisations as some 
scholars suggest (Kostova et al., 2008) multinational corporations may in fact play a 
significant role as national ‘ambassadors’. Multinational corporations whilst international 
in character retain strong links with their home country (Hu, 1992). It is therefore possible 
that MNCs become international symbols of a country’s commercial success, and 
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consequently feel it appropriate to reflect the home country’s institutional character in their 
corporate structure. Jaworski and Fosher (2003) suggested that multinational firms can 
gain competitive advantage through a “nation brand effect” (ibid. p 99) whereby the 
national institutional character is reflected in the product sold, such as the quality 
associated with Swiss watches or the workmanship of German cars. Taking this argument 
one step further it is not unfeasible that the same logic applies to corporate structures, and 
that the national institutional environment is not only reflected in the multinational’s 
product offering, but also in its corporate board.  
 
Contributions to managerial practice 
These results augment the findings of chapter 6 and extant literature on women on the 
board as reviewed in chapter 2, and provide a more finely grained view of what the 
institutional antecedence is for whether women acquired board directorships in a given 
firm, industry or country. From this emerge some important managerial implications for 
firms wishing to increase their share of female corporate board directors. Focusing at the 
firm level, which is the analytical level over which management has the most direct 
influence, a starting point would be to review actively the age of the corporate board. The 
findings revealed here suggest younger boards have more women, therefore firms wishing 
to build more gender diverse boards may also want to consider the average age of their 
directors in parallel with their gender composition. Over time, the result of this analysis 
suggests younger boards will also bring forth more gender diverse boards.  
 
The finding that market volatility was associated with fewer female board directors 
conforms to the broader literature. Van der Walt et al. (2006) found that firms which 
operated in uncertain and complex market conditions and had heterogeneous boards 
showed signs of lower firm performance. Van der Walt et al. (2006)’s results lend support 
to the argument that increased cognitive conflict which arises from increased diversity can 
have a negative impact on board proceedings and consequently firm performance (Mace, 
1971; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Cognitive conflict arises from the pluralities of 
judgements and perspective people of different gender, ethnicity and background bring to a 
group and may impede decision-making. On the other hand, increased cognitive conflict 
has also been shown to combat groupthink and result in a more robust evaluation of 
strategic options (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Milliken and Vollrath, 1991). The management 
teams of firms that operate in turbulent or volatile markets but are committed to making 
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their corporate boards more gender diverse must evaluate the added benefits of enhanced 
diversity versus the need to successfully negotiate complex market and trading condition.  
 
At the industry level, the finding that firms in industries that employ more women have 
more female board directors suggests that the issue around board gender diversity at the 
industry level needs a more systematic approach. Rather than view the board’s 
composition in isolation, industry interest organisations may want to consider the wider 
implications of sector-wide hiring practices, and specifically target the recruitment of more 
female employees, which over time would help build a sustained pipeline of female 
managerial talent that can take on corporate board directorships.  
 
The importance of the national institutional environment has been reinforced in this 
chapter. As discussed in the previous chapter, and emphasised by the results of this 
analysis, firms operating in national institutional contexts less conducive to female 
corporate board directors have a particular responsibility to be vigilant of board hiring 
practices to ensure a fair and representative sample of qualified candidates of both genders 
are considered for board candidature.  
 
Lastly, the surprising finding that the national institutional environment is a statistically 
significant influence on the gender composition of the boards of MNCs, reinforces the 
importance of institutional awareness. As MNCs are not exempt from national institutional 
cultural and normative influences, MNC management teams must equally be aware of the 
influence their home country’s institutional constellation has on the gender composition of 
their corporate boards.  
 
Theoretical contributions 
This chapter has extended the contribution made to academic conceptual literature in the 
previous chapter, and continued to press the boundaries of institutional theory and the areas 
of enquiry to which Scott’s (1995) pillars can be usefully applied. Scott’s (1995) 
framework has made a successful contribution to extant understanding of what institutional 
factors account for women’s prevalence on the board, across a national, industry and firm 
level context.  In particular, this chapter has shown that the institutional pillars are 
applicable across multiple levels of analysis as well as across countries.  At this juncture, 
after testing the efficacy of Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars in two distinct empirical 
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studies, a suggested avenue for conceptual development is offered. In light of the finding 
that Scott’s (1995) theoretical framework, drawn from a wide range of disciplines 
grounded in institutional theory, helps explain the prevalence of women on the board, it is 
evident that alternative frameworks to the established board level theories that have framed 
studies on women corporate board directors to date have a useful role to play in extending 
conceptualisations of women corporate board directors. In particular, in light of Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) call for multi-theoretical approaches to research on corporate boards, 
institutional theory may usefully be considered in conjunction with established 
frameworks. Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars are concerned with context, whether 
regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive in nature. Resource dependence theory by 
comparison, is concerned with linking the firm to its broader environment through the 
composition, character and demographic nature of the firm’s board of directors (Pfeffer, 
1972). Considering both theories’ emphasis on context and its implications for the firm and 
the corporate board, there may be merit in exploring a multi-theoretical framework that 
encompasses Scott’s (1995) three pillars and align these with the inherent skills, 
capabilities and experiences of the collective board, to consider whether rather than co-opt 
particular environmental resources for the sake of risk reduction, as the resource based 
theory suggests (Pfeffer, 1972), the board in fact also co-opts its broader institutional 
environment. As Hillman et al. (2007) pointed out, why women prevail on corporate 
boards may be explained by reference to their particular resources and skills as suggested 
by resource dependence theory, or on the basis of legitimacy as reflected in institutional 
theory, as having female corporate board directors is normatively considered important. 
Whether the firm’s board demography represents an active risk reduction strategy or an 
effort at increasing legitimacy may be difficult to ascertain, however, the finding that 
national institutional context influence the gender composition of corporate boards of 
MNCs opens up a particularly interesting theoretical avenue. Given the multiplicity of 
national contexts MNCs typically operate in, co-opting their country-of-origin’s 
institutional environment as reflected in their board demography is unlikely to be 
motivated by risk reduction, as the ensuing board demography may be less socially 
acceptable in other national contexts where the firm operates. Similarly, it is equally 
unlikely to be motivated by a desire to increase legitimacy, for the very same reason. 
MNCs’ legitimacy as reflected in the gender composition of their boards is similarly 
subject to different national perceptions of what constitutes legitimacy. Instead, this may 
suggest that institutional context is co-opted not because of considerations of legitimacy or 
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risk-reduction but in response to mimetic or normative isomorphism, where institutions are 
reflected on the basis of what is morally right and culturally supported (Scott, 1995) rather 
than with the explicit intention to reduce risk or gain legitimacy. The combination of 
Scott’s (1995) three institutional pillars and resource dependence theory may offer 
interesting future conceptualisations of the prevalence of women on the corporate board of 
directors.  
 
Limitations 
This study suffers from some limitations which will be dealt with next. Undertaking such a 
large and ambitious study as that contained herein does pose some sampling issues. The 
data used for this study was substantially obtained from BoardEx and from Datastream. 
Whilst both of these data providers are the premier sources of board related and firm 
financial data respectively (Fernandes et al., 2008), there were some data shortcomings, 
which resulted in an uneven sample being available for models 1-7 in table 7-2. However, 
subsequent robustness testing suggested this had not impacted on the validity of the 
reported results. The final set of countries included in the overall model (Model 6 table 
7.2) comprised of representative countries from Europe, North America and Australia. 
Whilst institutionally distinct, these countries are likely to show less institutional 
dissimilarities than if the data had covered Latin America, Asia and Africa. Whilst the 
author collected country-level data for a number of these countries, time, financial and 
language constraints meant it was not possible to collect the necessary firm level data for 
these countries.  
 
Concerning the findings related to culture, higher than generally accepted levels of 
multicollinearity were evident for the Power Distance variable and the Uncertainty 
Avoidance variable. Issues related to multicollinearity in Hofstede’s framework is much 
debated in literature (Hofstede, 1980; Franke et al., 1991; Smith, 2006), and research 
adopting Hofstede’s cultural framework as independent variables have reported issues with 
variance inflation factors in excess of the generally accepted limit of 10 (Yeh and 
Lawrence, 1995; Erramilli, 1996; Magnini, 2009; Waarts and Van Everdingen, 2005) 
between the elements of Hofstede’s framework. In particular, Erramilli (1996) reported 
similarly high correlations between uncertainty avoidance and power distance, as did 
Magnini, (2009), suggesting that the multicollinearity observed in the results in this 
analysis was not unique from a research perspective.  Lewis-Beck (1980) suggests three 
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ways in which researchers can address issues of multicollinearity: increase the sample size, 
investigate whether, if conceptually defensible, variables can be usefully combined through 
factor analysis; or exclude the variable(s) that cause multicollinearity problems. None of 
these possibilities provided real options in terms of this study. The sample had already 
been maximised, and excluding either of the cultural variables would result in an 
incomplete measure of culture. In light of the institutional theory adopted, there was also 
no obvious conceptual justification for conducting a factor analysis to reduce the two 
variables to one. In evaluating the relevance of national cultural institutions in accounting 
for the share of board directorships held by women in chapter 6, similar problems of 
multicollinearity were not found, suggesting there maybe problems related to specific 
sample included in this study, and future research should attempt to broaden the breadth 
and depth of the sample used or investigate alternative methods for operationalising 
culture.  
 
A further data limitation stems from the character of the firms included in this study. 
BoardEx and Datastream provide firm level information for publicly listed companies 
only. As these countries by the nature of being listed represent, in general, the most 
resourceful and largest companies in a given country, they are likely to be more similar in 
nature than their smaller non-listed counterparts. This means that the variation in 
prevalence of women on the board is probably suppressed by the sample firms included 
herein, suggesting that the variation in the prevalence of women on the board is larger and 
possibly subjected to a wider range of institutional influences than those captured here.  
 
The sample used for this analysis is cross-sectional in nature, as the study was 
predominantly concerned with explaining the hierarchical relationships between firm, 
industry and country, and because one distinct feature of institutions is that they are 
generally held to be subject to little change over time, at least at the national level (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). However, the institutional character of the firm and industry 
environment is liable to be more flexible over time, so a larger longitudinal dataset may 
offer an interesting extension of this study.    
 
Future directions 
These limitations offer the potential for fruitful future research avenues. Future research 
into the prevalence of women on the board would benefit from a wider dataset that 
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included countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As discussed in chapter 2, the vast 
majority of scholarly focus to date has been on the developed trading economies, in 
particular the UK, the US and Canada, with limited enquiry into smaller nations. 
Understanding the role played by Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars in accounting for the 
prevalence of women on the board in these other countries would help complete the 
geographical picture of women’s ascent to positions of corporate power. Further increasing 
the data may also help solve the observed multicollinearity issue, and help shed further 
light on the role of culture in accounting for the prevalence of women on the board.   
 
The emphasis on large listed firms in scholarly literature that addresses the role and place 
of women on the board might be contributing to suppressing the real extent of cross-
national differences in the prevalence of women on the board. The literature would benefit 
from an understanding of how the institutional context differs, if at all, for small firms. As 
the vast majority of the world’s firms are not listed, understanding the dynamics 
surrounding the boards’ composition of these firms may arguably bring more benefits to 
women who wish to acquire board directorships, as the size of the corporate universe of 
unlisted firms offers many more board seats for which women can vie. 
 
Zahra and Pearce, (1989) posited that to understand corporate boards, their dynamics, 
structure, impact and processes, a multi-theoretical perspective is necessary. Although this 
study and the study presented in chapter 6 have empirically established support for Scott’s 
(1995) institutional pillars, unexplained variance in the prevalence of women remains. 
Combining institutional theory with insights from other board theories or theories 
borrowed from sociology and social psychology may help complete the conceptual picture. 
 
Lastly, although the analysis presented here included firm level institutional characteristics 
for explaining the prevalence of women on the board, the nomination committee, which is 
the corporate governance mechanism specifically designed to facilitate a fairer and more 
transparent board recruitment process, has not been subjected to extensive study. The role 
played by the nomination committee in accelerating women’s progress onto the board is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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7.5. Chapter summary 
In reviewing the stated objectives of this chapter, the research presented here has met those 
objectives, not withstanding the limitations discussed above. This chapter reviewed the 
emerging multi-level literature on gender and management research and briefly revisited 
scholarship attesting to the importance of national institutions, but more broadly discussed 
the strands of work at the industry and firm level that have explored links between sector 
and company characteristics and the corporate board. From this a set of hypotheses 
informed by institutional theory were developed and subsequently tested and the findings 
were discussed with reference to broader managerial issues. Coupled with chapter 6, this 
chapter has provided a valuable insight into the multifaceted institutional context faced by 
women wishing to acquire board directorships. The next chapter analyses a related but 
contrasting element of the board’s context, and analyses the role played by the board’s 
structural and compositional characteristics as reflected in the nomination committee in 
accounting for board demography.  
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8. Nomination committees and board diversity: A matched pairs analysis 
This chapter completes the nested research agenda pursued in this thesis. Chapter 6 and 7 
evaluated the role played by the national, industry and firm level institutional environments 
in accounting for the share of women on corporate boards. Both chapters concluded that 
elements of the national institutional environment were influential determinants of the 
gender characteristics of the board and chapter 7 revealed that firm and some industry 
characteristics similarly influenced the prevalence of women corporate board directors. 
This chapter addresses a related but rather different aspect of the institutional landscape 
that women with directorial ambitions face, and evaluates the proposition put forth in 
chapter 3, that the nomination committee facilitates the rise of women board directors. 
Continuing the themes of institutional theory as reflected in Scott’s (1995) framework, the 
analysis presented here evaluates the particular role played by the nomination committee in 
widening the director talent pool to include women through the lens of homosocial 
reproduction as articulated by Kanter (1977). This conceptualisation addresses the cultural-
cognitive and normative element of Scott’s (1995) pillars.  To that end, this chapter has 
three objectives. First, to evaluate the antecedence and literature on nomination committees 
and to develop a set of testable hypotheses informed by this particular view of institutional 
theory; secondly to test these hypotheses using a matched pairs analysis approach; and 
thirdly to draw conclusions from the results and evaluate them with reference to theoretical 
and managerial practice. In fulfilling these objectives this chapter makes three 
contributions to extant literature. The analysis contributes to the development of research 
on impacts of committee structure and internal governance processes in general and the 
nomination committee in particular. The nomination committee has not been subjected to 
much systematic research, with the exception of one notable study by Ruigrok et al. 
(2006). Secondly, this analysis further add to scholarly understanding of extant influences 
on the prevalence of women on the board by evaluating the specific governance 
mechanism designed to alter the process and composition of corporate boards, and 
evaluates the degree to which it has succeeded. Thirdly, this chapter draws upon and 
further contributes to the conceptualisation of processes of admissions to boards by 
evaluating the normative/cultural-cognitive pillar of Scott’s framework as reflected in 
homosocial reproduction. Anchored in sociology, homosocial reproduction is a particular 
theoretical lens popularised by Kanter (1997) which suggests demographically similar 
individuals in a working group perpetuate the homogeneous nature of the group by 
recruiting individuals similar to themselves. In adopting this theoretical perspective this 
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chapter extends existing literature of board behaviour which has found homosocial 
reproduction to be pervasive amongst the board at large (Ramirez, 2003). This chapter is 
largely structured according to the outlined objectives; the next section reviews the 
antecedence and literature on nomination committees, next the hypotheses are developed, 
before a method section describes the analytical approach taken herein. A results section 
follows and a final section concludes. 
 
8.1  Literature review and hypotheses development 
As noted in chapter 1, corporate scandals and an increased awareness of the importance of 
effective corporate governance practices have resulted in a pervasive concern with more 
streamlined and frequently more explicit governance regulations and rules (Yoshikawa et 
al., 2007; Aguilera, 2005; Denis and McConnell, 2003). This is reflected in the sequence of 
initiatives pursued in the UK which have sought to examine, and make recommendations 
in respect of, a number of areas of corporate governance leading to the production of the 
Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report (1995), the Higgs Report (2003) and the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003). In the United States, similar trends 
culminated in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  
 
One important manifestation of this focus on corporate governance is the rise in the 
number and types of sub-committees of boards of directors tasked with overseeing 
particular areas of responsibility (Kesner, 1988). Kesner (1988) highlights that until the 
early 1980s firms typically maintained only one or two standing committees, and that since 
the 1980s both the average number and variety of committees has risen, with most 
companies now relying on between three and five. The latest Spencer Stuart Board Index 
suggests that S&P 500 companies now have between four and five standing committees on 
average (Spencer Stuart, 2008). In light of this trend, some research has examined the 
impacts of innovations in board committee structures on firm-level outcomes, with very 
mixed results. For example, while Conyon and Peck (1998) found that the presence of 
remuneration committees affects the level and structure of top management pay, Daily et 
al. (1998) found no evidence that compensation committees affected CEO pay. In the 
context of audit committees, while some evidence exists to show that firms with more 
independent audit committees are less likely to restate their earnings (Abbott et al., 2004) 
and suffer from weaknesses in internal financial control (Zhang et al., 2007), other 
research, particularly in the post-Enron era, has been highly critical of their impacts on 
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audit quality (Lee, 2001). In contrast to other standing committees, relatively little research 
has examined the impacts of nomination committees; it has only been possible to identify 
two studies that explicitly and exclusively assess the  impact of a nomination committee on 
the board’s composition. Ruigrok et al. (2006) evaluated the role and antecedence of the 
nomination committee in a Swiss context, and found that whilst nomination committees 
were related to the appointment of more non-executive directors and foreign nationals, 
there was no discernible difference in the share of women directors appointed as a result of 
instituting a nomination committee. Vafeas (1999) by contrast found no relationship 
between the adoption of a nomination committee and the number of non-executive 
directors appointed to the board, suggesting the share of non-executive directors was 
“exogenously determined” (Vafeas, 1999, p 220). However, he did find that the 
nomination committee did influence the degree of board independence, i.e. directors who 
were appointed where a nomination committee was involved tended to be more 
independent from incumbent managers than where the appointments were made outside 
the committee. Despite the positive impact the nomination committee was found to have 
on board independence, Vafeas (1999) did not recommend uniform adoption, but 
suggested the suitability of this governance mechanism depended on individual firms’ 
circumstances.  
 
The argument in academic literature for relying on a nomination committee rests on the 
premise that it will bring transparency, independence and due process to director selection, 
and improve the gender diversity of the board (McKnight et al., 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2006; 
Vafeas, 1999). As established in chapter 5, the corporate board largely remains the domain 
of white, middle-aged men, despite the increased supply of qualified senior women 
executives eligible for board directorships. The nomination committee consists of a sub-set 
of the main board’s directors, and is designed to ensure competent and experienced 
candidates suitable for nomination are recommended to the main board in a judicious and 
fair manner (Petra, 2005; Harrison, 1987). A nomination committee has the potential to 
remove the influence of executive directors from the board selection process, theoretically 
ensuring appointment of directors with fewer or no ties to the company or the incumbent 
CEO, preventing nepotism and enhancing the overall independence of the board (Knight et 
al., 2009). The formalised and structured nature of the nomination process when utilising a 
committee is also deemed to enhance the gender diversity of the board by encouraging a 
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wider perusal of the market for directorial talent extending beyond the board’s immediate 
circle of largely male contacts to include qualified women in the search for board talent.  
 
Central to the arguments developed here regarding the likely impacts of nomination 
committees on subsequent patterns of board demography is the observation that current 
board members are often heavily involved in, and have a significant capacity to influence, 
the processes of selection and recruitment of new directors (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Mizruchi, 1996). In particular, studies have shown that 
the CEO frequently has the final say in board appointments, even where boards use 
nomination committees (Lorsch and McIver, 1989; Tosi et al., 2003; Seidel and Westphal, 
2004). Studies have also shown that incumbent board directors appoint new directors 
demographically similar to themselves when the board at large was appointed before the 
CEO, and conversely where the CEO was appointed before the majority of the board’s 
directors, new appointees frequently mirror the CEO (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
 
Given that incumbent boards have the capacity to influence board appointments, the 
question arises as to how they tend to use this ability in practice. It has long been noted that 
groups, including boards of directors, have a strong tendency for self-replication in 
demographic and other respects. Kanter (1977) observed that “men who manage reproduce 
themselves in kind” (Kanter, 1977, p 48) and coined the term homosocial reproduction to 
describe processes whereby actors favour other actors with whom they share particular 
traits and characteristics such as gender, organisational background and professional ties. 
Homosocial reproduction has been identified as an important phenomenon in research on a 
diverse range of topics including academic competition (D’Aveni, 1996; Dressel et al., 
1994), executive turnover and diversity (Boone et al., 2004), race, gender and authority in 
the work place (Smith, 2002; Baldi and McBrier, 1997), and in particular women in 
management and leadership (Kanter, 1977; Corsun and Coston, 2001; Newman, 1994; 
Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Arfken, Bellar and Helms, 2004) and corporate board 
appointments (Dugger, 1981). It is also more pervasive when there is greater perceived 
role incongruence. Role incongruence occurs when a specific role resonates strongly with a 
particular type of person. When an individual who does not fit the stereotype is considered 
for such a role they are often deemed less suitable (Taylor-Carter et al., 1995). As board 
roles are generally perceived to be male in nature, role incongruence may cause women to 
be considered less able for the role.  
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Continuing the conceptual thread that runs through this thesis, Scott’s (1995) normative 
and cultural-cognitive pillars encompass some of the underlying sociological mechanisms 
associated with homosocial reproduction. The normative pillar stresses the importance of 
roles, values and norms that infuse social groups and develop into accepted standards of 
behaviour. The cultural-cognitive pillar emphasises the inherent, taken for granted patterns 
of behaviour that are manifested in the dominant cultural paradigm of a group.  These 
behavioural constructs are diffused by the normative and cultural-cognitive institutional 
carriers discussed in chapter 3. These carriers take different forms, but of particular 
relevance to the institutional phenomenon discussed here is the routine as a carrier of the 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars, where role conformity, duty and scripted 
behaviour are central themes, which also form central tenets of homosocial reproduction. 
 
Homosocial reproduction acts as a sort of umbrella term that describes the apparent 
relationships between current and future group composition that arise out of a wide range 
of social-psychological processes such as self-categorization theory (Westphal and Zajac, 
1995; Westphal and Milton, 2000; Polzer et al., 2000), positive affect (Westphal, 1998; 
Barsade et al., 2000;), norms of reciprocity (Wade et al., 1990; Westphal and Stern, 2006), 
and social cohesion (Kanter, 1968, 1977; Forrester and Tashchian, 2006; Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992; Harrison et al., 1998).  
 
Self-categorization theory begins from the premise that individuals have a tendency to 
categorize themselves and others (into in-group and out-group components) in social 
situations if they perceive that there is a benefit from doing so (Westphal and Milton, 2000; 
Zajac and Westphal., 1996). Demographic attributes of individuals are commonly used as a 
means of categorization in organisational life. For example, Westphal and Zajac (1995) 
argue that the innate desire to work with similar people and the self-esteem derived from 
feeling part of a working group, is part of the explanation for the demographic uniformity 
observed on corporate boards. A consequence of self-categorization may be that anyone 
not classified within one’s group is classified as an out-group members (Westphal and 
Milton, 2000), an assignation that carries negative connotations associated with stereotypes 
and a disregard for out-group members’ point of view.  Westphal and Milton (2000) 
assessed the impact of minority status on corporate boards in the light of, amongst other 
concepts, self-categorization theory. They found that board directors who were a 
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demographic minority on one board were likely to self-categorize with other minority 
members on the focal board, using this as a basis for an in-group bias. Individuals who 
self-categorize have been found to engender positive working relations, which at board 
level result in serving male board directors recruiting individuals with whom they 
experience a link of professional and sociological kinship, whilst directorial candidates 
self-select boards where they experience affinity with serving directors. The consequence 
is a board comprising of men with similar backgrounds and competencies, who conform to 
the behavioural norms implied by the in-group status conferred by self-categorization.  
 
Related to self-categorization is positive affect. Positive affect generates positive feelings 
within work-groups (Haynes and Love, 2004) and is related to increased enjoyment of 
work and satisfaction with demographically similar peers (Chatman and O’Reilly 2004, 
Collins; 1981). As Pfeffer (1982) notes, “the importance of similarity may be in its link to 
inter-personal attractiveness and feelings of inclusion and acceptance and the resultant 
assurance of interlocked and maintained cycles of interaction” (Pfeffer, 1982, p 223). The 
impacts of positive affect have been shown to be multifaceted, from improved decision-
making and more efficient categorisation, to increased search for variety in choices and 
increased motivation, improved effort and persistence (Isen and Means, 1983; Isen and 
Daubman, 1984; Erez and Isen, 2002). In addition to the positive affect generated by 
working with people who share a common sense of group-bias and social bonds, 
appointing directors with whom there is already an established professional rapport offers 
the added benefit of working with an individual whose credentials, working practices and 
professional conduct are established. However, positive affect has also been shown to 
engender ineffective governance by for example, excessive levels of trust amongst board 
directors, failure adequately to question the CEO’s decisions, and social distancing and 
ostracism of directors who contravene the implicit boundaries of positive affect and defy 
the group’s premises for affect by for instance lending support to initiatives that diminish 
the power of the CEO (Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Westphal and Milton, 2000; Westphal 
and Stern, 2006; 2007).    
 
Positive affect in turn fosters social cohesion which has been associated with a number of 
group level outcomes pertinent to the effective discharge of corporate board duties such as 
improved performance and productivity (Adams, 1954; Robbins 1952). Social cohesion is 
the “tendency of a group to stick together and remain united in the pursuit of instrumental 
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objectives and the satisfaction of members’ affective needs” (Forrester and Tashchian, 
2006, p 458). Results of most empirical studies show a strong relationship between 
homogeneity and increased social cohesion (Kanter, 1968, 1977; Forrester and Tashchian, 
2006; Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Harrison et al., 1998; Emerson, 1954).  In terms of 
gender diversity of boards, Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) proposed social cohesion as an 
explanatory variable in accounting for the low number of female board directors in the UK. 
They posited that social cohesion conferred an expectation of reciprocity amongst directors 
in the social network, engendering further directorships and favours rendered and returned. 
They further suggested that women’s smaller network of relevant contacts made them less 
attractive for board duties as they had less to offer by way of reciprocating directorships. 
The sense of reciprocity and the experience of positive affect and social cohesion 
emanating from groups that strongly self-categorize create invisible but highly effective 
normative and cultural-cognitive barriers to potential female board candidates. 
 
The notion of reciprocity is a further fundamental and enduring characteristic of human 
relations and “…is the vital principle of society” (Thurnwald, 1932, p 106). Reciprocity 
can be thought of as the rendering of an unprompted service, kindness or favour to another 
party, leaving the recipient of the act indebted to the giver (Westermarck, 1908; Thurwald, 
1932, Gouldner, 1960, Akerlof, 1982, Westphal and Zajac, 1997; O’Reilly III and Mein, 
2007). Furthermore, such social norms confer a duty on the debtor to help and assist the 
creditor in the intervening period between receipt of the kindness and the reciprocation of 
the favour. As such, reciprocity confers duties and responsibilities on all parties to the 
norm and creates a predictable pattern of system stability, which “…depends in part on the 
mutually contingent exchange of gratifications, that is, on reciprocity as exchange” 
(Gouldner, 1960, p 168). In the context of corporate boards, norms of reciprocity have 
been found to be an important factor in the board dynamic which governs the board 
appointment process of minorities (Westphal and Stern, 2006), CEO compensation 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995; O’Reilly III and Main, 2007) and board independence 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1997, Westphal and Khanna, 2003).  
 
The preceding discussion suggests that, without a targeted intervention aimed specifically 
at the board’s recruitment process, a wide range of related social-psychological processes 
are likely to maintain the homogeneous, male board. It is into this process that nomination 
committees intervene. Nomination committees are tasked with identifying potential board 
  220 
talent which embodies the necessary skills, experiences and competencies recognised by 
the board as required for successful service as directors (Petra, 2005; Harrison, 1987). The 
requirement for independence of the nomination committee (Higgs, 2003) is rooted in the 
desire for board nominations to be made based on the merit, skills and experiences 
required by the board, rather than homosocial reproduction. Based on these discussions, it 
is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of nomination committees is associated with greater 
subsequent increases in the proportion of directors who are female.  
 
Research into corporate governance has suggested that not only do corporate committee 
structures matter for decision-making, so too can their composition importantly influence 
their function. Evidence suggests board committee structure is related to firm performance, 
Klein (2002) found evidence of a link between negative firm financial performance and 
less independent audit committees, whilst Davidson III et al. (1998) established that where 
insiders dominated the compensation committee, negative returns were more frequently 
observed, leading the authors to conclude that “the board’s committee composition can 
influence the board’s ability to maintain its responsibility” (Davidson III et al., 1998, p 18). 
In the context of nomination committees, one key decision relates to whether a woman or 
women are members of these bodies. The relative proportion of men to women in the 
context of board committee structures can play a decisive role in whether women are able 
to assert themselves and influence the committee proceedings. Kanter (1977) highlighted 
the impact different male-to-female ratios had on working relationships within a group. 
She identified the uniform group, which was entirely gender homogeneous, the skewed 
group where one gender greatly outnumbered the minority who often represented a token 
voice, the tilted group where women were still a definitive minority with insufficient clout 
to build alliances but a tilted group represented a step away from tokenism, and lastly the 
balanced group, where women and men had a more even share of the position. Kanter 
argued that the social relations and cultural character of the group changed as the gender 
distribution became balanced. Groups that are more balanced in their composition negate 
the formation of strong in-groups and out-groups, where reciprocity, positive affect and 
social cohesion are reinforced within the sub-groups and instead encourage a group-wide 
sense of loyalty and affect (Kanter, 1968, 1977; Kramer et al., 2008). 
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Whilst self-categorization and acts of reciprocity will always take place, the effects can be 
mitigated by increasing the level of minority members. Kanter (1977) argued against the 
notion of token women, where one woman was placed on the board as a show of goodwill 
towards women, allowing the company outwardly to comply with demands of gender 
diversity whilst in reality the woman had little or no impact as she was designated an 
outsider. However, research has shown that as the proportion of women increases so does 
their level of influence even if their numbers do not reach that of men. As numeric clout 
increases it becomes harder to maintain an insider/outsider bias, as men themselves 
become outsiders to the women, who themselves self-categorize with one another 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000; Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1985; South et al., 1982). Constructive 
efforts aimed at increasing the share of female board directors beyond a token presence, 
such as the use of nomination committees, should therefore be advantageous to women and 
help break down the cycle of “like attract like” instead engendering an equitable 
recruitment process and broader perusal of the market for corporate directors. In light of 
this discussion, it is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The subsequent increases in the proportion of women on corporate boards 
will be higher where firms have females represented on their nomination committees than 
where they do not.  
 
8.2  Method 
Sample 
This study relies on matched pairs analysis to examine the impact of using nomination 
committees on the gender composition of the board. To explore this proposed relationship, 
a sample of matched pairs of firms was developed, in which each pair would consist of two 
firms having similar characteristics but where one firm had a nomination committee and 
the other firm did not. Subsequently, a second set of matched pairs was created for firms 
that had nomination committees, where firms with women on their nomination committees 
were paired with those without women. The starting point for this analysis is a database of 
companies comprising Standard and Poor’s index of the 500 biggest companies in the U.S. 
for the years 2002-2005. The S&P500 has been used often in earlier research, both because 
it “increases the likelihood that public data are accessible” (Hillman et al., 2007, p 74), and 
because it comprises firms from across the sectoral distribution and is a commonly used 
proxy for the listed firms sector in the United States. Data concerning their boards of 
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directors, and the presence and composition of standing committees, were obtained from 
BoardEx, as used in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
In order to control for the wide variety of factors that may be associated with evolving 
patterns of women on corporate boards, a matched pairs method was used for the analysis. 
Matched pairs analyses originated in medical and biological research but are now 
commonly used in management, finance and economics research (Claessens and Tzioumis, 
2006; Premuroso and Bhattacharya, 2007; D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993). Most medical 
research designs involve a distinction between a treatment group (i.e. those subjects 
receiving a particular therapy, intervention or drug) and a control group of subjects who do 
not receive the same treatment. The relative merit of the medical experiment is then judged 
by evaluating differences in outcomes between these two samples; this difference is 
generally referred to as the “treatment” effect (Rubin, 1973).  
 
A central requirement in matching studies is that in order to observe properly the treatment 
effect, the companies that comprise the treatment and control samples should have similar 
characteristics. The emphasis is therefore on constructing a control sample of companies 
with as similar characteristics as possible to those with nomination committees but which 
do not, in fact, have nomination committees. In the literature there are a number of 
generally accepted methods used to achieve this objective. In order to ensure the 
robustness of findings to subtle variations in approach, two of the most commonly used 
were employed in this study. Drawing on evidence regarding the importance of firm size 
and industry sector for board demography, the first method, termed “simple matching”, 
and which mirrors approaches adopted by Litvak (2007) and Farber (2005) among others, 
involves matching each firm with a nomination committee with a control firm within the 
same three-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) industry sector and with market 
capitalisation within 25 percent of the firm that has a nomination committee. If a match 
within the same three-digit SIC industry is unavailable, then a firm is matched with a firm 
from the same two-digit SIC code. In summary, for every firm with a nomination 
committee this approach provided a control company that satisfied three criteria: (1) 
operated in the same primary three-digit (or, at worst two-digit) SIC industry code, (2) had 
the closest market capitalization, with at worst 25% difference between the companies, and 
(3) did not have a nomination committee. Each firm’s SIC code and market capitalisation 
was obtained from DataStream.  
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The second method of identifying a control sample for the companies that have nomination 
committees follows what is known as a “nearest neighbour” approach. Adopting a nearest 
neighbour approach involves estimating a model that predicts the probability that a firm 
will have a nomination committee. The predicted probability (or “propensity score” 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985)) from this model can then be used to identify, for 
each firm with a nomination committee, the company with the closest probability of having 
a nomination committee but which did, in fact, not have one. Ruigrok et al. (2006) shows 
that firms with bigger boards and without CEOs who are also the board chairperson are 
more likely to have nomination committees. Similarly, the propensity for firms to establish 
nomination committees is likely to be sensitive to current board composition, a firm’s 
industry, financial performance and indebtedness. Finally, as the members of the 
nomination committee are selected from the main board, the gender composition of the 
main board greatly influences the gender distribution of the nomination committee 
(Conyon and Peck, 1998). Reflecting the characteristics thus described, the following logit 
model was specified.   
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
Firm Size = the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; 
Board Size = the total number of directorships comprising a firm’s board; 
Board Composition = the ratio of outside directors to board size; 
Profitability = the ratio of pre-tax profits before interests to total assets; 
Percentage Women = the percentage of a firm’s directors that are female; 
Leverage = the ratio of long term debt to total assets; 
 
In addition, a family of (N-1) industry and (M-1) year dummy variables were included. 
Data on firm size, profitability, and leverage were obtained from DataStream. Data 
concerning the composition of corporate boards were obtained using BoardEx. Both of 
these databases were described in chapter 4. Using these methods of matching, identified 
two sets of matched pairs, one obtained by following the simple matching procedure, and 
P(NominationCommittee)0/1 = α0+β1FirmSize+ β2BoardSize+ β3Board Composition+ 
β4Profitability+ β5Percentage Women+ β6Leverage 
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one obtained by following the nearest neighbour approach. The simple matching procedure 
resulted in 64 pairs in 2003, 68 pairs in 2004, 63 pairs in 2005 or 195 pairs in total, and the 
nearest neighbour approach returned 96 pairs in 2003, 93 pairs in 2004, and 96 pairs in 
2005 or 285 pairs in all. Table 8.1 provides some descriptive statistics for the treatment and 
control samples as obtained by each method. An important point is that there are no 
statistically significant differences in firm size (measured either by market capitalisation or 
number of employees) between firms with and without nomination committees according 
to either matching method. Some small differences exist in the size and composition of 
boards however, with firms having nomination committees having slightly smaller and less 
independent boards. Overall, though, the similarity between the treatment and control 
groups in respect of size, industry and other characteristics should provide clear results of 
the treatment effect.  
 
Table 8-1 Characteristics of the matched pairs 
 Simple Matching Nearest Neighbour Matching 
 Nomination 
Committee 
No 
Nomination 
Committee 
Nomination 
Committee 
No  
Nomination 
Committee 
Board Size  
(No. Directors) 
10.88 11.60 10.65 11.60 
Board Composition 
(% Independent 
Directors) 
84.99 86.79 81.95 85.89 
Market Capitalisation 
($M) 
 
23,575 22,273 24,315 24,814 
No. of Employees 
 
40,054 38,928 45,400 49,868 
 
Board diversity 
Having identified treatment and control samples of companies through matching processes, 
the analysis could be carried out. The focus was on one indicator of female presence on 
boards: the percentage of board seats occupied by female directors in a given 
company/year. In order to compute this figure for particular countries/years a similar 
method to that which was used in previous chapters was adopted. Data on the gender 
characteristics of the board directors was extracted from BoardEx, and supplemented with 
reviews of annual reports where data was missing. 
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8.3 Findings 
This section discusses the findings of the matched pairs analysis. Table 8-2 describes the 
average year-on-year change in the proportion of women on the boards of companies with 
and without nomination committees for the two methods of matching. For both methods of 
matching, firms with nomination committees had higher subsequent rises in the proportion 
of women on their boards than firms without, although this difference was only statistically 
significant for the nearest neighbour method (p=0.058). Over the period 2003-5 the 
cumulative difference between these groups was around 1% for the simple matching 
method and more than 2% for the nearest neighbour method. Although these changes may 
seem small, when compared to the mean proportion of board directors in the sample that 
was female in 2002 (the first year of our analysis), which was just over 12%, the effect of 
the nomination committee can be seen to be more substantial as it amounts to 8%-16% of 
the original proportion of women board directors.  
 
Table 8-2 The impact of nomination committees on board gender demography  
  Percentage point change in % women on company 
boards over subsequent year 
  2003 2004 2005 Average 2003-2005 
Nomination 
Committee 
0.98% 0.54% -0.56% 0.32% 
Simple matching 
No Nomination 
Committee 
0.48% 0.50% -0.89% 0.03% 
Nomination 
Committee 
0.93% 1.34% 0.32% 0.87% 
Nearest neighbour 
matching No Nomination 
Committee 
0.30% 0.51% -0.41% 0.13% 
 
Table 8-3 extends the analysis to consider whether the gender composition of nomination 
committees affects their impact on subsequent board diversity. Here, the methods 
described above are repeated to pair companies with nomination committees that have 
female directors as members with comparable companies with nomination committees 
without female members. As above, both methods of matching suggest that where women 
are members of nomination committees, their presence leads to a significantly greater 
increase in the proportion of women on boards in subsequent years. For the simple 
matching process, the presence of at least one woman on a nomination committee leads to 
a rise of around one percentage point in the proportion of women on firms’ boards in 
excess of that which is found for companies with all-male nomination committees 
(p=0.045). For the nearest neighbour approach the difference between the groups is more 
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than half a percentage point each year, or around 1.75 percentage points cumulatively over 
the period under study. 
 
Table 8-3 The impact on board demography of gender diverse nomination committee 
  
Percentage point change in % women on company 
boards over subsequent years 
  2003 2004 2005 Average 2003-2005 
At least one woman 
on Nomination Ctte 
1.77% 1.18% 0.30% 1.08% 
Simple matching 
No woman on 
Nomination Ctte 
0.46% -0.91% 0.69% 0.08% 
At least one woman 
on Nomination Ctte 
1.44% 1.91% 0.71% 1.36% 
Nearest neighbour 
matching No woman on 
Nomination Ctte 
1.56% 0.04% 0.68% 0.76% 
 
Table 8.4, provides a summary of the evidence presented above by identifying the changes 
in the proportions of women on corporate boards that the analysis suggests occur in the 
period 2003-5 depending on which of the three logical “types” of nomination committees a 
firm has (no nomination committee, an all-male nomination committee, a nomination 
committee with at least one female member). Again, a distinction is made between the two 
approaches to matching. These findings underline the fact that in the absence of a 
nomination committee there is almost no subsequent change in the pattern of board 
diversity, a finding strongly resonant with processes culminating in homosocial 
reproduction and the observation by Dugger (1981) that institutional roles are reproduced 
in subsequent executive generations. Where firms have nomination committees, there are 
substantially greater rises in the percentage of women on corporate boards, though these 
are significantly greater for the nearest neighbour matching method. Lastly, where there is 
female representation on nomination committees, this further contributes to rises in the 
proportion of female board directors. This last finding is strongest for the simple matching 
process.  
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Table 8-4 Summary of impacts of nomination committees on board demography 
 
  
Percentage point change in % women on company 
boards over subsequent years 
  2003 2004 2005 Average 2003-2005 
No Nomination 
Committee 
0.48% 0.50% -0.89% 0.03% 
All male nomination 
committee 
1.44% -0.36% 0.13% 0.40% 
Simple matching 
 
At least one woman 
on Nomination Ctte 
2.75% 1.72% -0.26% 1.41% 
No Nomination 
Committee 
0.30% 0.51% -0.41% 0.13% 
All male nomination 
committee 
2.49% 1.38% 1.00% 1.63% 
Nearest neighbour 
matching 
At least one woman 
on Nomination Ctte 
2.38% 3.26% 1.03% 2.22% 
 
Finally, turning to the hypotheses, in general these results indicate support both the 
proposed hypotheses. Firms with nomination committees do appear to have substantially 
and significantly greater subsequent rises in the proportion of women serving on their 
boards than firms without nomination committees. At the same time, the composition of 
those nomination committees, and the presence of women on them in particular, does seem 
to have an important additional effect. Where women sit on nomination committees the 
subsequent rises in the proportion of women on such boards is significantly higher than 
where they do not.  
 
8.4 Discussion and conclusion 
This study completed the nested research agenda outlined in chapter 1 by exploring the 
role played by nomination committees, and their composition, in the evolving pattern of 
board diversity by adopting a matched-pairs method that twins companies with nomination 
committees with those without them and then compares how the boards of each group 
evolve. Consonant with the proposed hypotheses, the findings show that firms with 
nomination committees have greater subsequent increases in the prevalence of women on 
their boards than those without them. This suggests the nomination committee is an 
effective corporate governance mechanism which successfully intervenes to stop 
interpersonal relationships from defining corporate board composition and mitigates some 
of the power other studies have found wielded by CEOs over the board appointment 
process (Lorsch and McIver, 1989; Tosi et al., 2003; Seidel and Westphal, 2004). This is a 
point of particular importance when considered in the context of this analysis, which 
showed that there is almost no change in the proportion of directors that are female in this 
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period among firms that do not have nomination committees. Set against a context where 
the prevalence of women on corporate boards in the US has risen very substantially in the 
last ten years or so, the absence of any change in this group is a strong indicator of 
Kanter’s (1977) observations regarding the tendency of elites to self-replicate. Without 
concerted and directed action specifically targeting board diversity, male dominated 
corporate boards look set to prevail. Although the finding that firms without nomination 
committees observed virtually no change in the proportion of board seats held by women, 
the finding is consonant with what one would expect to see in light of the literature on 
positive affect and social cohesion, and the finding that men prefer to work in groups that 
are male dominated (Chatman and O’Reilly, 2004) 
 
Contributions to managerial practice 
This study offers some notable implications for management practice. In particular, the 
findings presented here strongly suggest voluntary approaches to increasing board diversity 
do work. Although Norway’s decision to introduce affirmative action resulted in a steep 
rise in the share of female board directors, this study suggests ‘soft-law’ approaches are 
effective too, offering an alternative to the more heavy handed approach of legislation, 
which has also been associated with some negative outcomes for the women concerned 
(Taylor-Carter et al., 1995). Some research into affirmative action, whilst not specifically 
focused on the board of directors, seems applicable in a board context. The research results 
are mixed. At the company level, Taylor-Carter et al. (1995) identified a risk with 
exclusive focus on filling required quotas associated with affirmative action initiatives. 
Rather than systematically assessing the firm’s hiring, training and development practices, 
a focus on filling quotas might not result in lasting systematic changes to attitudes, 
corporate culture and perception of women in the workplace. On an individual level, 
women associated with affirmative action initiatives are often seen as incompetent 
regardless of actual qualifications or competencies exhibited (Heilman et al., 1997). Hence, 
affirmative action programmes, though very effective in shaping board demography, are 
unlikely to be without issues and problems. At the time of writing, nomination committees 
of one form or another are almost ubiquitous among large companies in the US. This 
suggests that voluntary mechanisms are likely already to be playing an important role in 
shaping America’s boardrooms. However, many European and Asian countries have been 
much slower to adopt this particular corporate governance mechanism. A third of Spanish 
firms do not have a nomination committee (Osma and Albornoz, 2005), only 3.2% of 
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Greek firms have adopted a nomination committee and across South East Asia there is 
substantial variation in the uptake of this particular committee.  In Hong Kong 30% of 
firms rely on the nomination committee, in Malaysia 63% of companies have a nomination 
committee whilst for Singapore the number is 97% whilst in Taiwan no company use the 
nomination committee (Nowland, 2008). This suggests the findings from this study can 
help inform corporate governance practice in other countries where the committee 
structure is less widespread.  
 
This research complements the substantial amount of research that has been done regarding 
the implications of firms developing more sophisticated governance structures. Where 
research on remuneration committees and audit committees has often found their effects to 
be ambiguous (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2001; Daily, 1996; 
Klein, 2002), this research suggests that nomination committees are playing a very 
important role in supporting more meritocratic and transparent processes of recruitment to 
corporate boards.  
 
Theoretical contributions 
Looking more broadly at the implications of this research for theorising about processes by 
which women come to be represented on corporate boards suggests that such processes are 
complicated. Particularly intriguing is the observation that where women are present on 
nomination committees firms have substantially greater rises in the subsequent prevalence 
of women on their boards. One possibility, and that which the conceptual development 
advanced, is that the presence of a female member on nomination committees reduces the 
tendency for the committee to identify potential female recruits as being out-group and 
hence breaks the tendency for homosocial reproduction. Equally, though, other 
mechanisms may play an important role. Appointments to boards rely on adequate supply 
of female managerial talent as well as demand, and roles in companies that already have 
female directors are likely to be more attractive to potential candidates. Similarly, existing 
female directors may be members of networks and communities that help companies to 
identify and attract further female directors. Although homosocial reproduction is 
generally discussed in contexts where men are the benefactors of this particular 
sociological process, there is in principle nothing to suggest that women do not similarly 
rely on interpersonal and social-psychological processes in the same way men do. The 
increased prevalence of female board directors where more women sit on the nomination 
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committee may be a result of women engaging in the same practices as men by 
homosocially reproducing.   
 
Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations. First, the study is confined to a particular study 
period and set within a single country. Given the findings in chapters 6 and 7 which clearly 
showed the importance of country context, it is possible that the functioning of nomination 
committees is to some extent contingent on aspects of the environment within which firms 
operate. Aligned to the limitation of a single-country focus is the fact that nomination 
committees are now commonly considered best practice in large public American 
companies and are almost ubiquitous. However, this was not the case for the time frame 
studied, when only ca 60% of the sample firms had adopted nomination committees, which 
suggests there was no deep issues associated with the sampling. In terms of sample size, 
when this study is considered in the context of previous matched pairs studies on corporate 
boards and corporate board committees, this study compares favourably. Evaluating a 
proposed link between corporate board committee structure and firm performance, 
Premuroso and Bhattacharya (2007) constructed 23 pairs of firms from the S&P 500. In 
other studies of board independence, Daily and Dalton (1997) identified 45 matched-pairs 
in their assessment of the impact of a dual CEO/Chairman role, similarly in research into 
bankruptcy Daily (1996) constructed 53 pairs whilst Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) 
twinned 53 companies in their assessment of firm failure. Secondly, the focus on the 
nomination committee has been at the expense of seeing the nomination committee as part 
of a portfolio of mechanisms of internal governance. Finally, the study suffers from the 
drawback that is common to all quantitative research of this kind – it was not possible to 
observe the processes in action, merely their outcomes.  
 
Future directions 
The limitations of this study may offer useful future research opportunities. In particular, 
future work might explore the interdependencies between the presence and functioning of 
nomination committees and other aspects of firms’ governance architectures, and 
complementary research of a more phenomenological nature that seeks to document 
processes associated with homosocial reproduction and the structures as they are 
understood by those that implement and use them would be invaluable. Widening the 
geographic perspective to take account of the use of nomination committees in other 
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national context should also be considered in light of the findings in this thesis that 
national institutional context play an important role in defining board level outcomes.  
 
8.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter addressed three objectives. Firstly, it evaluated the antecedence and literature 
on nomination committees before developing a set of testable hypotheses informed by 
homosocial reproduction. Secondly, these hypotheses were tested using matched pairs 
analysis, thirdly, the results were discussed and the implications of both a theoretical and a 
managerial nature were considered.  The findings of this analysis show that firms with 
nomination committees have significantly higher subsequent rises in the prevalence of 
women on their boards than firms that do not and that this effect is substantially more 
pronounced where nomination committees have female members. Although the 
hypotheses put forward in this chapter did not follow Scott’s (1995) ‘pillar’ structure 
adopted in chapters 6 and 7, the institutional theoretical lens adopted clearly reflect 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements. Normative systems of behaviour such as those 
that originate through the numerous social processes associated with homosocial 
reproduction “regulate the relations of individuals to each other” (Parsons, 1934/1990 p 
327). In particular, homosocial reproduction engenders institutional practices that 
perpetuates a normative and cultural-cognitive role systems and constitutive rules, which 
collectively sees men recruiting men in their own image at the expense of women, who 
continue to be prevented from adding their skills, talent and cognition to the board’s 
“talent pot” in the absence of structural intervent
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9. Conclusion 
This chapter pulls together the main findings and contributions of the thesis. The chapter 
seeks to link the research avenues identified in the literature review with the conceptual 
development in chapter 3 and the subsequent empirical research presented in chapters 5, 6, 
7 and 8, and, show how this thesis contributes to extant literature through the four research 
contributions set out in chapter 1. It will also seek to explore further where this area of 
research may go next. The two core objectives of the chapter are to evaluate the 
contributions and relevance of the thesis with reference to the gaps identified in previous 
literature and to discuss the limitations of this thesis and build on these to suggest new and 
valuable directions for further research.   
 
This chapter starts from the premise that the eight propositions developed in Chapter 3 
have been empirically tested, and the result of these tests, in parallel with the systematic 
international mapping of the prevalence of women on the board, form the core contribution 
to extant academic literature The chapter goes on to reflect on these findings and their 
implications for research. 
 
9.1. Advancing extant literature on women board directors 
This thesis has addressed the research propositions put forth in chapter 3 and responded to 
elements of the research agenda articulated in chapter 2. The literature review presented in 
chapter 2 and the conceptual framework proposed in chapter 3 together offered a 
systematic research map into the prevalence of women on the board. The starting premise 
was the observation that the body of descriptive literature, which accounted for a 
substantial tranche of the literature on women on the board, was geographically narrowly 
drawn, and largely concentrated in the US, Canada, the UK and Australia (Burke, 1997, 
1999, 2000; Singh et al., 2001; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; 
Sheridan, 2001; Sheridan and Milgate, 2003, 2005; Burgess and Tharenou, 2000; Conroy, 
2000; Conyon and Mallin, 1997) and only a small number of studies focused on smaller 
countries such as Spain (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008), Denmark (Smith et al., 
2006), New Zealand (McGregor, 2000) and Switzerland (Ruigrok et al., 2007). Secondly, 
empirical literature had largely attempted to account for women’s presence or absence 
from the board with reference to single-level studies focusing on firm or board level 
characteristics (Kesner, 1988; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Westphal and Stern, 2007; 
Erhardt et al.,2003; Carter et al., 2001), individual traits (Sheridan and Milgate, 2003, 
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2005; Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Hillman et al., 2002; Selby, 2000; Holton, 2005; Rose, 
2007) or industry factors (Harrigan, 1981; Elgart, 1983; Hillman et al., 2007; Thomas, 
2001; Brammer et al., 2007), leaving the national institutional context substantially 
unexplored. Thirdly, conceptually most research into women’s prevalence on the board 
was framed in board level theories such as agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Lynall et al., 2003, Daily et al., 2003), resource dependence theory (Ong and Lee, 2001; 
Roberts et al., 2005; Davis et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991) and stewardship theory (Pfeffer, 1972; Selznick, 1949; Muth and Donaldson, 
1998), which did not adequately take account of the wider firm context women had to 
negotiate to acquire board seats. Consequently, the research agenda and conceptual 
development identified the need to firstly, broaden the theoretical perspective on women 
board directors to account for the firm specific context, secondly,  analyse systematically 
the prevalence of women on the board in an international perspective, and thirdly account 
for the role played by the institutional environment at the national, industry and firm level 
to understand better why women acquire board seats in some institutional contexts, but not 
in others. Next, the research contributions made to each of these scholarly areas will be 
discussed and the theoretical and managerial implications of the research will be explored. 
  
9.2. Broadening the theoretical perspective on women board directors 
This thesis has extended the theoretical perspective adopted in research on women 
corporate board directors through the application of institutional theory, as reflected in the 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars. The adoption of Scott’s (1995) 
institutional pillars for the study of women on the board answered calls from the literature 
to further “contextualise” research into female corporate board directors (Terjesen and 
Singh, 2008; Lubatkin et al., 2007) and explain the prevalence of women’s board 
participation with reference to the wider institutional environment in which women seek 
board directorships and within which companies choose to appoint them. This application 
of institutional theory constituted one of the research contributions of the thesis. The need 
to move beyond the dominant board level theoretical frameworks normally adopted in 
studies of women on the board was made evident by the continued disregard in extant 
research of the role played by the institutional environment in accounting for why 
boardrooms remain predominantly male. Where the wider country context was taken into 
account it was done so without reference to theory (Terjesen and Singh, 2008). 
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The application of institutional theory as operationalised through the regulative, normative 
and cultural-cognitive pillars progressed research in two ways: Firstly, as far as it has been 
possible to ascertain it is the first study to address systematically the prevalence of women 
on the board using Scott’s (1995) pillars and secondly, the inherent multi-level character of 
the framework meant that the large and persistent variation in the prevalence of women on 
the board could be effectively explained by reference to a broader set of explanatory 
variables across multiple levels of analysis, which resulted in a more holistic view of how 
institutional context shapes gender demographic patterns at board level.  
 
Adding institutional theory to the conceptual arsenal at the researchers’ disposal offers the 
opportunity to build a more nuanced and complete explanation for the international 
disparity in women’s participation across the world’s board rooms. In doing so, research 
can progress our understanding of what enables or prevents women from acquiring board 
directorships, which in turn can help inform policy and managerial practice and ultimately 
contribute to increasing the proportion of board directorships held by women. Applying 
institutional theory also answers Aguilera’s (2005) call to address how the prevailing 
institutional climate influences corporate governance and pushes the boundaries of board 
research beyond the confines of the ‘usual suspect’ theories, such as agency, resource 
dependence and stewardship. It extends the theoretical focus of the issue of gender 
homogeneous boards away from being a board level phenomenon only, to one that is 
embedded in a wider context where a larger constituency of stakeholders can play a useful 
role in addressing the gender imbalance.  
 
9.3. International mapping of the prevalence of women on the board 
The second research contribution to emerge from this thesis is arguably the most 
systematic and comprehensive academic review of the pattern of female corporate board 
directorships to date.  From the thorough review into scholarly research on female 
corporate board directors conducted in chapter 2, it became evident that the majority of 
studies concerned with mapping the evolving pattern of female corporate board 
participation had confined their attention to a narrow range of countries, specifically the 
US, Canada, the UK and Australia (Burke, 1997, 1999, 2000; Singh et al., 2001; Singh and 
Vinnicombe, 2004; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Sheridan, 2001; Sheridan and Milgate, 2003, 
2005; Burgess and Tharenou, 2000; Conroy, 2000; Conyon and Mallin, 1997). Although a 
minority of studies had explored the pattern of female board directors beyond these 
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geographic limits (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Smith et al., 2006; McGregor, 
2000; Ruigrok et al., 2007), a substantial proportion of emerging and developed economies 
had however, not been included in any of the studies. In particular, the major Asian and 
Latin American economies had largely been ignored, as had the former Eastern Bloc. 
Failure to account for the evolving pattern of female board participation in these regions 
meant only a partial picture of the prevalence of women on the board was available. The 
extensive analysis of the international variation in the prevalence of women on the board 
presented in chapter 5 most likely represents the most comprehensive review of the pattern 
of female board participation to date and consequently is a substantial contribution to 
extant literature on female corporate board directors.  
 
A systematic overview of this variation is important for three reasons. Firstly, it highlights 
that the commonly held view in the literature that women tend to be located on the boards 
of larger companies with more independent boards may not be true in all circumstances 
(Burgess and Tharenou, 2000; Burke, 2000; Erhardt et al., 2003; Harrigan, 1981; Farrell 
and Hersch, 2005; Carter et al., 2003). Consequently, extant literature on women’s 
progress onto the board should be carefully considered in light of national variation and 
countries, and firms wishing to improve the gender balance of their corporate boards 
should be cautious of drawing general conclusions from the literature. 
 
Secondly, from a comparative corporate governance perspective, these results suggest that 
particular elements of board composition are less susceptible to converging practices than 
others.  As noted in chapter 5, the gap between the firms ranked in the top quartile for 
gender diverse boards versus those companies in the lower quartile widened over the 
observed period. Although data were only available for a period of five years, is suggestive 
of support to those corporate governance scholars who argue that path dependence and 
national institutional influences are more important in shaping local corporate governance 
practice than are international trends towards globalisation (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; 
Gilson, 2001).  
 
Thirdly, by systematically mapping the evolving pattern of female corporate board 
directors in a cross-national and cross-industry context, this thesis has provided a valuable 
starting point for researchers wishing to explore further the prevalence of women on the 
board.  
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9.4. Institutional context and the prevalence of women corporate board directors 
This thesis has empirically tested the explanatory power of Scott’s (1995) institutional 
framework in accounting for the prevalence of women on the board with reference to 
national, industry and firm level institutional context and in doing so offered a third unique 
contribution. This thesis has added to extant scholarly understanding of why women 
successfully acquire board directorships in certain contexts, but fail to do so in others. 
Systematically analysing the role of Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars across the country, 
industry and firm level offered new insights into what drives the prevalence of women on 
the board. Reflecting the nested nature of the thesis, the salient contributions as they 
pertain to the national, industry and firm level will be discussed in turn. 
 
National level influences on the prevalence of women on the board  
The research carried out for this thesis established that national level institutional context 
does influence the prevalence of women on the board. In particular, the results of the 
country-level analysis suggest that elements of national culture and the normative 
environment are significant indicators of women’s prevalence on the corporate board. 
Chapter 7 extended the analysis presented in chapter 6 and tested the relative importance of 
national institutions when considered in relation to industry and the firm characteristics, 
and results, albeit based on a different sample, showed that national level institutions were 
of continued importance when compared with firm and industry characteristics. A 
particularly interesting finding to emerge from chapter 7 was the degree to which country 
context explained the prevalence of women board directors on multinational companies. 
Multinational companies have by some been considered to constitute a seperate class of 
firms, not bound by home country culture, legislation and normative considerations 
(Kostova et al., 2008). However, this thesis found that the gender characteristics of 
multinational boards were firmly embedded in the home country context.  
 
The cross-national research carried out in chapter 6 and the multi-level study reported in 
chapter 7 comprehensively tested the country-level theoretical propositions articulated in 
chapter 3 (Propositions 1 –3) which focused on each of Scott’s (1995) three pillars and the 
research avenue suggested in 2.3 which called for research to be conducted on national 
institutional determinants on the prevalence of women on the board.  The finding that 
cross-country differences in the prevalence of women on corporate boards are substantial, 
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enduring, and to a great extent explicable by reference to the attributes of national 
institutions suggests that the failure to address macro-level influences and processes in 
board demography research is a serious omission, which opens up further research 
opportunities, and these will be discussed in section 9.3.  
 
Industry level influences on the prevalence of women on the board  
Testing Propositions 4, 5 and 6 in the study presented in chapter 7 revealed that the only 
factor in the industry institutional environment to be a significant predictor of the 
prevalence of women on the board was the share of jobs in a given sector occupied by 
women. The results therefore suggested partial support for Proposition 5 as articulated in 
chapter 3 which suggested that less unionised industries that had a larger share of female 
employees would have more women board directors. Results suggested industry 
unionisation was not an important consideration for the share of board directorships held 
by women; however the proportion of female employees in a given sector was significant.  
This finding is consonant with Hillman et al. (2007) who found that there were more 
women on the board of industries which had a larger share of female employees. No 
support was found for Proposition 4, which reflected the regulative pillar and proposed a 
relationship between state share ownership in a given industry and increased female board 
representation. Similarly, the results did not suggest that industry culture played a 
statistically significant part in explaining the gender composition of corporate boards, as 
suggested by Proposition 6.   
 
Firm level influences on the prevalence of women on the board  
This thesis found support for the contention that firm characteristics influence the 
prevalence of women on the board, and both Propositions 7 and 8 were supported. 
Proposition 7 suggested older boards had fewer women, and the effect of temporal 
considerations bore out. In chapter 7, Scott’s (1995) framework was subject to certain 
theoretical modifications at the firm level. The regulative pillar was deemed untenable in a 
firm level context given that any regulative initiative was likely to affect not a single firm 
but rather all firms in a given domain, be it industry regulations, listing requirements or 
national corporate governance codes. Regarding the normative and cultural-cognitive 
pillars, these were operationalised as one at the firm level, following Scott et al. (2000) and 
Scott (2004, 2005) and reflected in the average age of the board. The results of the analysis 
showed support for a negative relationship between age and women’s share of board 
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directorships. The higher the average age of the board, the lower was the share of female 
corporate board directors. Proposition 7 was therefore supported.   
 
Chapter 8 completed the last piece of the nested ‘puzzle’ pursued throughout this thesis 
and explored the role of the nomination committee in explaining the share of board seats 
held by women, and through this analysis added the fourth and final research contribution 
to this thesis. Framing the enquiry in homosocial reproduction, a theory reflecting some of 
the normative and cultural-cognitive elements of Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars, the 
study adopted a matched pairs analysis and revealed the efficacy of the nomination 
committees in breaking the cycle of male dominated boards. The study supported 
Proposition 8. The study further established that where women were represented on the 
nomination committee, the subsequent share of board seats held by women rose further. 
These findings underline the impact voluntary corporate governance initiatives can have 
when comprehensively adopted.     
 
Contributions to managerial practice 
Some salient implications for managerial practice have emerged from the various studies 
carried out here. The accelerated rise in the share of board directorships held by women 
over time may be the result of a ‘snowballing’ effect, where increased attention and focus 
paid to the issue of women on the board in international business press, academic 
literature, women networks and increased awareness and appreciation of the benefits 
brought by diversity have begun an organic evolution of more gender equitable boards. 
Sustained awareness and increased attention to these issues by industry bodies and 
corporate interest organisations may be an important vehicle for increased board diversity.  
Major global corporate investors are becoming more attuned to diversity and have 
implemented diversity screens as part of their investment criteria (Schepers and Sethi, 
2003), and such pressures may give countries that rely on investment from these businesses 
further impetus to assess and develop the composition of their corporate boards. If the 
current trend seen across the countries included in this study continues, the number of 
women on the board of directors will increase and women will grow as a force in corporate 
governance. As such, they will act as role models and mentors for younger women, 
contributing to a sustained pipeline of female executive talent. Focused efforts at attracting, 
retraining and retaining talent and ambitious women, may aid this process further.  
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Academic enquiry has established that women corporate board directors can make a 
positive contribution to firm performance. More gender heterogeneous boards have been 
associated with increased financial performance, product and marketing related benefits 
and improved talent management of female employees (Wolfman, 2007; Kanner, 2004; 
Daily and Dalton, 2003; Hillman et al., 1998; Thomson, 2005; Adler, 2001; Catalyst, 2007; 
Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003). These findings in conjunction with the results of 
the analysis presented in chapter 6 and 7 suggest that companies wishing to utilise the 
broadened talent pool made available by including women in the total market for 
directorial talent and consequently reap the many benefits they offer, should consider the 
broader institutional environment within which they operate when composing their board. 
Companies operating in countries found to have an institutional environment less 
conducive to female board participation should be mindful of the additional hurdles 
encountered by women harbouring board ambitions in these countries. Where the national 
institutional environment is less conducive to furthering women’s directorial ambitions, 
firms should be especially mindful of their board recruitment practices and take the steps 
necessary to ensure women are offered a fair chance, e.g. by instituting a nomination 
committee (preferably be with women serving on it), consider employing professional 
search and selection companies and consider professional spheres outside the private sector 
that may similarly offer well qualified female board talent.  
 
The finding that where women constitute a larger share of the total employee base for a 
given industry they are also more broadly represented at board level, suggests industry 
interest organisations and other sector related associations may have an important role to 
play in attracting more female employees into industries where women make up a smaller 
part of the employee base. The gender demography of the industry workforce may create 
both a pull and a push effect, as regard the gender composition of corporate boards. In light 
of the suggestion that women corporate board directors have an important role to play as 
role models for younger ambitious women (Thomson, 2005); they may also serve to attract 
women to industries where they are less widely represented at the rank-and-file level. 
Conversely, where women make up a larger share of the employee base, there is similarly 
a larger share of women who accumulate the necessary skills and experiences to progress 
up the executive ladder, and this may attract still further women to the industry and its 
corporate board (Konrad et al., 2008).  
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At the firm level, the finding that board directors’ age influence the board’s gender 
demography suggests boards and CEOs committed to broadening the gender profile of he 
board should similarly consider the age of the board’s directors. Board directors’ age was 
hypothesised to influence the prevalence of female board directors on the basis that age has 
been found to create salient bonds between cohorts and act as a basis for out-group bias, 
which in turn has been associated with homosocial reproduction. Chapter 8 illustrated the 
importance of adopting a nomination committee to intervene in these interpersonal 
processes which have been found to play an important role in preventing women from 
acquiring corporate board directorships (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Westphal and Stern, 
2006. 2007; Westphal and Milton, 2000).  
  
Theoretical contributions 
The biggest theoretical contribution offered by this thesis is the testing of the efficacy of 
institutional theory in accounting for the prevalence of women on the board. Scott’s (1995) 
synthesis of three institutional pillars was not specifically designed to account for board -
related phenomena, yet the framework proved helpful in accounting for cross-national and 
multi-level variation, underlying the inherent strength of Scott’s (1995) synthesis. 
Adopting an institutional theory for this thesis extended our understanding of where it may 
offer helpful insights and pushed the theoretical boundaries of board research, showing that 
broader theoretical views that extend beyond the immediate board remit should be 
considered as a valuable addition to the theoretical arsenal employed in future board 
research. In particular, an interesting conceptual approach may be to combine the insights 
from resource dependence theory with institutional theory the notion of corporate boards 
co-opting their institutional environment through mimetic or normative isomorphism.  
 
The insights offered by homosocial reproduction when applied to the adoption of 
nomination committees suggested there are important interpersonal processes at play that 
without concerted interventions may well continue to perpetuate an all-male board. The 
finding that nomination committees, and the gender composition of the nomination 
committee, accelerated the rate at which women subsequently attained board seats, 
underlined the need to further our understanding of how these process operate, both when 
they appear to favour men and when they appear to favour women.  
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A final interesting theoretical observation was made in the course of the exploration of the 
role played by national institutions for the prevalence of women on the board of MNCs, 
and the observation that more international firms reflected more of their national 
institutional characteristics than did less international firms. Institutional theory according 
to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) would suggest that firms requirement for legitimacy, 
would result in isomorphic pressures for firms to show sensitivity to issues of diversity on 
the boards of their largest companies. However, there is little evidence to suggest that this 
is indeed happening; rather the trend appears to be for continued divergence both within 
and across countries and industries. This has implications for non-legislative initiatives 
aimed at redressing the gender balance on corporate boards. Countries that adopt a 
voluntary approach to corporate governance matters, such as gender diversity on their 
corporate boards, may record an overall rise the prevalence of female directors. However 
,such a trend may be masked by some industries taking a more proactive approach to 
making their boards gender heterogeneous, whilst others make little or no effort to recruit 
female corporate board directors. Although the overall national trend would be for 
increased corporate board diversity, some industries might still fail to recruit from the full 
potential talent pool, which could lead to sub-optimal performance. 
 
Limitations 
As is true for any empirical study of significant magnitude, this thesis suffers from some 
notable limitations. As was noted in chapter 2, much of the extant literature on women 
corporate board directors is based on inconsistent samples, and as illustrated in chapter 4, 
much research has relied on relatively small sample sizes. In conducting the research for 
this thesis, the reason for this persistent shortcoming in the literature became apparent. 
Data availability across nations was frequently found to be inconsistent or lacking 
altogether. Where obvious and large flaws were noticed, remedial work was conducted 
such as building a database from scratch for the prevalence of women on the board in 
India, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Chile. However time restrictions and language issues 
prevented exploration of some notable regions such as the Middle East and South Asia. 
Organisations such as the European Commission track the prevalence of women on the 
board on a yearly basis, which proved a useful source and a means of triangulating data 
from BoardEx. However, other parts of the world not covered by the European 
Commission’s data, remain unaccounted for.  
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Sampling issues were not just evident at the national level extracting industry and firm 
level data that was consistent and reliable were often problematic. At the industry level in 
particular, it was virtually impossible to obtain consistently reported figures. Whilst the 
World Bank and various research agencies associated with the United Nations, and the 
United Nations themselves carry out annual or bi-annual data collection exercises, some 
countries and some industries are noticeably more diligent in their data provision than 
others.  
 
At the firm level, although the use of information sources like Datastream made sampling 
easier, it was often the case that the smaller trading economies had fewer entries and less 
consistently reported data. For example, nomination committee data were only available 
for the US, which restricted this particular analysis to one country. Despite these 
limitations, the research presented here in all likelihood represent the most systematic and 
comprehensive research on women’s share of corporate board directorships to date.  
 
An obvious “missing link” in this research is the absence of the voice of the women 
concerned themselves. As alluded to in chapter 8, a shortcoming of much statistical work is 
the inability to observe the process, but merely witness an outcome. In particular, what this 
research fails to account for is the rather fundamental question, ‘do women want corporate 
board directorships?’ It is implicitly assumed in this research that qualified career-
orientated women covet corporate board positions. This may not always be the case. 
Research suggests women may decide on alternate careers that are equally fulfilling, but do 
not involve the politics and profile of corporate board directorships (Burke and Mattis, 
2000; Sing et al., 2001). If that is the case, institutional context may only be part of a much 
broader explanation for the persistent absence of women on the board. 
 
Directions for future research 
These limitations offer some exciting avenues for future research. A consistently built and 
updated international database of women’s prevalence on the board reflecting firm level 
detail would enable researchers to continue to push the boundaries of scholarship in this 
important area still further. However, whilst such a feat is perhaps beyond a humble 
researcher, and better left to the likes of BoardEx, collecting data at the national level for 
some of the countries currently not covered by these commercial data providers, would be 
a useful starting point. Given the large variation observed across predominantly European 
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countries in chapter 5, it can be expected that similar variations are observed in other 
regions, such as South Asia. The emphasis on large listed firms in scholarly literature that 
addresses the role and place of women on the board might be contributing to suppressing 
the real extent of cross-national differences in the prevalence of women on the board. The 
literature would benefit from an understanding of how the institutional context differs, if at 
all for small firms. As the vast majority of the world’s firms is not listed, understanding the 
dynamics surrounding the boards’ composition of these firms may arguably bring more 
benefits to women who wish to acquire board directorships, as the size of the corporate 
universe of unlisted firms offers many more board seats for which women can vie.  
 
The data inconsistency was not only evident for the dependent variable, percentage women 
on the board. Some of the independent variables were also less consistently available. For 
example, the absence of data on numerous aspects of country welfare systems may limit 
this analysis. Future work may benefit from assessing the degree to which welfare 
provisions such as adequate childcare facilities matter for whether women attain board 
directorships. 
 
Further research, possibly of a more phenomenological nature, can add important insights 
into the prevalence of women on the corporate board of directors by addressing the issue of 
motivation. Understanding what motivates women to pursue board directorships, or 
alternatively, what makes women decide not to seek board responsibility can help further 
our understanding of why board seats continue to be predominantly occupied by men. If 
women are found not covet corporate board responsibility, this adds another dimension to 
the wider explanation for why women continue to occupy noticeably fewer board seats 
than men.   
 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) posited that to understand corporate boards, their dynamics, 
structure, impact and processes, a multi-theoretical perspective is necessary. Combining 
institutional theory with insights from other board theories or theories borrowed from 
sociology and social psychology may help complete the conceptual picture. 
  
9.5. Chapter summary 
This chapter had two core objectives: to evaluate the contributions and relevance of the 
thesis with reference to the gaps identified in literature in chapter 2 and to suggest new and 
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valuable directions for further research.  There were three substantial gaps in the literature, 
which stemmed from restricted geographic focus in extant research, lack of international 
comparative data on the evolving pattern of female board participation and an absence of 
empirical research considering the wider institutional context in accounting for women on 
the board. This thesis has comprehensively addressed these gaps in the literature, and in 
doing so made important contributions to scholarship on women board directors.  
The context within which a firm operates is an important factor in accounting for women 
on the board, and the adoption of institutional theory as articulated by Scott (1995) proved 
an important addition to the extant literature on women board directors, which may now 
benefit from a more holistic view of what determines the gender composition of corporate 
boards globally.  
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